Gender, Alienation, and Dignity in Global Slums by Luttrell, Johanna
  
 
GENDER, ALIENATION, AND DIGNITY IN GLOBAL SLUMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
JOHANNA LUTTRELL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION 
 
Presented to the Department of Philosophy 
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy  
 
September 2013 
  ii 
DISSERTATION APPROVAL PAGE 
 
Student: Johanna Cathleen Luttrell 
 
Title: Gender, Alienation, and Dignity in Global Slums 
 
This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in the Department of Philosophy by: 
 
Dr. Naomi Zack Co-Chairperson 
Dr. Cheyney Ryan Co-Chairperson 
Dr. Bonnie Mann Core Member 
Dr. Eileen Otis Institutional Representative 
 
and 
 
Kimberly Andrews Espy Vice President for Research and Innovation; 
 Dean of the Graduate School  
 
Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School. 
 
Degree awarded September 2013 
  
  iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2013 Johanna Luttrell 
 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No 
Derivs (United States) License. 
  iv 
DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Johanna C. Luttrell 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Philosophy 
 
September 2013 
 
Title: Gender, Alienation, and Dignity in Global Slums 
 
This dissertation is a philosophical inquiry into the problem of the slums that 
develop in and around large cities in the Global South, considered in the context of 
globalization.  I argue first that theories of global justice must consider this new human 
condition engendered by the global slums; second, that the language of alienation and 
dignity is crucial to conceptions of global poverty; third, that this alienation is in large 
part predicated on the exploitation of women’s labor; and finally, that this dignitarian 
response to alienation is a critical addition to the Capabilities Approach. 
 
  v 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
NAME OF AUTHOR:  Johanna C. Luttrell 
 
 
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: 
 
 University of Oregon, Eugene 
 University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom 
 DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois 
  
 
 
DEGREES AWARDED: 
 
 Doctor of Philosophy, 2013, University of Oregon 
 Master of Arts, 2011, University of Oregon 
 Bachelor of Arts, 2006, DePaul University 
  
 
 
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: 
 
 Social and Political Philosophy 
  
 Feminist Philosophy 
 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: 
 
Graduate Teaching Fellow, the Savage Endowment for International Relations 
and Peace, 2011-2013  
  
 
Graduate Teaching Fellow, Department of Philosophy and Department of Women 
and Gender Studies, 2007-2013 
 
 
GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS: 
 
Dissertation Fellowship, Wayne Morse Center for Law and Politics, University of 
Oregon, 2011 
 
 Fellowship, Oregon University System- Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship 
Fund, University of Oregon, 2010 
 
  vi 
 
PUBLICATIONS: 
 
Luttrell, Johanna.  “John Berger”, The Encyclopedia of Global Justice, ed. Deen   
K. Chatterjee, Springer, 2010. 72-74. 
 
 
 
 
 
  vii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I wish to express sincere thanks to my co-chairs, Dr. Naomi Zack and Dr. 
Cheyney Ryan, for their inspiring mentorship.  I also would like to thank the members of 
my committee, Dr. Eileen Otis and Dr. Bonnie Mann, for their clearheaded support and 
guidance. This project was made possible a dissertation fellowship from the Wayne 
Morse Center for Law and Politics at the University of Oregon, as well as the Oregon 
University System- Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund. 
 
  
  viii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I dedicate this work to my parents, Anthony and Jan Luttrell, for all their support during 
graduate school. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ix 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
 
 
I. THE PICTURE OF POVERTY TODAY: URBAN SLUMS IN THE GLOBAL     
SOUTH  ......................................................................................................................  1 
 
 1.1. Overview ........................................................................................................  1 
 1.2. Slums on a Global Scale ................................................................................  4 
 
 1.3. Avoiding Being Killed: Port-au-Prince and São Paulo ..................................  17 
 
      1.4. Finding Work: Rio de Janiero and Nogales ...................................................     20 
      1.5. Gaining Respect: Mumbai .............................................................................  24 
 1.6. A Response to Global Poverty .......................................................................  27 
 
II. WOMEN’S WORK AND ASSETS ......................................................................  31 
 2.1. Overview ........................................................................................................  31 
      2.2. Instrumentalizing Women’s Labor for Neoliberal Expansion .......................  32 
 
     2.3. Exploiting Women’s Labor in the Global Economy: The Third Shift ...........  35 
 
     2.4. Getting Out of Poverty: Asset Accumulation .................................................  47 
     2.5. Conclusion  .................................................................................................  50 
 
  III. JUSTICE, GLOBAL JUSTICE, AND POVERTY ............................................  52 
    3.1. Overview ..........................................................................................................  52 
    3.2. Justice ...............................................................................................................  53 
    3.3. Global Justice: The State of Theory .................................................................  55 
  x 
 Chapter                                                                                        Page 
 
    3.4. Political Contract Theory’s Response to Economic Liberalization .................  56 
 
    3.5. Liberalism in Light of Globalization ...............................................................  61 
     3.6. The Blind Spot of Liberalism .........................................................................  67 
     3.7. The Limits of the Contractarian Approach .....................................................  69 
     3.8. David Hume: Justice as Contract for the Protection of Property ....................     80 
 
     3.9.  Aristotle: Distributive Justice and the Suspicion of Profit .............................  84 
 
     3.10. Contract and Virtue: Comparing Hume and Aristotle ..................................  89 
     3.11. John Stuart Mill: Justice as Sentiment that Precedes Law ............................  90 
 
     3.12. Amartya Sen: Comparative Theories of Justice ............................................  93 
     3.13. A Consolidated Vision of Justice Appropriate to the GSUS ........................  95 
 
     3.14. A Responsibility for Justice ..........................................................................  97 
     3.15. Conclusion ....................................................................................................  100 
 
IV. ALIENATION ......................................................................................................  102 
     4.1. Overview .........................................................................................................  102 
     4.2. A Definition of Alienation, in Light of the Urban Slums of the Global  
 South  .............................................................................................................   103 
 
     4.3. Arendt as a Critical Reader of Marx ...............................................................  108 
     4.4. The Importance of the World ..........................................................................  115 
     4.5. Elaine Scarry on the Making of the World .....................................................  126 
     4.6. Alienation as Critical to Theorizing Global Poverty ......................................  135 
 
V. DIGNITY ...............................................................................................................  148 
  xi 
    Chapter                                                                                                                      Page 
     5.1. Overview .........................................................................................................  148 
     5.2. Why Alienation is Not Enough .......................................................................  149 
     5.3. Dignity in Law and Activism: An Overlapping Consensus ............................   156 
     5.4. Roman and Hebrew Responses to Slavery .....................................................  162 
     5.5. The Complicated Inheritance of Kant .............................................................  175 
     5.6. Dignity as Autonomy and Authority ...............................................................  178 
     5.7. Authority as the Capability to Create the World ............................................  184 
 
VI. CONCLUSION: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAPABILITIES  
APPROACH ...............................................................................................................  196 
 
     6.1. Overview .........................................................................................................  196 
     6.2. The Capabilities Approach as a Response to Global Poverty .........................   196 
 
REFERENCES CITED ...............................................................................................  204
  1 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
THE PICTURE OF POVERTY TODAY: URBAN SLUMS IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH 
 
 
“The anticipated shift from a predominantly rural world to a predominantly 
urban one is now a reality, forcing us to rethink our most basic paradigms, not 
only paradigms of the urban condition but of the human condition as well.” 
- Janice Perlman 1 
 
“The cities of the future, rather than being made out of glass and steel as 
envisioned by earlier generations of urbanists, are instead largely constructed out 
of crude brick, straw, recycled plastic, cement blocks, and scrap wood.  Instead of 
cities of light soaring toward heaven, much of the twenty-first century urban 
world squats in squalor, surrounded by pollution, excrement, and decay.  Indeed 
the one billion city-dwellers who inhabit postmodern slums might well look back 
with envy at the ruins of the sturdy mud homes of Çatal Hüyük in Anatolia, 
erected at the very dawn of city life nine thousand years ago.” 
- Mike Davis 2 
 
1.1. Overview 
 
Having lived and worked in the slums of Guayaquil, Ecuador, I have witnessed 
the results of the last three decades, in which industrial poverty has been exported and 
expanded to the Global South. Slums have developed on the outskirts of large cities, 
expanding at a scale previously unknown in human history. International trade 
agreements have made life unsustainable in many rural areas, and, in hope of finding 
work, people move to cities and settle on the hillsides, fields, farmlands and garbage 
dumps in the surrounding areas; they set up temporary communities in ramshackle 
dwellings that fail to adequately provide reasonable standards of living.  The 
development that creates and maintains this transience has been sold, in great measure, 
under the banner of liberation for women --- because most of the global slums employees 
                                                
1 Janice Perlman. Favela: Four Decades of Living on the Edge in Rio de Janeiro.  Oxford: Oxford UP,   
2010. 41. 
 
2 Mike Davis.  Planet of Slums.  New York and London: Verso, 2006. 19. 
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are female. Women’s inclusion in the work force is generally billed as a positive 
development in a culture’s progress toward gender equality, and employers have 
capitalized on this sentiment to hire women on the basis of the prevailing ideology that 
women will work harder for less pay. At the same time, the ‘inclusion’ of women in the 
workforce has not lessened the expectation, in many places, that women remain primarily 
and unequally responsible for care of the families. 
In Chapter I, then, I use women’s personal narratives, long-term sociological 
studies and journalistic accounts, and statistical analysis from the United Nations to 
locate the subject of my inquiry, and convey how people are presently living in these 
slums.  
In the second chapter, I argue that the alienation of the global slums is fueled by 
the exploitation of women’s labor.  I use sociological research, especially Sylvia Chant’s 
work, to show the ways in which global capitalism appropriates the second wave feminist 
insight that women should be members of the workforce while simultaneously 
accommodating the anti-feminist position that women should remain primary caretakers 
of the family. I show how some practices of globalization that drive migration to the 
slums often leave poor women with ever increasing responsibility, and ever decreasing 
support.  I also use Caroline Moser’s work to show how the way out of poverty is based 
on the accumulation of private property.   
In Chapter III, I argue that visions of global justice which rely on contractarian 
premises alone are an insufficient response to global poverty, because the model of 
connectivity that relies on political states and contracts is outdated in a world of 
economic liberalization wherein the Global North profits by the labor of people in the 
Global South.  I argue that Aristotle’s conception of distributive justice that regards profit 
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as a threat to virtue is more appropriate for global justice than contractarian conceptions 
that regard justice as a function of securing profit and property.  Further, I maintain that 
John Stuart Mill’s understanding of justice as grounded in sentiment, antecedent to the 
formation of law, could be a plausible foundation for conceptions of contemporary global 
justice.  
Chapter IV draws from Hannah Arendt and Elaine Scarry to argue that global 
justice theorists should use the language of alienation, in addition to the language of 
rights and obligations, to characterize the conditions of life in urban slums. With Arendt 
and Scarry, I characterize alienation as the loss of the world, that is, the depravation of 
durable material structures and lasting institutions that are the preconditions for political 
speech and action. The language of alienation provides a first-person perspective that 
evidences how the problem of poverty is one of a lack of work, the kind of work that 
attests to people’s creativity, uniqueness, and dignity.  Further, the language of alienation 
describes the specific kind of vulnerability people suffer under global poverty, in a way 
that is missing from the predominant philosophical preoccupation with rights and duties. 
The fifth chapter shows that, in order to answer to alienation and gendered 
exploitation in the urban slums of the global south, political philosophy, international 
law, and development economics needs a more robust and precise account of human 
dignity.  Here, then, I define dignity in a way that counters the prevailing logic of utility 
which assumes that people, women in particular, are means to an end of economic growth 
and not ends in themselves. Inspired by a disagreement between Jürgen Habermas and 
Jeremy Waldron on the origins of the concept of dignity in Western law, I have 
consolidated an intellectual history of dignity that incorporates both the notion of dignity 
as inalienable worth regardless of social status, which is found in Kant as well as early 
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Hebraic law, with Roman law’s notion of dignity as status, dependent upon social 
recognition. I use this new, robust notion of dignity as both autonomy and authority to 
critique the instrumentalization of the global poor.  I contend that dignity is both, like the 
Existentialists’ idea of freedom, a fact and an achievement. The union of autonomy and 
authority is best expressed in people’s creation of a world, in the dignity of being able to 
manifest oneself in one’s lasting and shared creation.  
Finally, in the conclusion, I show how this dignitarian response to alienation 
contributes to the Capabilities Approach, as articulated the works of Martha Nussbaum 
and Amartya Sen. Nussbaum describes the Capabilities Approach as having Marxist and 
Aristotelean intellectual roots, mentions meaningful work as one of the essential 
capabilities, and justifies the approach by an appeal to an intuitive idea of human dignity. 
My account strengthens the Capabilities Approach by providing intellectual justifications 
that have been lacking so far. 
This first chapter is a description of areas of urban poverty in what is commonly 
termed ‘the global south’.  The purpose is to convey the ways in which people live in the 
slums: how their houses are constructed, how they might spend their days, work, and 
create communities.  My aim here is solely to set the scene, that is, locate the object of 
inquiry for the theoretical account that is to come later.  I use women’s personal 
narratives, and long-term sociological studies and journalistic accounts of life in global 
south urban slums [henceforth referred to in this work as GSUS], as well as statistical 
analysis from the United Nations.  Although this dissertation, is a theoretical work 
informed by empirical research, the matter of international poverty is not, as some 
philosophy takes it to be, a purely theoretical problem. Thus, the purpose of this chapter 
  5 
is to show in narrative form, and from the perspectives of women, the hardship of living 
in these places. 
 
1.2. Slums on a Global Scale 
Since the 1960s, the world has seen the industrial poverty that once characterized 
much of life in 19th century Europe exported and expanded to the Global South. 
Urbanization has increased almost everywhere, and slums are expanding at a scale 
previously unknown in human history.3  As Mike Davis describes it in Planet of Slums, 
the scale and velocity of this change utterly surpasses the scale of the slums in Victorian 
Europe.  “London in 1910,” Davis writes, “was seven times larger that it has been in 
1800, but Dhaka, Kinshasa, and Lagos today are each approximately forty times larger 
than they were in 1950.”4  We, in the discourse of the academic West, have inherited our 
ideas on poverty and urban slums from Victorian Europe, while it was reeling from the 
repercussions of the Industrial Revolution and from the early twentieth century flood of 
immigration into the United States.  These descriptions, typified first by Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels, Charles Dickens, and later Jane Addams in the United States, give a 
sense of what poverty was like in the Western urban centers of the past.  What is 
happening now, however, in terms of global migration into urban centers far from 
London or Chicago, utterly outstrips the conventions of our discourse on the matter. 
                                                
3 United Nations.  The Challenge of the Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements, New York: UN-
Habitat.  2003. xxxi.  Also: “Rapid urbanization, one of the greatest socio-economic changes during the last 
five decades or so, has caused the burgeoning of new kinds of slums, the growth of squatter and informal 
housing all around the rapidly expanding cities of the developing world. Urban populations have increased 
explosively in the past 50 years, and will continue to do so for at least the next 30 years as the number of 
people born in cities increase and as people continue to be displaced from rural areas that are almost at 
capacity.” (xxxi) 
 
4 Davis, 11.  Davis terms this event, the first time the urban population of the earth outnumbers the rural, a 
watershed in human history, comparable in significance to the Neolithic or Industrial Revolutions. (1) 
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As the urban centers in the global south expand, cities are bursting at their seams.  
These cities have neither planning nor organization to house and support the influx of 
people that settle within their bounds, with the result that enormous slums develop on 
their outskirts. The 2003 UN Global Report on Human Settlements on The Problem of 
the Slums reports: “In 2001, 924 million people, or 31.6 percent of the world’s urban 
population, lived in slums.  The majority of them were in the developing regions, 
accounting for 43 percent of the urban population, in contract to the 6 percent in more 
developed regions.”5  Further, “It is projected that in the next 30 years, the global number 
of slum dwellers will increase to about 2 billion . . .” 6 The UN calls this  phenomena, the 
explosive growth of cities in developing countries,  ‘the new urban revolution’.  It is 
unprecedented in human history; “Every year, the world’s urban population is increasing 
by about 70 million, equivalent to 7 new megacities.” 7This shift is equal to seven new 
New York Cities growing every nine months.  Again, this massive shift is geographically 
specific: urbanization is not increasing at this scale in the United States and Europe; it is 
only happening in the cities of the global south.   
This new urbanization is different than previous mass migrations to the cities, 
both in reasons and form.  In fin de siècle19th century America, during the age of 
immigration in New York and Chicago, people moved to tenements in ethnic enclaves, 
drawn from their native countries by the promise of work.  Now, urban migrants are as 
much being pulled to the cities as pushed out of the country.  As Davis notes, 
“Overurbanization . . . is driven by the reproduction of poverty, not by the supply of 
                                                
5 UN-Habitat, xxvi 
 
6 ibid. 
 
7 ibid. 
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jobs.”8  Migrants move less to tenements inside the city, and more to previously unsettled 
or unwanted land surrounding the city.  Their neighborhoods are not often ethnically 
homogenous, but rather quite ethnically diverse. Nineteenth and twentieth century 
theorists of urbanization such as Karl Marx and Max Weber, predicted that the large 
cities of the future would more or less resemble London or Chicago, in that they would 
be industrialized.  This has not happened.  Davis writes that the great cities of today are 
more like Victorian Dublin than Victorian London, a city on the periphery of power, 
where the slums were not produced by the Industrial Revolution but by de-
industrialization.  The cities of the GSUS may have large, industrial factories that can 
offer rural farm families relatively better opportunities, but more often they do not.  
Regardless of whether there are or are not jobs in the cities of the global south, and 
further, whether or not the jobs that exist provide any semblance of reasonable livelihood, 
people keep coming, often despite, the lack of jobs and connection to the new global 
economy.9  
Who are these migrants that leave their ‘homelands’ and risk their livelihoods in 
the bustling, disorienting urban slums? Perlman writes that it is both the destitute that 
come to the city, and the country’s ‘best and brightest.’  “Some of these migrants,” she 
notes, “are “pushed” off the land by starvation, subjugation, and suffering, just as others 
are “pulled” toward the city by the lure of opportunity.  In either case, the argument that 
cutting off housing or social services for the poor will discourage migrants from coming 
to the city has proven spurious.  Even as unemployment has risen, squatters have been 
                                                
8 Davis, 16. 
9 I will give a more thorough account as to what is fueling this process, that is, why it is that people are 
pushed, rather than pulled, into cities, in Chapter II, when I discuss the role that neo-liberalism has played it 
the global economy.   
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forced to the peripheries, and violence has become the norm; people keep coming and 
what they are leaving behind is worse.”10  No matter the lack of infrastructure, 
preparedness, or support for migrants in the cities, the rate of urbanization is not slowing; 
people continue to come. 
 Cities of the global south are adopting millions of new residents each year, so 
that it seems they have reached a saturation point, in terms of their capacity to supply 
goods, services, and jobs to the migrants who set up squatter and informal housing 
structures. The UN writes: 
The world is rapidly moving toward ‘maximum urbanization’, which has 
already largely been completed in Europe and North and South America.  
Mostly, the population growth will be absorbed by the cities of the developing 
world, which will double in size by 2030.  Three-quarters of the growth will 
be in cities with populations of 1 to 5 million or in smaller cities under 
500,000 people.  There is little or no planning to accommodate these people or 
provide them with services.11 
 
People migrate to the cities most often because their livelihoods in the countries have 
become unsustainable.  However, all too often, their livelihoods in the cities do not 
substantially improve.  They set up informal housing or squatter settlements, outside or 
beyond the sphere of city-provided goods and services.  Priscilla Connolly observes that 
in Mexico City “as much as 60 percent of the city’s growth is the result of people, 
especially women, heroically building their own dwellings on unserviced peripheral land, 
while informal subsistence work has always accounted for a large proportion of total 
employment.”12  Migrants, many times women, build dwellings that do not meet hygienic 
or secure housing standards.  Often, when people first arrive in the slum, if they do not 
                                                
10 Perlman, 44. 
 
11 UN-Habitat, 3. 
 
12 Priscilla Connelly, “Mexico City: Our Common Future?”, Environment and Urbanization 11 (1999): 56. 
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have family already settled there with whom to live, they construct a temporary living 
space—a shack—out of whatever materials are available to them, often aluminum or tin 
sheets for a roof and cardboard for walls. In most GSUS, there is no plumbing; residents 
dig a hole for personal use.  Without plumbing, there is no running water.  To bathe, 
drink, and cook, residents will either transport water from rivers or lakes, dig a shallow 
well, or pay local private companies to buy tubs of water off of traveling water trucks. It 
is rare that local governments transport water to slum residents.  The local governments 
most often do not pick up trash, either, so trash is burned, buried, or discarded in 
unofficial trash dumps, which can be located precariously close to human dwellings.  The 
UN description of the situation reads: “The urban poor are trapped in an informal and 
“illegal” world---in slums that are not reflected on maps, where waste is not collected, 
where taxes are not paid and where public services are not provided.”13 The United 
Nations categorizes slums in two ways:  slums of hope and slums of despair, places 
where people are improving their livelihoods, however slowly, and expanding their 
neighborhoods, versus places where people are leaving and livelihoods are diminishing. 
The very notion of ‘slum’, coined in Victorian England, has changed in light of the 
proliferation of informal settlements in the global south.  Before, the definition of ‘slum’ 
was the earlier picture of urban tenements: housing that was once usable but is now 
degraded.  In other words, when Americans think of slums, they might think of the West 
Side of Chicago, or downtown Detroit: places where building that were once thriving 
now stand deserted and crumbling, next to large, empty lots taken over by drug dealers. 
The picture of slums in the global south is very different. Janice Perlman writes that 
                                                
13 UN-Habitat, 6. 
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unlike deteriorated areas in the global north, “there are no vacancies in favelas [Brazilian 
slums].  Every space is used, and most households rent out a room or use part of the 
home for day care, commerce, or manufacturing.”14  Often, single shacks house member 
of extended families, and multiple families share walls, appliances, outhouses, and 
workspaces. gain, according to the UN, the GSUS: 
… have come to include the vast and informal settlements that are quickly becoming 
the most visible expression of urban poverty in developing world cities, including 
squatter settlements and illegal subdivisions.  The quality of dwellings in such 
settlements varies from the simplest shack to permanent structures, while access to 
water, electricity, sanitation, and other basic services and infrastructure is usually 
limited.15 
 
The United Nations defines and characterizes slums in the negative, by lack of basic 
services, substandard housing or illegal and inadequate building structures, overcrowding 
and high density, unhealthy living conditions and hazardous locations, insecure tenure, 
poverty, and social exclusion.16  Of course, as Perlman and others who write about and 
live in the GSUS point out, actual life in these slums is not, and cannot, be defined 
merely by ‘lack.’  The people who live in these places, and the communities they create, 
can be lively, positive, and dignified.  Still, it makes sense in terms of global comparisons 
to employ the UN’s definition of the slums as areas with lack of basic services and 
substandard housing and social exclusion as a structural definition that calls for social 
change, but does not name people’s social identity. 
 
                                                
14 Perlman, 44 
 
15 UN-Habitat, 9 
 
16 ibid., 11 
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In the GSUS, both the space in which people live, and the work that people do, is 
‘informal’.  Of course, residents of the slum do all kinds of work. Most of the people who 
live in the colonias surrounding the Maquilas, [factories], on the US/Mexico border, for 
instance, are employed by the multi-national enterprises that run these factories.  Thus, 
their labor is formal.  Also, in places like Dongguan, China, most people move there 
specifically to work in multi-national factories, and their housing situations vary from 
informal squatting to formal, tenement-style renting, and dorm-style dwellings supported 
directly by the factories.17  In addition to the global factory-supported slum, there are 
slums that exist despite the noted lack of global enterprise to undergird people’s incomes.  
Thus many people in the GSUS work in the so-called ‘informal sector’.   While there is 
not a sharp divide between formal and informal work, e.g., it is difficult to make a 
meaningful distinction between, say, contracted part-time work as a security guard at a 
Wal-Mart subsidiary and a hand-shake agreement for security guard work on the premise 
of a family grocery store, Davis concludes that “the majority of the slum dwelling 
laboring poor are truly and radically homeless in the contemporary international 
economy.”18 
In a similar vein, Donald Krueckenber remarks  “Marx would probably be 
shocked to find how in developing countries much of the teeming mass does not consist 
of oppressed legal proletarians but of oppressed extralegal small entrepreneurs.”19  If 
there is a crisis in capitalism in this era, it is, first, geographically specific, and second, its 
                                                
17 See Chang, Leslie T. Factory Girls: From Villiage to City in a Changing China. New York: Spiegel and 
Grau,  2009. 
18 Davis, 178 
 
19 Krueckenber, Donald.  “The Lessons of John Locke or Hernando de Soto: What if your dreams come 
true?”, Housing Policy Debate 15 (2004): 2. 
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historical subject includes formal factory workers and informal entrepreneurs, domestic 
laborers, drug dealers, and trash pickers, amongst many others.  Davis adds: “All 
together, the global informal working class (overlapping with but non-identical to the 
slum population) is about one billion strong, making it the fastest-growing, and most 
unprecedented, social class on earth.”20  The economies that exist ‘horizontally’ between 
people themselves living in the GSUS in contrast to the ‘vertical’ economies that link 
people within the privileged parts of globalization, are complex and the people who 
survive in them are extraordinarily innovative and resourceful.  However, often the 
informal economies do not provide a security net or long-term, sustainable hope for 
improvement of livelihoods. 
Frederic Thomas describes the fragmented nature of work in an ‘informal sector’, 
in Calcutta: 
 
Three or four persons dividing a task which could be as well done by one, 
market women sitting for hours in front of little piles of fruit or vegetables, 
barbers and shoeshiners squatting on the sidewalk all day to serve only a 
handful of customers, young boys dodging in and out of traffic selling 
tissues, wiping car windows, hawking magazines or cigarettes 
individually, construction workers waiting each morning, often in vain, in 
the hope of going out on the job.21 
 
The sparseness of informal work, and the fits and starts that characterize the flow of cash 
in the informal arena, hurt many residents of the GSUS, harming women and children, 
especially.  Jan Breman and Arvind Das claim that informality—in both space and 
                                                
20 Davis, 173 
 
21 Frederic C. Thomas, Calcutta Poor: Elegies on a City Above Pretense, New York: M.E. Sharpe,  1997. 
114 
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work—ensures the extreme abuse of women and children.22  Out of public view, out of 
the purview of community and family members who watch out for one another, such 
informal women and children workers bear the heaviest burden of poverty.  Poverty is 
thus not shared equally amongst all residents of a certain geographical area and the 
hierarchies of poverty are reproduced in the private space of the home. 
Given that the slums are so large in both geographical space and population, they 
are no longer a mere ‘accident’ or unfortunate side effect of what we know to be global 
urbanization.  Rather, the GSUS, and their problems are the heart of the contemporary 
global city of the South.  As Perlman writes, “Favelas are not the shadow side of the city; 
rather, the city is the shadow side of the favelas.”23  Furthermore, we are not merely 
talking about geographical space here, but the contributions of human beings to the 
livelihoods—the lifeblood—of the cities and societies. Perlman’s decades-long study on 
the favelas of Rio de Janeiro “revealed that the residents of favelas are not “marginal” to 
society but tightly integrated into it, albeit in an asymmetrical manner.  They give a lot 
and receive very little.”24  Favela residents support the communities in all kinds of ways, 
both in terms of formal and informal labor.  Most of Perlman’s subjects work as domestic 
laborers for the city’s middle- and upper-class residents. They are cooks, cleaners, 
nannies, and maids.  They do essential work for the maintenance of other people’s 
households, and get very little back for it.  They do not receive adequate payment for 
their services, mostly because there are no enforceable living wage standards in countries 
                                                
22  Breman, Jan and Arvind Das, Down and Out: Laboring Under Global Capitalism, New Delhi: Oxford 
UP, 2000. 56.   
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that house the GSUS, and so poor residents cannot build their houses to make them 
secure from violence, natural disasters, or expulsion.   
Perlman concludes that the favelas of Rio are a paradigmatic example of what is 
happening around the world.  That is, not only is the world becoming more urbanized, but 
at the same time, urban areas are becoming poorer.  This is the radical shift of our era: not 
only urbanization as such, but also widespread, unprecedented suffering alongside 
urbanization.  Before this shift of recent decades, the worst poverty and most severe 
suffering occurred in rural areas.  25  This historical change not only ‘says something 
about them’, i.e., the residents of the GSUS or the so-called ‘global poor’, but it says 
something about ‘us’, too---we the residents of the global north and citizens of 
democratic institutions.  For just as the slums are not marginal to the city, so these cities 
are not marginal to the world, or to the human condition.  The reality of the contemporary 
GSUS is changing the meaning of the human condition. 
 
 What do these residents of the GSUS need?  First, they need to escape from 
poverty.  The ways in which that happens are not, as some social scientists might imply, 
extremely difficult to determine.  Katherine Boo, writing on the slum dwellers in 
Mumbai, comments: “As every slum dweller knew, there were three main ways out of 
poverty: finding an entrepreneurial niche, politics and corruption, and education.”26  
However, the difficulty lies not in naming these means but in practically implementing 
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them.   An apt question might be: what is preventing the global poor from achieving 
entrepreneurial, political, and educational foothold?   
 In conjunction with information from a Life magazine reporter, Perlman 
conducted a longitudinal survey of the residents of one favela in Rio, wherein she asked, 
simply, what the community needed.  She gave the same survey, to the same 
neighborhood, in 1961 and then again in 2001.  The self-reported results were remarkably 
similar over the course of 40 years:  
  
What the Catacumba residents said they most needed in 1961 included: a 
community center where they could meet and conduct civic activities; a 
crèche [day-care cooperative]; a better school for their children; medical 
and maternal clinics; literacy classes; job training; and a police station to 
“control the dope peddlers and criminals. 
More than 30 years later, at the meeting of the surviving 
Catacumba residents and their descendants, the list was as follows: A 
cultural center; an autonomous residents’ association; a crèche; a better 
school for children and adolescents; full day schooling and social 
programs; preparatory courses for university entrance exams; a health 
clinic; a place for sports, leisure, and culture; work cooperatives for the 
manufacture and sale of products; courses on information technology and 
other professional skills; and help for senior citizens.27 
 
The only differences Perlman noted over 40 years was that people stopped wanting a 
police station in the neighborhood, because they had lost faith in an increasingly corrupt 
police force.  Also, they wanted university training for their children, because several 
children from the neighborhood had made it to college in the intervening years and they 
realized they needed to know more about technology to enter the formal workforce.  The 
sort of institutional support that residents desired—in the form of active schools, 
community centers, social support for senior citizens remained remarkably stable over the 
course of decades. 
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Javier Ayero and Deborah Alejandro Swistun came to similar findings,  based on 
what poor residents self-report needing, in their study of the Flammable slum in Buenos 
Aires, Argentina. Auyero and Swistun gave local elementary school students in 
Flammable disposable cameras, and they asked them to take pictures of things they liked 
and things they did not like, in and around their neighborhood. Ayero and Swistun report:  
The concurrence among the groups was striking: among the things they like were 
people (most of the pictures classified by them as “good” portrayed friends and 
family) and institutions (pictures of the church, the school, the health center).  
Yet, even when they placed the school among the “good” pictures, during the 
interviews they did not fail to notice its dilapidated condition  . . . Overall, the 
students stress they didn’t like the “bad” pictures because they show how dirty 
and contaminated their barrio is.28 
  
With remarkable similarity, the students demonstrated, though the pictures, that they 
‘liked’ their friends and family, and the local institutions.  They disliked the state of 
disrepair in which these institutions stood and the general lack of institutions in the 
neighborhood: garbage dumps where there could be schools, empty and contaminated 
lots where there could be community centers. 
 So, the beginnings of an answer to the question as to what is preventing people 
from escaping poverty and improving their livelihoods, is not the lack of community per 
se, but the lack of thriving communal institutions.  Ayero and Swistun note that in 
Flammable, residents are so consumed by their daily lives, their individual health and 
their family members’ health, that they cannot themselves form the basic institutions that 
would serve as steps out of subsistence living.  That is, they do not feel themselves 
empowered in the sense of connecting to either the cities or the global economy as a 
whole.  
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Lest it need be said, this lack of empowerment is not a moral failing on the part of 
poor people.  In her autobiography, Benedita da Silva, a woman born and raised in a 
favela, who went on to become the Brazil’s National Minister of Social Action, defined 
being poor as:  
 
Having only one set of clothing and washing it each night; not having 
enough food for the children; satisfying their hunger with a fried mixture 
of water and manioc to swell the stomach; sending them to sleep with 
cloth tied tightly around their bellies to reduce the hunger pains; sending 
them from door to door at the end of the month to ask for food or money; 
and using motor oil for cooking because it costs less than cooking oil.29  
 
Residents of GSUS have neither the time nor the resources to invest in what they 
themselves report that they really need, the social infrastructure that would function as 
stepping stones out of poverty.  When a mother is worried about where she can get cloth 
to tie her children’s bellies up at night so they will not feel their hunger, she can hardly 
worry about other people’s children or their elderly parents.  That is, she cannot invest 
her time and effort into building the long-term, institutional support it would take to lift 
her community out of poverty.  
Perlman writes, simply and profoundly, that the particular challenges of people 
who are currently living in the favela are “finding work, avoiding being killed, and 
finding respect.”30  Philosophers, theorizing about global poverty, have argued over 
whether global justice is a matter of equal distribution of goods and resources, or whether 
it is a matter of ‘recognition’, social respect and realization of identity. The truth is that 
global poverty, in the form of massive urban slums, is a matter of both distribution and 
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recognition.  But as a practical matter, for the poor, poverty is a problem of first, not 
getting killed, second, of finding work, and third, of maintaining one’s dignity.  It is 
important to theorize global justice along these practical lines. 
 
1.3. Avoiding Being Killed: Port-au-Prince and São Paulo 
Crime is a problem in almost every slum, but it is difficult to talk about crime in a 
universal way, as applied to all or most slums in the global south, because the extent of it 
varies so much in each context, according to time and location.  For instance, in 
Catacumba, the crime levels drastically changed during the time of Perlman’s study, 
depending upon the police presence, the level of bureaucratic corruption, and gang 
movement.  Furthermore, not every slum has gangs, or, for that matter, endemic drug 
problems.  So, one cannot generalize across place and time, about the level of violence 
characteristic of GSUS as an entity, even though violence might be the driving worry of 
some (many) slum residents.  
However, it can be said that trying to survive in the GSUS, even without the 
intrusion of violence, is difficult.  It is difficult to secure enough food to eat, and GSUS 
typically have severe sanitation deficiencies.  As Davis writes, “Today’s poor megacities- 
Nairobi, Lagos, Bombay, Dhaka, and so on- are stinking mountains of shit that would 
appall even the most hardened Victorians.”31  Slums often function as the dumping 
ground for the city’s recluse, including the cities industrial waste.  There is little 
government regulation of sanitation practices, or of the contamination of air, water, or 
soil. In most GSUS there are no sewage systems.  Because of these sanitation 
deficiencies, “Digestive-track diseases arising from poor sanitation and the pollution of 
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drinking water---including diarrhea, enteritis, colitis, typhoid, and paratyphoid fevers---
are the leading cause of death in the world, affecting mainly infants and small children.”32  
Open sewers rife with intestinal parasites, and cholera, a disease now unknown to the first 
world, continue unabated in the GSUS.  The diarrhea associated with AIDs puts the 
problem of poor sewage systems in an alarming light.  Because of the health problems 
caused by so many people living in such close quarters with few sanitation systems, 
Davis writes that, now, “The most extreme health differentials are no longer between 
towns and country sides, but between the urban middle class and the urban poor.”33  
GSUS are much more vulnerable to natural disasters, fire, and even predictable 
fluctuations in the weather.  Slum dwellers do not merely suffer from monsoons or 
hurricanes but from the annual rainy seasons.  Lovly Josaphat, a women who lives in Cité 
Soleil, Port-au-Prince’s largest slum, in Haiti, describes her experience of the annual 
rainy season: 
 
When it rains, the part of the Cité I live in floods and the water comes in the 
house.  There’s always water on the ground, green smelly water, and there are no 
paths.  The mosquitoes bite us.  My four-year-old has bronchitis, malaria, and 
even typhoid now . . . The doctor said to give him boiled water, not to give him 
food with grease, and not to let him walk in the water.  But the water’s 
everywhere; he can’t set foot outside the house without walking in it.  The doctor 
said that if I don’t take care of him, I’ll lose him.34 
 
 Brazilian writer Carolina María de Jesus gives a similar account of the hardships 
of the rainy season in her journals, “Children of the Dark”. 
 
December 25, Xmas Day (1958):  
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“João cam in saying he had a stomach ache.  I knew what it was for he had eaten a 
rotten melon.  Today they threw a truckload of melons near the river. 
 I don’t know why it is that these senseless businessmen come to throw their rotted 
products near the favela, for the children to see and eat. 
 In my opinion the merchants of São Paulo are playing with the people just like 
Caesar when he tortured the Christians.  But the Caesars of today are worse than the 
Caesar of the past.  The others were punished for their faith.  And we, for our hunger! 
 In that era those who didn’t want to die had to stop loving Christ. 
 But we cannot stop loving eating. 
 
Jan. 5 
 “Its raining.  I am almost crazy with the dripping on the beds because the roof is 
covered with cardboard and the cardboard is rotten.  The water is rising and invading 
the yards of the favelados.”  
 
Jan. 7 
 “Today I fixed rice and beans and fried eggs.  What happiness. Reading this you 
are going to think Brazil doesn’t have anything to eat.  We have.  It’s just that the 
prices are so impossible that we can’t buy it. We have dried fish in the shops that wait 
for years and year for purchasers.  The flies make the fish filthy.  Then the fish rots 
and the clerks throw it in the garbage, and throw acid on it so the poor won’t pick it 
up and eat it. My children have never eaten dried fish.  They beg me. 
 “Buy it mother!” 
 But buy it- how? At 180 cruzeiros a kilo?  I hope if God helps me, that before I 
die I’ll be able to buy some dried fish for them.”35 
 
 
1.4. Finding Work: Rio de Janeiro and Nogales 
 In addition to the daily struggles of staying alive, avoiding disease, getting enough 
to eat, residents of the GSUS struggle to find and hold on to steady work, and make a 
living wage.  As noted, residents of the GSUS work both in the formal and informal 
sector. The women who work informally often work as domestic laborers in middle or 
upper class households. Donna Goldstein, in Laughter Out of Place: Race, Class, 
Violence, and Sexuality in a Rio Shantytown, describes the work life of her friend Glória, 
a mother and domestic worker in Rio de Janeiro: 
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Glória’s life in the early 1990s could best be characterized as having been 
a slave to feeding both her own children and her adopted children.  She 
woke up every day at five-thirty or so and ordered one of the younger boys 
to go out to the bakery and pick up some soft white bread, baguette style.  
In the meantime, she would get up and start making a large pot of heavily 
sweetened coffee for everyone to share.  She gathered up the bedding and 
placed it outside on the clothesline to air out, folded up the pieces of foam 
mattresses and placed them in a corner, and did a quick sweep of the 
shack.  By the time the bread arrived, Glória was passing out half-full 
glasses of hot, sweet coffee, and each child was allowed to politely pull 
off a piece of bread for him or herself.  Glória was out the door at about 
this time, running to the bus stop even before the morning breakfast ritual 
was completed.  She worked fourteen- or fifteen hour days and spent one 
or two hours every day traveling, often changing buses two or three times 
to reach each employer’s home. 
I accompanied Glória on many of these fourteen-hour days and 
was impressed by her efficiency and competence.  Each household 
presented an exhausting and strenuous array of tasks.  She would arrive at 
each employer’s home and immediately change into her comfortable 
cleaning clothes.  Then she would clean the bathrooms and the kitchen, 
including the usual large pile of dishes left from several days’ worth of 
meals.  She would change the bedding, gather up dirty laundry, get a wash 
going, then begin sweeping or vacuuming the rooms of the apartment. If 
the floors needed waxing, she would get on her hands and knees to apply 
the strong-smelling wax, allowing the greasy circles to dry into a thick 
filmy layer and later returning to remove it by buffing the floor by hand 
with a dirty cloth.  She would take a break by looking into the refrigerator 
and the freezer for what was available to cook with, then descend to the 
markets on the street to buy any ingredients that might be lacking.  
Usually, the entire afternoon was devoted to cooking three or four main 
dishes and an equal number of side dishes, and then, finally, to ironing and 
folding clothes.  By the time Glória left an apartment, every piece of glass 
or silver was shining, clothes were cleaned and ironed and put back into 
their closets, floors were slippery from their new coat of wax, and the 
refrigerator was filled with cooked foods, meals that would last for a 
number of days.36  
 
 After working long days, Glória would leave her employers home at seven in the 
evening, and take the hour to two-hour crowded bus ride home. The bus ticket would cost 
one to two dollars, and Gloria would make about six dollars a day.  Glória had children of 
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her own, and would often adopt children in the neighborhood if no one else were taking 
care of them, so Goldstein writes that, at any given time, Glória was taking care of 14 or 
more children without assistance from a significant other.  After working, Glória would 
typically get home around 10 pm, clean up around her own home, cook herself a dinner 
of fried fish, and drink a beer before going to sleep. 
 In Glória’s neighborhood, most women worked as domestic laborers.  Indeed, this 
is the work that was expected of them, and so Glória would sometimes bring her 
daughters to work with her, both to help her own work along and train them for when 
they graduated high school and worked on their own.  However, everyone in the 
neighborhood, Glória’s daughters included, were well aware of how grueling this work 
was, and how difficult it was to make a living wage doing it; many described it, in no 
uncertain terms, as slave labor, and remarked that not much had changed in Brazil, in 
terms of poor women’s work, since the time of the slave trade.  Knowing all this, Glória’s 
friend and neighbor, Darlene, choose a different route: “She decided that working a few 
hours a day as a sex worker was far more rewarding---in financial terms as well as the 
effort expended---than low-paid domestic work.”37  Darlene was responsible for five of 
her own children and one niece.  Every weekday, behind the back of her husband, 
Darlene would leave the house in a cleaning uniform and head out to one of Rio de 
Janeiro’s central prostitution zones, changing into her ‘work clothes’ when she arrived.  
She worked for a couple hours each day, and returned to her home in the early afternoon 
to greet her children coming home from school. She made as much, and sometimes more, 
than Glória.  Goldstein interprets Darlene’s choice of work as a form of resistance, and an 
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ingenious way to make a living in a place where most women are expected to work 
fifteen-hour days for pittances. 
 
 In addition to informal work, many people in the GSUS work in the formal sector.  
In Mexico, many people find jobs in the maquiladoras, factories on and near the highly 
industrialized US/ Mexico border. Because there are so many migrants and immigrants, 
factory employees are forced to work for low wages in places with high turnover rates.. 
 Maria Guadalupe Torres, a maquila worker in Nogales, Mexico, explains her daily 
routine:  
 
I worked in a maquiladora [foreign-owned assembly plant] for eighteen 
years.  Every day I rose at 4:30 A.M. and was at my work station at 6:45, 
where I spent the entire day.  I couldn’t go to the bathroom without getting 
permission. My job was to assemble electronic capacitors with epoxy.  
Many coworkers developed health problems because of the epoxy.  I don’t 
know if it is responsible for my current health problems or not. I was paid 
$27 for a forty-hour week.  Twenty-two percent of that went for 
transportation.  I worked 3 1⁄2 hours to buy a gallon of milk.  My diet was 
a few potatoes, six eggs, a kilo each of tortillas and beans.  Meat, 
vegetables, and fruit were unaffordable luxuries. I lived in one room with 
an outdoor toilet.  My colonia [neighborhood] had no potable water, no 
electricity, no sidewalks, no infrastructure.  (Maquiladoras do not 
contribute to local taxes.)38  
 
Laborers like Guadalupe Torres work long hours for insufficient pay.  The job is 
monotonous, and, partly because there is no union presence, its conditions are unfair. 
 Guadalupe Torres’ testimony accords with what J. Carillo defined as 
‘maquilization’, that is, the four constitutive dimensions in the logic of these specific 
factories. “1) feminizing the labor force; 2) highly segmenting the skill categories (with 
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the majority of workers in unskilled jobs); 3) lowering real wages; and 4) introducing a 
non-union orientation.”39  The history of the maquilas confirms these definitive 
characteristics.  As with most global outsourcing, the maquilas existed form their very 
beginnings in the 1960’s and 70’s as loopholes for U.S.-based enterprises to circumvent 
union laws by employing cheap, unskilled, foreign labor.  This history shows a trend in 
the maquilas of increased efficiency and productivity over time, partially by means of 
government deregulation. Yet even with this increased productivity, the workforce has 
not seen an increase in wages, but rather a decrease in both job security, benefits, and 
wages. 
 Migrants and immigrants in Nogales often do not have their own transportation, so 
transient communities pop up next to these factories.  Laborers and their families make 
their homes in miles of colonias, neighborhoods that have no infrastructure.  Under the 
logic of first the Programa de Industrialización Fronteriza and later the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the maquilas became exempt from Mexican tax laws.40   
As a result of this exemption, the neighborhoods engendered by the maquilas exist in a 
kind of in-between, stateless zone, where no public institution takes direct responsibility 
for the construction of basic amenities.   
 
1.5. Gaining Respect: Mumbai 
 Of course, finding a job and staying alive in the slum is difficult enough, but 
people’s livelihoods include more than mere subsistence and basic work.  They are, of 
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course, about a sense of self and possibilities for the future, that is to say, respect and 
dignity.   
 In her work Behind the Beautiful Forevers: Life, Death, and Hope in a Mumbai 
Undercity, Katherine Boo describes the situation of Zehrunisa, a resident of the 
Annawadi slum located behind the Mumbai airport, and mother of nine.   Zehrunisa’s 
story offers insight into the reasons women have for choosing to stay in the slum, even in 
the face of other options.  Zerunhisa’s husband, Karam, tried to persuade her to move 
away from the slum, back to a village like the one where he had grown up.  The village, 
he implored, was better for the children---they would be healthier, and life there was 
more old-fashioned, so it is possible that the children would respect his wishes more 
when separated from the cosmopolitan influence of the diverse city.  Although Karam did 
not romanticize village life, and although he knew that there was little work there except 
to harvest sugarcane and that children died there at one of the highest rates in India, he 
was worried that the Annawadi slum was corrupting his children in ways he could not 
control. 
 Zerunhisa was wary of her husband’s plans.  She could see the 
advantage of moving---her family lived in a small lean-to shack in the 
middle of Annawadi, and her children were always sick—but she 
wondered if he wanted to move to the village because it was more socially 
conservative than the slum. She too had grown up in a small, Muslim, 
conservative village, and lived in purdah  (the practice of concealing 
women from men) until her husband got tuberculosis and she was forced 
to work in the sugarcane fields, at night, alongside men. Boo recounts 
Zehrunisa’s story:When she was younger and forced to work in the fields] 
She had prayed constantly for her husband’s TB to relent so that she could 
get back into purdah.  “I couldn’t even speak in those days,” she told her 
children. “I was scared of the whole world.” Having a man to deal with 
that world on her behalf had seemed to her a fine thing. 
 She had stopped praying for a return to purdah after Kehkashan 
[her first born daughter] was born.  She believed in focusing her requests 
to Allah, troubling Him with only one matter at a time.  So she prayed for 
the health of Kehkashan and then for the health of Abdul [her first born 
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son], who entered the world in a pile of dirt by the Intercontinental hotel.  
Her husband had brought the family to Mumbai in hopes of finding work 
less strenuous than farming.  Renting a pushcart to transport waste to 
recyclers was the work he could find.41 
 
 Over the years, living in Annawadi, Zerunhisa had developed a role in her son 
Abdul’s business of trash picking and recycling: she negotiated with scavengers, thieves, 
and police.  Once one of her other sons was old enough, she was hoping that she could 
spend more time on fixing up the house.  But she was not ready to go back to purdah, and 
such a transition might be expected in the village.  She was worried that the move would 
“exacerbate her husband’s condescension, a quality sufficiently annoying that she had to 
snap at him from time to time.”42 
 
“Just because I can’t read, you pretend to everyone that you’re the hero in 
this family and I am the nothing,” she’d said to him recently.  “Like I 
would have been stuck in my mother’s womb without you to get me out! 
Go, act like this big-time shareef, but it is I who have been managing 
everything!” 
 Annawadi’s lack of censorious, conservative Muslims allowed to 
her call out her husband when necessary, just as it had allowed her to work 
to feed her children.  Such freedoms would be painful to give up.43 
 
 True, Zerunhisa’s family was suffering in Annawadi.  Her hut was close to falling 
down, her son Abdul was suffering from nervous conditions from having to work so hard 
picking trash all the time, she felt ashamed when Imams come to visit, her husband 
suffered from breathing problems because of the cooking smoke and burning trash, and 
she sometimes could not sleep for the smell of all eleven members of her family sleeping 
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together in one tiny room.  But, in the end, she did not want to go back to where she came 
from. Rather,  
She wanted a more hygienic home here, in the name of her children’s 
vitality.  She wanted a shelf on which to cook without rat intrusions- a 
stone shelf, not some cast-off piece of plywood.  She wanted a small 
window to vent the cooking smoke that caused the little ones to cough like 
their father.  On the floor she wanted ceramic tiles like the ones advertised 
on the Beautiful Forever wall---tiles that could be scrubbed clean, instead 
of broken concrete that harbored filth in each striation.  With these small 
improvements, she thought her children might stay as healthy as children 
in Annawadi could be.44  
 
 So, in the end, Zerunhisa made the decision to stay in the slum that totters 
precariously on top of the large swamp behind the Mumbai international airport, because 
there at least she had a say over her own and her family’s livelihood.  Further, she 
decided to sell the plot her husband had purchased in the village and use the money to 
improve her family’s hut, even though everyone in the slum knew that, sooner or later, 
the developers from the airport would come with bulldozers and raze the land.  Zehrunisa 
was not alone in this effort: almost all families opted to improve their dwellings when 
they could, even though they knew that they were putting money into something that 
would be demolished.  Residents remodeled their houses—replacing cardboard walls 
with bricks, holes in the ground with outhouses—“in pursuit not just of better hygiene 
and protection from the monsoon but of protection from the airport authority.”45 The 
more their dwellings resembled places of ownership and the less they resembled 
temporary squatter settlements, the more likely it would be that the state government 
would acknowledge them and relocate them to tiny apartments in city high-rises.   
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1.6. A Response to Global Poverty 
I have given a description here of how some women live in the GSUS, the work 
they do, and the choices they make.  Slum conditions differ but nevertheless, slums 
resemble each other in so far as as all are, according to the United Nations definition, 
‘zones of social exclusion.’  Given the scale of the GSUS, and the way that global 
poverty is changing the very meaning of the human condition, it may be well to pause for 
a moment and consider the matter as an open question: what is an adequate response to 
such a problem?  The answer is undoubtedly manifold, and surely more practical than 
theoretical.  Nevertheless, theory must respond as well.   
A positive response to the GSUS is hard to talk about, not the least because our 
language is shaped by Victorian Europe’s response, its language and theory, and the scale 
of the GSUS in our era dwarfs these conceptions.  When we speak of responses on the 
‘global’ level, our discourse feels strange.  The language feels strange because, first, the 
idea of the ‘global’ poor is an abstraction.  If you asked a person who lived in a GSUS if 
they were one of the ‘global poor’, it would probably be an insult.  I could imagine 
someone saying, “No I am Koli’s daughter.” Or, “I am Lakshmi’s son.” And, “ I am 
worse off than Glenda down the road but much better off than Carlos next door.”  Thus, 
global poverty is not a signifier of identity. People do not define themselves by ‘lack’, 
nor should they.  
Another reason why talk of the ‘global poor’ is an abstraction is that here is so 
much need in the world; the need is on a ‘global’ scale’, and we are only each one person.  
Who can imagine ‘global’ need, on this scale?  Even people living in very large cities live 
in neighborhoods and know, and are compassionate towards, a finite number of people.  
Wherever we live, we relate to each other like co-villagers, on a human scale.  When one 
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imagines oneself standing in the face of a global trend and problem, one feels very small. 
The feeling of good intentioned people, thinking about the problem of ‘global poverty’, is 
more one of futility than maleficence.  This futility gives way to the sort of fatalism 
expressed in the maxim of something akin to ‘the poor will always be with us’, or the 
false optimism of something like ‘they are poor but happy.’  This fatalism is, if not 
sound, at least understandable.  The vision of cumulative needs of millions---billions---of 
people is far too much for one person to take in. 
Nevertheless, neither fatalism nor false optimism is an adequate response to the 
problem of the GSUS.  Neither, as I will explain later on, is beneficence.  Given that the 
problems with which residents of the GSUS struggle, problems of staying alive, finding 
work, and gaining respect, I propose that the language most useful, indeed most critical, 
to talking about the GSUS, is the language of alienation and dignity, concepts that will be 
theoretically examined in chapters I and V. But first, Chapter II will give context to the 
GSUS, and women’s work within them, in terms of the history of neoliberal reforms and 
globalization.  Chapter III will then take up ideas of justice and injustice as they can be 
applied to the GSUS. 
 
Some Figures on Global Poverty Today:46 
  
25,000 children per day die of poverty-related diseases 
4,000 poor people die every hour from poverty related diseases 
1/3 of all human deaths, 18 million annually, are due to poverty-related causes 
 
                                                
46 Taken from Thomas Pogge’s Politics as Usual: What Lies Behind the Pro-Poor Rhetoric.  Cambridge: 
Polity.  2010.  Figures are from 2005. 
 
  30 
The bottom 50% of world population’s share of private wealth: 1.1% 
The bottom 50% of world population’s share of global household income: 3% 
The top 10% of world’s population’s share of private wealth: 85.1% 
The top 10% of the world population’s share of global household income: 71.1% 
1,020 million human beings are chronically undernourished 
884 Million lack access to safe water 
2,500 million lack access to basic sanitation 
2,000 million lack access to essential drugs 
924 million lack adequate shelter 
1,600 million lack electricity 
774 million adults are illiterate 
218 million children are child laborers 
3,085 million people live below the poverty line of making $2.05/day 
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CHAPTER II 
WOMEN’S WORK AND ASSETS 
 
“Throughout much of the developing world, globalization is seen, not as a term 
describing objective reality, but as an ideology of predatory capitalism.” –Kofi Annan47 
 
Speaking of Italy, Francesca Comencini, a mother of three, said, “I don’t know what the 
situation is in America, but here women are doing everything. This problem, which is 
really the problem of modern times, is not solved anywhere.” “Well, Scandinavia,” 
Cristina said. “But it’s cold.” -Ariel Levy48  
 
 
2.1. Overview 
The GSUS have a history and a raison d'être.  Their existence is supported by the 
exploitation of labor, and this exploitation is a gendered phenomenon.  Thus far, I have 
described the new picture of global poverty today, that is, the lived circumstances for 
residents of the GSUS and specifically how women in the GSUS live and work.  The aim 
of this chapter, then, is to show how the GSUS, created by the complex processes of neo-
liberalism and globalization, are structurally supported by the exploitation of women’s 
labor. Feminists have called this gendered exploitation of labor under globalization ‘the 
feminization of responsibility’, by which they means that women are now responsible for 
most of the productive and reproductive care work.  Caroline Moser has shown how 
women in GSUS get out of poverty, which is mainly through asset accumulation, most 
importantly the acquisition of adequate housing.  This chapter gives history and context 
to the GSUS, and women’s labor within them, while laying the framework for a 
theoretical description of global poverty described in terms of alienation and dignity. 
                                                
47 Annan, Kofi. Address to the United Nations, October 5, 1998. 
 
48 New Yorker article, June 2011, on Silvio Berlusconi, 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/06/06/110606fa_fact_levy#ixzz1OQj54AGk 
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2.2. Instrumentalizing Women’s Labor for Neoliberal Expansion 
 Currently, it is popular for some development theorists and activists to envision 
women’s labor as the ‘solution’ to poverty.  This vision is problematic because its aim is 
not always or primarily women’s empowerment or accumulation of wealth, but rather 
economic growth for growth’s sake, generally, and in particular for the sake of the 
growth of the larger economic unit within which poor women in the GSUS live and work.  
These units are most often the nation-state, but could include women’s communities or 
their families.  However, the subject of economic reforms is rarely women’s own 
wellbeing.  Such economic growth is in line with the broader neo-liberal goal of opening 
up new markets for capital expansion. That is, the growth of the economic units within 
which women in the GSUS work, enables those larger units to become viable investment 
prospects.  Under this model, foreign investors benefit from economic growth, but 
working women most often do not. And if the investments are profitable to both external 
investors and local owners of capital, then the entire local economic units in question are 
that much closer to becoming part of the global economic system, as a source of labor 
(and sometimes resources) and an endpoint for the consumption of new imported 
products. However, neither the activities of labor nor consumption guarantee that women 
workers get out of poverty.  Indeed, in GSUS, it is more often the case that both of these 
activities keep women (and men) in poverty, rather that alleviating their need.   Ideally, 
there would be a connection between labor, consumption, and overall wellbeing.  Indeed, 
economists assume such a connection when they promote women’s labor as the key to 
the reduction in poverty.  The very problem of the GSUS is that such a connection has 
been severed. 
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The foregoing process of development is often put into effect without focusing 
on, or at the least by overlooking, who is actually doing the work or providing the labor--
-mainly women.  Because development toward incorporation into the global economy is 
a desirable goal, development theorists and activists thereby often end up 
instrumentalizing women for the larger economic gain of the units in which they work, 
the result is both a theoretical and actual reproduction of gender inequalities that may be 
initially addressed.  Much popular development literature, also and with surprisingly feW 
exceptions, considers women, Asian women especially, to be the so-called “Double X 
solution” to the problem of economic inequality between nations.49  
This misguided instrumentalist vision of women in development rests upon the 
long history of modernization theory, which, as Nalini Visvanathan explains, “depicts 
traditional societies as authoritarian and male dominated and modern ones as democratic 
and egalitarian; thus it appears to show sensitivity to the oppression of women.”50  
However, Chandra Mohanty and others have found such modernization theory unsound 
in so far as it draws from the long history of oppressive and racist colonial imaginations 
that exhibit little first hand knowledge of so-called ‘traditional’ societies.51  Much 
contemporary development theory, though, is a long way from considering Mohanty’s 
type of critique. .   
                                                
49 See, for example, Kristof, Nicholas D. and WuDunn, Cheryl.  Half the Sky: Turning Oppression into 
Opportunity for Women Worldwide.  NY: Knopf,  2009. xvii. 
 
50 Visvanathan, Nalini. “Introduction to Part 1”, The Women, Gender, and Development Reader, Nalini 
Visvanathan, Lynn Dugan, Laurie Nisonoff, and Nan Wiegersma, eds.  London and New Jersey: Zed 
Books,  1997.  
 
51 Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. Feminism without Borders: Deconolizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity.  
Duke UP,  2003. 
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The naïve approach of Westerners to the situation of those living in the slums of 
the global south (and something one hears often from students, especially), is some 
version of “they are poor but happy”.  It is convenient for many Westerners to note that 
material wealth does not guarantee happiness, but fail to recognize that enforced and 
extreme lack of material support does in fact significantly decrease one’s quality of life---
to the extent of making one miserable. Official US State Department Policy, only slightly 
less naïve then such general assumptions, has operated on the basis that women in 
Afghanistan and Iraq need to be liberated from their oppressors, namely, the men of color 
who populate their government and their homes. In other words, the application of rights 
discourse in US Foreign policy often repeats the gendered colonial logic whereby some 
of the “savage” others need to be saved from others in their same culture and 
communities.52    And although it may appear to be progressive, such US foreign policy is 
accompanied with the ideological rhetorical of a flimsy version of Western Feminism.  
Many popular assumptions about development, which collectively might be called 
the ‘common-sense’ notions of foreigners, in relying on the colonial inheritance of 
modernization theory, fail to take into account the more recent history of industrialization 
and neo-liberalism that drives globalization.  In addition, popular assumptions about 
development for the most part fail to understand that transience and poverty are matters 
of the inability to gain a foothold in the world, which goes along with poor people’s labor 
being exploited.  Poor people cannot build a livable world, that is, accrue personal assets, 
and contribute to the formation of infrastructure and institutions that will benefit them 
and their families, if they are constantly working merely to survive.  Under the current 
                                                
52 See, for example, State Department: The Office of Global Women's Issues, led by Ambassador-at-Large 
Melanne Verveer, http://www.state.gov/s/gwi/ 
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global economy, and within the structure of the GSUS, women especially provide this 
exploited labor that for them bears the reward of survival alone. 
 
2.3. Exploiting Women’s Labor in the Global Economy: The Third Shift 
 Women who live in the slums of the global south do all kinds of different work, 
but, crucially, their labor is exploited on the basis of the fact that very little of their work 
results in sustainable housing, lasting and hygienic infrastructure, or clear political 
representation.  Another way of saying this is that women’s labor often does not give 
permanence to their communities, does not create something that could last beyond their 
own lifetimes.   
What is the nature of poor women’s labor, now, after globalization? In terms of 
what economists call ‘productive’ labor, women in many of the world’s slums, especially 
on the US Mexico-Border and in China, work in factories owned by transnational 
corporations.  As Lourdes Benería observes, women, especially in East Asia, also 
increasingly work in the so-called ‘pink collar’ sector, doing data entry, credit card 
processing, or are employed in the expanding tourist sector.  Moreover, in the same era of 
globalization that saw the large expansion of the slums, there has been an expansion of 
facilitated prostitution and related ‘sex work’, and more women travel out of their native 
country to engage in domestic day care work.53  Benería points out that this ‘feminization 
of the work force’ on a global scale has been quick, in comparison with other cultural 
                                                
53 Benería, Lourdes.  “Accounting for Women’s Work: The Progress of Two Decades”, in The Women, 
Gender, and Development Reader. 112- 118.  See also Rhacel Salazar Pareñas’ Children of Global 
Migration: Transnational Families and Gender Woes.  Stanford: Stanford UP,  2005.  And Global Woman: 
Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy.  Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild.  
NY: Henry Holt and Co. 2002. 
 
  36 
shifts, and involves much more movement on the part of women, both in terms of travel 
within countries and transnational migration. 
The feminization of the global workforce has also meant the informalization of 
women’s work.  As I have explained in chapter I, instead of formal jobs that involve 
some form of employee benefits, job security, and contracts, both women and men are 
increasingly working in the informal sector.  The informalization of the global 
workforce—people’s transience, patterns of migration, and general lack of income 
security-- can be traced to the broader phenomena of neoliberalism. Ruth Pearson writes:  
 
“For many, deregulation and flexibilisation have become synonymous 
with informalisation, mirroring debates about post-Fordism and core and 
peripheral labour markets.  Women have increased their participation in 
the labour market in response to the greater demand for cash to meet 
household survival needs because of a number of factors including 
structural adjustment programmes, the liberalization of previously 
centrally planned economies and/or because of the changing nature of 
global consumption patterns.”54  
 
There are multifarious global economies, even sometimes in one GSUS.  Saskia 
Sassen describes the different ways in which the ‘feminization of survival’ manifests 
itself in these multiple economies.55  In export-oriented agriculture, women’s work in 
producing food and other necessities in subsistence economies is made invisible by way 
of informalization.  For example, women’s invisible work could include feeding their 
families while their husbands pick fruit, raising children so that they can enter into the 
agricultural workforce, and/or working themselves in the sugarcane fields, doing un-
                                                
54 Pearson, Ruth. “Women’s Work, Nimble Fingers, and Women’s Mobility in the Global Economy.” In 
The International Handbook of Gender and Poverty. (henceforth referred to here as IHGP) Sylvia Chant, 
ed. Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham, UK.  421-423. 
 
55 Sassen, Saskia. “Strategic Gendering: One Factor in the Constituting of Novel Political Economies”, in 
the IHGP. 29-34.  
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contracted labor if their husbands are ill or unable to work.  Women’s unmonitized 
subsistence production allows for agricultural operations to modernize.  Sometimes, 
when small-scale agricultural operations ‘modernize’ and become large-scale, 
corporatized farms, subsistence-level workers are no longer able to make a living in 
agriculture, and are pushed into large cities to look for other work. 
In terms of large-scale manufacturing production, most evident in the global 
economy after the 1970s, Sassen writes about the feminization of the proletariat, wherein  
“off-shoring manufacturing jobs from developed economies under pressure of low-cost 
imports generated a disproportionately female workforce in the poorer countries where 
these jobs moved.”56  So, in poorer countries, women are holding many, if not most, of 
the manufacturing jobs.  Women, especially predominate the garment and electronics 
industries.  As a result, Sassen writes, “women proletariat weakens strong unions and 
secures competitive prices.”57   
Currently, the ‘feminization of survival’ can be seen most clearly in the traffic of 
and in women, but it is also visible in international patterns of migration wherein entire 
governments are dependent upon remittances from women migrants.  An example of 
such a government is the Philippines, where remittances from expatriate women domestic 
workers accounts for a large part of that country’s gross national product.  Of course, 
many women have, for a long time before the shift occasioned by globalization, engaged 
in what economists call ‘reproductive labor,’ the work most often associated with duties 
of care and the maintenance of the domestic, and the so-called ‘private’ sphere.  To note, 
                                                
56 idid., 32 
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though, women are not often in charge of these realms of labor; they are still vastly 
underrepresented in management and property ownership. 
 The exploitation of women’s labor, both productive and reproductive, is 
intricately connected to the real socio-economic conditions both of the 19th century and 
post-cold war policy shifts. That is, the globalization of the feminization of the 
productive work force, while extraordinarily quick, is not without a history. Some 
economists consider women’s large-scale employment in these manufacturing sectors 
new, but, as Heidi Hartmann argues, women’s wage work was never far from the mind of 
capitalists, even in the very nascent stages of the industrial revolution.58  In the 19th 
century, during the time when Karl Marx was writing, the first factories used women and 
children almost exclusively, as employment of these populations drove down wages for 
everyone because women and children would work for less and constituted a more 
flexible labor force.  We see this trend in the early textile and printing mills in America, 
where, in New England, young women would leave their respective homes to live and 
work in mill towns.10  As Iris Marion Young points out, “Throughout the history of 
capitalism women have served the classic functions Marx described as those of the 
reserve army of labor.  They have served as a pool of workers who can be drawn into 
new areas of production without dislodging those already employed, and as a pool which 
can be used to keep both the wages and militancy of the workers low.”59 Low, but not 
invisible, as we see in the early strikes of the Lowell Mill Girls, and also the workplace 
                                                
58 Hartmann, Heidi.  “The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism.” Women and Revolution.  Lydia 
Sargent, ed.  Boston: South End Press, 1981. 1- 41. 
 
59 Young, Iris Marion. “Beyond the Unhappy Marriage: A Critique of the Dual Systems Theory”, In 
Women and Revolution. 43-69. 
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reforms instituted after the 1911 Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire in New York City.60  
Nevertheless, women were always seen as good factory workers because they seemed 
more submissive and they had “nimble fingers,” as the traditional phrasing goes. Of 
course, if women are more submissive it is because of socialization and not some natural 
law, but the industrialists did not, of course, see it this way.13 And, along with an 
ideology that supports some women as workers, that is, mostly poor and minority 
women, there has, in the history of the United States at least, come a concurrent ideology 
that supports women as non-productive workers.  This is the ideology of the ‘family 
wage’, albeit, now, in the current recession, quickly loosing its tenability.61  
As both Hartmann and Young note, the ideology of the ‘family wage’ reached its 
zenith in the mid-20th century, wherein the idea of the male breadwinner enmeshed in the 
traditional gender relations of the nuclear family carried extreme normative force.  The 
ideal of the family wage, and its subsequent expectations of gender roles, was in part a 
result of the social-democratic reaction to wages being driven down by working women.  
Mid-century social democratic policies in the United States and Europe both supported 
and were supported by a strong union presence and government regulation of working 
conditions. 
That latter part of the 20th century, however, saw a shift away from a popular 
social democratism, and women’s work outside of the United States and Europe was 
                                                
60 Robinson, Harriet Hanson. Loom and Spindle or Life Among the Early Mill Girls (New York, T. Y. 
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affected by this shift.  Laurie Nisonoff explains that “the increasing post-WWII focus on 
export-led development in the Third World has had a profound impact on the working 
lives of women.”62 As the twentieth century progressed, transportation costs declined, tax 
codes changed, and electronic communications improved so much that basic 
manufacturing capabilities of countries with robust economies could be outsourced to 
foreign shores.  Beginning in 1948, the first ‘outsourcing’ of basic manufacturing labor 
from the US occurred in Puerto Rico, called ‘Operation Bootstrap.’  This operation 
“exploited the island’s US commonwealth status for lower taxes, and also made land and 
capital available (with subsidized low prices).”63  
Beginning in the 1970s, but primarily after the end of the Cold War, the ideology 
of neo-liberalism began to take hold, in place of social-democratic policies, in the US and 
Britain, to take advantage of this trend in outsourcing. To hear David Harvey’s version of 
this history, in both his works A Short History of Neoliberalism and Spaces of Global 
Capitalism, members of the world’s most elite and moneyed classes used the benefits of 
outsourcing to their advantage and created, in academic and policy circles, a following of 
neo-liberals, and with that, an ever-widening gap between the world’s rich and poor.64 
The first experiment in large-scale neo-liberalism was the military coup in Chile in 1973, 
engineered by the so-called ‘Chicago boys’ proponents of Milton Friedman--which was 
economically disastrous for the mass of Chile’s population, but profitable for elites. From 
there, the ideology of neo-liberalism, the most visible proponents of which were Ronald 
                                                
62 Nisenhoff, Laurie. “Introduction to Part 3”, in The Women, Gender, and Development Reader, 177-178. 
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64 Harvey, David.  A Brief History of Neoliberalism.  Oxford: Oxford UP,  2007. And Spaces of Global 
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Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, took hold in the policy-making decisions of US and 
Britain. 
What is this ideology of neo-liberalism, exactly?65  Alison Jaggar explains that 
neo-liberalism’s basic assumptions are that material acquisition is the normal aim of 
human life, and the essential function of government is “to make the world safe and 
predictable for the participants in market economy”.66  According to Jaggar, the basic 
features of neo-liberalism are the following: free trade, private ownership of public 
goods, hostility to regulation of working conditions and environmental protections, and 
governmental abandonment of social welfare responsibilities like housing, health care, 
education, disability, and unemployment.  We see the result of neo-liberal policy 
measures in trade agreements like NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and 
CAFTA (Central American Free Trade Agreement), which regulates working conditions 
‘at home’ but leaves ‘free-trade zones’ clear of government regulation and governmental 
responsibility for infrastructure.  Ruth Pearson summarizes neoliberalism’s effects thusly: 
a rapid growth in female employment; transnational corporations organize through 
subcontractors, leaving the responsibilities of their day-to-day operations though proxies; 
the International Labor organization has lost influence to protect workers and regulate 
companies; labor has become increasingly mobile.  The global financial crisis of 2008 
exacerbated these effects, while also adding new strains to the livelihood of poor women. 
Pearson writes:  
 
                                                
65 To note, I am not attached to the specific name of ‘neoliberalism.’ One could just as well call the matter 
‘economic liberalism’.  What I am referring to is the belief, prevalent after the 1970s, that the market 
without the state can and should function as a moral force. 
 
66 Jaggar, Allison. “Is Globalization Good for Women?”, Comparative Literature, 53 (2001): 298-314. 298. 
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The squeeze on government revenues will threaten already inadequate 
services such as healthcare, education, housing construction and other 
essential services which women need in order to juggle their dual 
responsibilities for paid work and unpaid carework.  Echoing the cuts 
made during the dark days of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in 
the 1980s, the further withdrawal of the state from public provisioning will 
throw working women back on their own or their family’s resources, or on 
other institutions such as religious organizations and political parties.”67 
 
In short, the recent and ongoing financial crisis prolongs and exaggerates the 
effects of neo-liberal reforms of the earlier decades.  Poor women are left with 
increasingly diminishing support for their ‘reproductive’ labor of care, and also, 
interestingly and importantly, greater expectation that they contribute to the economy 
through their productive labor. This feminization of the financial crisis has occurred both 
within affluent societies such as the United States, and throughout the world, especially 
in countries and regions that were poor before the crisis. 
 In her study of women’s work in Sub-Saharan Africa, Kate Meagher comes to 
similar conclusions as Pearson.68  Meagher agrees that the global informalization of the 
economy constitutes a poverty trap for women, “concentrating them in low-skill, low-
income activities with little prospect of advancement.”69  Neoliberal economic reforms, 
Meagher writes, increased women’s economic disadvantage because they turned the 
‘double burden’ of unpaid care labor without adequate social and/or state support into a 
‘triple burden’ domestic labor, income generation, and decreasing support.  Women are 
now expected to be breadwinners as well as primary caregivers, and do so without any 
increase in support, either from their social systems or state intervention.  Those 
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expectations are just too much of a burden for women, or anyone, to bear. Interestingly, 
Meagher concludes:  
 
Amid the depredations of economic restructuring, the growing role of women as 
‘breadwinners’ through increased informal income-generation and more direct 
access to credit have tended to increase women’s share of reproductive 
responsibilities, diminish their control over income, and intensify rather than 
alleviate women’s economic vulnerability in the fame of diminishing male 
household contributions.70 
 
Thus, women’s increasing responsibility for both productive and reproductive labor have 
not increased their empowerment, only their exploitation.  Meagher critiques USAID’s 
approach to policy as merely reducing obstacles for women to formal and informal 
employment.  Aid agencies do not understand, Meagher argues, that women’s informal 
economic participation concentrates them in ‘survivalist’ rather than ‘growth’ activities, 
and these survivalist modes of work prevent women from gaining a real foothold in the 
global economy.71 
Again, the history of neo-liberalism has specific consequences for women that it 
does not have for men.  Firstly, because they are most often responsible for children’s 
welfare, women suffer the most from cuts in state funding of care and social support. 
Secondly, women in this era are more mobile; there is, at this point in history, ever 
increasing migration and immigration, most often in the form of movement from a 
woman’s ancestral or familial home to the outskirts of an industrial city.  Both Jaggar and 
Harvey note that we might accurately name this phenomenon a kind of dispossession or 
expropriation. However, the issue is complicated. The exploitation of women under neo-
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liberalism is not absolute; and furthermore, expropriation is not always equivalent to 
exploitation.  As Leslie Chang eloquently recounts in her work of international 
journalism, Factory Girls: From Village to City in a Changing China, many young 
women find leaving home an exhilarating experience of freedom and independence.72  
Even though they may work over 12 hours per-day in foreign-owned factories, and live in 
a strange and hostile industrial cities, they find opportunities for personal growth in this 
milieu and very much prefer having their own income to depending on their families for 
support.  Choices like these, though, between poverty on the one hand and slightly less 
poverty on another, are limited choices, at best.   
Nevertheless, the ‘good’ of the situation, that sometimes the rising tide of neo-
liberalism lift’s women’s boats, so to speak, to a position slightly less bad than their 
former one, does not, like the Rawlsian difference principle, exclude the possibility that 
they are still being exploited.  We do not live in a world that is free of the problems of 
industrialization and exploitation that Marx witnessed in his 19th century England; it is 
only that now there has been a geographical shift, or outsourcing, of industrialization, and 
the proletariat may now be, in good measure, poor women. 
  The new global order that produces the continual expansion of the slums outside 
of the world’s industrial cities takes advantage of women’s productive labor.  But this 
productive labor, namely, the work of making and negotiating a realm outside of the 
home proper, most often does not result in an attenuation of alienation.  That is, women’s 
productive work, under neo-liberalism, does not often create ‘a world.’ As noted, all too 
often, women do not engage in creating and maintaining public infrastructure, lasting 
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institutions, products that they can pass on to the next generation, externalizations of 
themselves that give meaning and make it possible for women to have a political voice.  
On this basis, women’s productive labor is exploited. 
 In addition to the primary features Jaggar mentions, neo-liberal ideology 
characteristically undervalues and exploits women’s reproductive labor.  Sylvia Chant 
concludes that the current era has not seen so much a ‘feminization of poverty’ as an 
increasing ‘feminization of obligation and responsibility.’21 The feminization of poverty 
is typically taken to mean first, that women are the majority of the world’s poor, second, 
that their disproportionate share of poverty is rising relative to men’s, third, that women-
headed households are in the direst of straights.  Chant argues that the feminization of 
poverty is highly exaggerated, and more of an ideology than a sociological fact.  Because 
women are benefiting in some measures from their widespread inclusion in productive 
labor (mostly factory work, office jobs, tourism, cleaning, daycare, and small 
entrepreneurship), Chant contends that to hold onto notions of the ‘feminization of 
poverty’ is also to hold onto notions of women primarily as victims, when, really, they 
are actors and decision makers.  It is only that, under present conditions, their decisions 
are extraordinarily limited. Along with Meagher and Pearson, Chant agrees that, like the 
‘second shift’ in rich countries whereby women who work by day return home to do 
domestic work, women of the global south are increasingly taking on the burden of both 
productive and reproductive labor.  In short, women are just working harder.  Chant 
writes: 
 
Over and above the fact that this [the widespread inclusion of women into 
the productive sphere in the present era] is occurring in the context of 
cutbacks in state services and rising prices of basic goods which 
frequently imply greater investments of time in domestic labour and self-
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provisioning, that women are also bringing more money into households 
through wage labour or income-generating activities raises serious 
concerns about inequality, exploitation and sustainability . . .Expectations 
of female altruism, for example, continue to be remarkably persistent and 
mean that women often remain resigned to heavier burdens. 22 
 
However, the Global North’s ‘second shift’ paradigm might even be an 
underrepresentation of the problem for women living in the GSUS. In writing about 
housing markets in the Global south, Sunil Kumar alters Chant’s analysis to argue that 
women living in the GSUS have, essentially, a ‘third shift’.  Women have a triple role: 
reproductive (childbearing and caretaking), productive (as income earners), and 
community organizing tasks (because women are often the ones responsible for 
demanding and organizing for basic services like water and sanitation).73 
 Women are certainly working harder than ever before.  The expectations of the 
global economy, shaped by the reforms of neoliberalism, are that women would be both 
income earners and primary caretakers.  Concurrently, the state has retreated as an arbiter 
of support for either of these activities.   But, one could ask, what is wrong with women 
working harder, if that work is their ticket out poverty?  The problem with women doing 
all the work of the global economy is precisely that this work does not allow them to 
accumulate any assets. They spend all their time in ‘survivalist’ work, without getting to 
do any of the work that would give them basic housing or infrastructure, schooling for 
their children, or security for the future.    
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2.4. Getting Out of Poverty: Asset Accumulation 
 What would it look like, then, if women could labor not only for survival or 
subsistence, but labor to build something for their communities in that would last into the 
future?  Asked in a different way, what does it take for a person’s work to lift them out of 
poverty? 
Anthropologist Caroline Moser conducted an excellent, longitudinal study on a 
group of families living on the outskirts of Guayaquil with that guiding topic, that is, how 
to account for some families getting out of poverty, while others remain?74  Moser 
concluded that the accumulation of assets, basic housing being the first asset, is a 
necessary (but not sufficient) condition of poverty alleviation.  Moser lived and worked 
in a suburbio (slum on the outskirt of a city) of Guayaquil from the 1970s to 2004. In the 
1970s, the community of Indio Guayas first settled a swath of swampland, building 
houses on stilts above the water, and connecting the houses with rickety boardwalks 
made of wood, sugarcane, and aluminum. Most first generation families in this 
community had come to Guayaquil looking for work in the city when farm life became 
too difficult to sustain.  Being far from the city center, Indio Guayas did not originally 
have electricity, running water, sewerage, or roads.  The lack of basic infrastructure was 
harder for women, who had to complete their domestic tasks in primitive conditions.  
Also, moving from their places of origin was harder for women.  Many women in the 
community feared loneliness when they first moved to the settlement. In leaving their 
families, women had to find different kinds of support.  By 2004, the neighborhood had 
changed significantly; many families had brick and mortar houses, and they had been 
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able to send their children to school.  Second and third generation families were able to 
start out their adult lives with more assets and security than first-generation families had.  
Moser argues that the families who were able to dig themselves out of first generation 
poverty did so because of a combination of factors: they were able to build themselves 
homes, mobilize for infrastructure, educate family members, deal with violence within 
the family, and identify opportunities for employment both in Ecuador and in Spain.  
When individual men and women in the families were able to be empowered in these 
ways, they could get out of poverty with minimal support from external aid agencies or 
NGOs.75     
 Moser found that women could be empowered within their own communities, and 
oftentimes external agencies merely got in the way of this empowerment because their 
presence in any given community was transitory and their structure of knowledge about 
the community was too ‘top heavy’, so to speak.  Instead of focusing on the duties of 
external aid agencies in a technocratic manner, Moser advocates that we see GSUS as 
places of agency, recognizing “that self-help housing was in fact a rational response by 
low-income populations to the growing shortage of conventional housing.”76  She 
continues,  “Here [in the GSUS] the poor could incrementally build their homes within 
their income constraints, allowing them “freedom” to decide on the size, standard and 
style according to their individual family needs.”77 Migration to the slums is often a 
perfectly rational choice for low-income families looking to improve their livelihoods.  
The GSUS provide a setting for potential advancement, wherein families can form real 
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communities and build houses on their own terms.  The difficulty is that state and 
international economic policy must remove obstacles to building such communities.  
Knowing that women’s inclusion into the productive workforce neither lessens their 
responsibilities in the reproductive sphere, nor ensure alleviation of their poverty, Moser 
advocates that international aid and state policy focus on asset accumulation, the first 
asset being basic housing. 
 Housing is the building block of social capital that is to come later.  “Housing”, 
Moser writes, “is the first priority asset, and while it does not necessarily get households 
out of poverty, adequate housing is generally a precondition for the accumulation of other 
assets.”78  Of course, there is no magic solution to getting out of poverty  --- both income 
and assets matter, and are, of course, interrelated.  However, Moser writes, when women 
own land and have an opportunity to build their own houses, they have the potential to 
accumulate other varied and valuable assets, against which they can leverage their way 
out of poverty.  Like Virginia Woolf wrote about a ‘room of one’s own’ as a necessary 
precondition for women’s basic growth and empowerment, so poor women need ‘a house 
of one’s own’, or rather, control over housing assets for themselves and the well-being of 
their families.79  Moser is worth quoting at length on this:  
 
Housing was not only the most important component of physical capital 
but also the first asset accumulated. Although housing did not get all 
households out of poverty, for various reasons it was a precondition for 
the accumulation of other assets.  First, shelter reduced the physical 
vulnerability of the homeowner’s family as well as the socioeconomic 
fragility of extended household members, who often stayed during times 
of adversity.  Second, over time it provided a mechanism through which 
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additional income could be generated; options included home-based 
enterprises, rent (from rooms or separately built apartments above the 
original house), and cash from subdivisions.  Finally, for many of the next 
generation, the original plot continued to provide shelter for them as adults 
with their own families, with houses extended (upwards or outwards) or 
separate structures built in the same plot.80 
 
When women own and control their homes, they can begin to build a life for 
themselves that takes them out of poverty.  Research in Chandigarh, India, shows that 
when women can joint-title their homes, they make more decisions, and have more 
access to public knowledge, and gain more respect from their husbands.81  Alternately, 
expropriation from private property hurts women especially.  Forced evictions 
disproportionately effect women because it disrupts the social support system for 
caregiving.82  Of course, in most places, it is harder for women to gain access to land—
they face discriminatory credit practices, and exclusion from property inheritance.83 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 Global poverty, in the form of the GSUS, continues in part because women’s 
labor is being exploited on a global scale.  Because of the history of neoliberal reforms 
and an ideology that accompanies capitalism under globalization, women in the global 
south work not only a ‘second’, but a ‘third’ shift: they take care of families, they earn an 
income, and they must advocate for themselves for basic goods and services.  The 
question, then, given these facts about women’s exploitation both in the public and 
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private realm, is this: what would it mean for women’s labor not to be exploited?  The 
answer is, in part, related to what it may look like for women not to be alienated.  That 
positive vision includes truly basic asset accumulation, including basic housing.  The 
labor of those working in the GSUS, women especially, must be labor that creates a 
world.  Women must be able to labor in a way that they are not merely working to 
survive, but also working to gives them assets upon which to build a pathway out of 
poverty.  In the following chapters, I will show how the lack of basic assets, really, the 
lack of private property, contributes to alienation and diminishes people’s dignity. 
Further, I will show how the situation of the GSUS—their transience, lack of basic 
infrastructure and institutions, and the work that women do within them—alters and 
refines a vision of justice. 
Nancy Fraser, in her work Scales of Justice, asks, too, how to think about poverty 
today.84  Fraser encourages her readers to give attention to this issue she calls 
‘misframing,’ a concern that grows out of the debate, in philosophical circles, between 
recognition and redistribution.  In addition to asking whether resources are justly 
distributed or whether people are justly recognized, that is, the questions of the ‘what’ of 
justice, she urges theorists to consider questions of ‘the who’--- who is being left out of 
this discourse?  We should consider this question “… when, for example, the claims of 
the global poor are shunted into the domestic political arenas of weak or failed states and 
blocked from confronting the offshore sources of their dispossession.”85 
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CHAPTER III 
JUSTICE, GLOBAL JUSTICE, AND POVERTY 
 It can be unproductive [to assign guilt] for the project of getting people together 
to do something about the problem, because people become more and more 
focused on themselves, their past actions, the state of their souls and their 
character, than on the structures that require change.  We who admit that we 
have been at fault in producing or failing to prevent injustice make our 
confessions and examine ourselves for signs of callousness or malice.  Such self-
indulgence can distract us from discussing more objectively how social structures 
operate, how our actions contribute to them, and what can be done to change 
them.   
-Iris Marion Young86 
 
3.1. Overview 
This chapter’s aim is to carve out a space within the history of ideas of justice for 
the specific conceptual project of theorizing the GSUS in terms of alienation and dignity,  
Alienation and dignity are matters of justice, and the conception of justice supporting 
them  needs to be delineated. .  I will argue that visions of global justice which rely on 
contractarian premises alone are an insufficient response to global poverty, because the 
model of connectivity that relies on political states and contracts is outdated in a world of 
economic liberalization wherein the Global North profits by the labor of people in the 
Global South.   Aristotle’s conception of distributive justice that regards profit as a threat 
to virtue is more appropriate for global justice than contractarian conceptions that regard 
justice as a function of securing profit and property.  Further, John Stuart Mill’s 
understanding of justice as grounded in sentiment, antecedent to the formation of law, is 
also a relevant conception of justice for ideas of contemporary global justice that are 
applicable to GSUS inequalities. 
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3.2. Justice 
 The urban slums of the global south prompt a reexamination not only of the extent 
of our urban planning, the scope of transnational duties, or business standards for 
multinational corporations. They impel a reconsideration of the human condition itself. 
Even though life in the GSUS may be largely invisible to citizens of wealthier nations, 
the unprecedented magnitude of the slums commands our attention. Moral and political 
theory must be informed by these new human conditions, evident in the lives of the 
billions of people living in severe poverty. 
If we reflect on the global South’s urban slums, we cannot be neutral.  We cannot 
survey or experience large-scale poverty solely in the mode of observation without, also, 
the mode of critique. Such a critique must appeal to justice, and not only charity or 
humanitarian concerns.  Claims of justice require urgency, and compel, rather than 
request, that those who have power to change the situation do so.  It is imperative that 
global poverty, in its current form, is considered not just a humanitarian crisis, which it 
certainly is, but also blatantly unjust. 
An appeal to justice is, nevertheless, a tricky matter.  Certainly, as Katherine Boo 
indicates, the international business people flying into Mumbai for the first time, who, 
upon their descent into the city, see the Annawadi slum outside of their window, miss a 
great deal if all they see is squalor.87  They miss the creativity and ingenuity, the unique 
solutions people come up with for managing quotidian tasks, and, in general, the 
dignified way in which Annawadi’s residents manage to conduct their lives despite many 
obstacles.  Still, the GSUS are unjust.     
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On what basis do we name the situation as unjust?  When one visits or lives in 
one of these slums, one is certainly disturbed about the lack of sanitation infrastructure 
and the environmental degradation that causes the residents constant illness.  The 
environment is certainly unequal to middle class neighborhoods in London or New York.  
And the residents of Annawadi are aware of this inequality.  The feeling of injustice, 
though, is not based merely on the fact that slum residents have televisions which enable 
them to see how materially unequal their living habits are to representations of Los 
Angeles and London.88  No, the claim of injustice rests upon the fact that people in 
poverty are being prevented from leading the lives they want, and need, to lead. Forces 
beyond their control thwart their basic capabilities.  This is a very intuitive idea of justice 
at work here, that each person experiences upon living in or visiting a GSUS: their living 
conditions are unequal in a way that is morally wrong.   
To begin a critique, then, we must ask: What sort of vision of justice comes about 
from a basic objection to the day-to-day concerns of residents of the GSUS, that is, from 
knowledge about their concerns of staying alive, finding work, and gaining respect?    
What parts of an historical, philosophical inheritance are useful for forming a conception 
of justice that responds to the GSUS? What historical resonances obfuscate attempts at 
critique?   
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3.3. Global Justice: the State of Theory 
Current philosophical debates in global justice have mainly focused  on questions 
of rights and duties.  That is, what duties do the citizens of rich nations have to the very 
poor?  Theorists like Henry Shue and Thomas Pogge have responded with varying 
degrees of cosmopolitan affirmation, in saying that the citizens of rich nations do indeed 
have duties, whether negative or positive, stringent or basic, to the very poor.89  More 
communitarian-leaning theorists like David Miller and Thomas Nagel argue to the 
contrary, maintaining that duties of justice make the most sense in terms of national 
obligation.90  Nagel especially holds that ‘global justice’ is nonsensical, because justice, 
for Nagel, is an associative relation, and there is no associating relation between peoples 
of different geographies, cultures, and nationalities, given that there is no form of social 
contract between them.   My inquiry here, on the matter of the basis for calling the GSUS 
unjust, is different from a strict debate about rights and duties.  Nevertheless, a vision of 
justice that can respond to the GSUS both depends upon and departs from current and 
historical conceptions of justice, and it is worth determining where the points of 
agreement and departure relate to that debate and tradition. 
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3.4. Political Contract Theory’s Response to Economic Liberalization  
 Amongst philosophers, the topic of ‘global justice’, considered as a field of study 
itself, crystalized with Charles Beitz’s work, Justice and International Relations, in 1973.  
Before the early 1970s, the questions which social and political philosophy concerned 
itself with were primarily domestic, and the theories of justice, including especially 
Rawls’ 1971 A Theory of Justice, were inquiries into how individual states, and their 
primary institutions, should operate according to principles.  Compared with other 
academic philosophical topics like epistemology or philosophy of religion, global justice 
is a recent field. The field is new partly because economic globalization is a new 
phenomena.91  That is, recent philosophical discussions about global justice have 
functioned as ways for theorists to come to terms with globalization, and especially for 
our purposes, economic globalization,92 which has in recent years taken the form of 
economic liberalization.  
 In a 2010 “Report on the World Social Situation,” the United Nations defines 
economic liberalization thus: 
Economic liberalization encompasses the processes, including government 
policies, that promote free trade, deregulation, elimination of subsidies, 
price controls and rationing systems, and, often, the downsizing or 
privatization of public services (Woodward, 1992). Economic 
liberalization has been central to adjustment policies introduced in 
developing countries since the late 1970s, mostly in the context of the 
conditions for lending set by international financial institutions. Thus, 
government policies were redirected to follow a non- interventionist, or 
laissez-faire, approach to economic activity, relying on market forces for 
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the allocation of resources. It was argued that market-oriented policy 
reforms would spur growth and accelerate poverty reduction. 
 
From this perspective, government intervention in markets is seen as both 
inefficient and distortionary. It is argued that even if an interventionist 
State acts with good intentions, it does not have the competence to manage 
the economy well. By moving scarce resources into less productive 
economic activities, the State is thought to reduce overall economic 
growth, with adverse consequences for poverty reduction. 
 
Within this framework, the State creates enabling conditions in the form of 
macroeconomic stability, guaranteeing property rights, and maintaining 
law and order for rapid economic growth driven by private sector (both 
domestic and foreign) investment. As economic growth rises, poverty will 
fall (Dollar and Kraay, 2002). Distribution and social justice benefit from 
the trickle-down principle, as economic growth will eventually benefit all 
members of society. The free market, based on comparative advantage, 
will thus bring about economic expansion through labour-intensive export 
activities, which will create employment and hence improve the general 
well-being of the entire society.93 
 
 According to the foregoing UN text, a working definition of economic 
liberalization can be summarized as: the retreat of state governments from regulation of 
private companies in the free market.  As ideology, the heyday of economic liberalization 
occupied the latter part of the twentieth century, following a shift away from popular 
social democratism.   Proponents of global economic liberalization began to implement 
their ideas en force in the late 1970s.  
In addition to philosophical debates about global justice, the history of the 
development and growth of the GSUS runs tandem to the history of the economic 
liberalization. Lest it be argued that global slums were not a consequence of global 
processes of economic liberalization, Katherine Boo offers, via a descriptive example, 
this rejoinder: 
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Seventeen years [after the Annawadi’s slum’s founding], almost no one in 
this slum was considered poor by official Indian benchmarks.  Rather, 
Annawadians were among roughly 100 million Indians freed from poverty 
since 1991, when, around the same moment of the slum’s founding, the 
government embraced economic liberalization.  The Annawadians were 
thus part of the most stirring success narratives in the modern history of 
global capitalism, a narrative still unfolding. 
 True, only six of the slum’s three thousand residents had 
permanent jobs. (The rest, like 85 percent of Indian workers, were part of 
the informal, unorganized economy.)  True, a few residents trapped rats 
and frogs and fried them for dinner.  A few ate the scrub grass at the 
sewage lake’s edge.94 
 
 India is not the only country where there is a shared history between the creation 
and growth of the GSUS and the processes by which nations implemented the policies of 
economic liberalization.  Mike Davis has outlined this history, arguing that policies like 
widespread Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), in which nations in the global south 
were pushed into debt resettlement programs at exorbitant rates of interest, left little 
funds to be spent on public infrastructure and state welfare programs that would offer a 
safety net against poverty.95  
In his 1998 Harvard address, then United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan 
gave a prescient diagnosis of both the state of economic globalization and the state of the 
theory attempting to explain globalization’s rapid development.96  Annan announced, 
grievously, that what he called the “politics” of the last two decades had not kept up with 
economic liberalization.  That is, the processes of economic liberalization that had 
overtaken the world market in the latter part of the twentieth century completely outpaced 
all the moral and political theories about it.  Indeed, most moral and political theory had 
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not even regarded economic liberalization and globalization as a crucial topic. “In a 
sense,” Annan specified, “it may be said that politics and political development as a 
whole suffered benign neglect during globalization’s glory years.”97  By “politics,” 
Annan meant respect for rights and dignity of all peoples, that is, justice.   
According to Annan, the elements of justice lacking during the advance of 
globalization include:  
“the development of a society based on the rule of law; the establishment 
of legitimate, responsive, uncorrupt government; respect for human rights 
and the rights of minorities; freedom of expression; the right to a fair 
trial—these essential, universal pillars of democratic pluralism were in too 
many cases ignored.  And the day the funds stopped flowing and the banks 
started crashing, the cost of political neglect came home.98 
 
For a naïve interlude, Annan explained, people regarded globalization and 
economic liberalization only in a positive light, as the advance of technologies and 
communications that make world distances shorter and connect disparate groups around 
the globe.  This presumption was born out by reality for some time.  “Indeed,” Annan 
contends, “it worked so well that in many cases underlying political schisms were 
ignored in the belief that the rising tide of material growth would eliminate the 
importance of political differences.”99 However, it would be myopic to consider 
globalization through a singular prism.  There is undoubtedly a downside to 
globalization’s encroachment. “Throughout much of the developing world,” Annan 
continued, “globalization is seen, not as a term describing objective reality, but as a 
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ideology of predatory capitalism. …. Millions of people are suffering; savings have been 
decimated; decades of hard-won progress in the fight against poverty are imperiled.”100 
Thus, there has been a breed of political philosophy, initiated by Charles Beitz, 
that has understood itself, in part, as an effort to come to terms first with global poverty, 
and concurrently, with globalization and economic liberalization.  There is, however, 
much more work to be done on the matter.  For instance, Elke Mack outlines the history 
and current status on the global poverty discourse amongst philosophers, theologians, and 
social ethicists, in her introduction to Absolute Poverty and Global Justice: Empirical 
Data, Moral Theories, Initiatives.101  Mack explains that the discussions around the 
ethical dilemma of absolute poverty first arose explicitly in the 1970s, with Peter Singer’s 
essay “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”, and Charles Beitz’ work, Political Theory and 
International Relations.102 The discussion continued with the contributions from Latin 
America in Liberation Theology through the 1980s and then took its current form after 
the close of the Cold War, with the onset of globalization in its fullest flowering.   
However, by now, the debate in philosophy has centered primarily on the 
following concerns: whether global justice entails worldwide systems of distribution 
(Pogge), “the guarantee of a life of dignity; the Aristotelian teleological development of 
anthropologically well-founded ‘functionings’ and ‘capabilities’ for the poor” (Nussbaum 
and Sen); ethically sound incentives for business investment on the side of the poor, and, 
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most popular right now, what the charitable duties of rich westerners hold towards the 
global poor (Singer).103 
 
3.5. Liberalism in Light of Globalization 
 As stated the first wave of political theorists and philosophers tackling the 
problem of global justice took their cue, more or less, from Charles Beitz, in expanding 
the problems, structure, and vision of justice for the domestic arrangements of individual 
nation-states to global, intra-state arrangements.  In doing so, theorists took the 
predominant Rawlsian paradigm of liberalism, and argued over whether or not such a 
paradigm could be globalized.  Framing the problem in this way, as an expansion of 
liberalism, is both helpful and limiting.  Since Rawls, theorists have continually felt 
compelled to respond to liberalism, and the problem of national sovereignty has 
thoroughly constrained the problem of global justice.  That is, the model of the domestic 
nation-state, its ‘contracts’, its ideals of liberal justice, and the duties of its citizens to one 
another, has been the model for global justice. Or at the very least, the model of the 
nation-state has framed the questions of global justice. 
Beitz began his study of global justice by asking the question, Do obligations to 
radically re-structure the world economic system exist? Beitz concluded that such 
obligations do exist, arguing that Rawls was shortsighted in not extending his Theory of 
Justice to apply in a global setting.  Rawls meant the central tenets of the Theory of 
Justice --- the two principles of justice as freedom and equality in freedom, the difference 
principle, and the original position --- to apply, firstly, domestically, within what he 
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called “well-ordered” societies.104  Rawls does mention expanding the original position to 
international contexts, in terms of the principles of self-determination, non-intervention, 
the pacta sun servanda rule (or, the principle of good faith between contracting parties), a 
principle of justifiable self defense, the principles which define jus in bello (international 
humanitarian law, or the laws that govern the ways warfare is conducted, including the 
limits to acceptable conduct) and just ad bellum (justifications or reasons for war or its 
prevention).105  Rawls does not account, however, for economic interrelation.  Rawls 
constrains himself in this way because his theory of justice is intended to describe a 
social contract between free and equal persons who are given the task of coming to 
agreement on principles of justice.   
Beitz offers a critique of Rawls, not in the construction of the principles of justice 
themselves, which he accepts as sound, but in their application as limited to individual 
nation states. Beitz contends that Rawls’ principles of justice should apply 
internationally.  Rawls, Beitz notes, takes the nation-state as the foundation for 
contractarian principles.  This would make sense if nation states were self-sufficient, 
independent entities. However, the realities of the global economy suggest otherwise.  
Firstly, Beitz argues that nation states are not self sufficient, because there are conflicting 
claims to natural resources between states, claims that have moral importance. Moreover, 
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, national self-sufficiency is a myth, because the international division of labor has 
developed in such a way that, because goods are manufactured in poor countries and 
marketed in rich ones, “the system of world trade is one where value created by one poor 
society is used to benefit members of other, rich societies.”106  Beitz concludes: 
“Participation in the global economy on the only terms available involves a loss of 
political autonomy.”107  For Beitz, this fact is the basis for claims of injustice, and, 
consequently, it becomes the subject of global justice. Thus, in the global economy, 
everyone’s basic material needs, needs that are the precondition for being a ‘reasonable 
person’ under the Rawlsian criteria, are not met.  
It should be noted, here, that Beitz does not depart radically from Rawls in terms 
of his overall vision of justice.  He, too, is “more contractarian than comparative”---to 
speak in Sen’s categorization---in terms of his approach to justice. Beitz maintains only 
that the contract be expanded, not abolished.  For Beitz, as well as Rawls, justice is “the 
first virtue of social institutions,” and, “its primary subject is the basic structure of 
society, or more exactly, the way in which the major societal institutions distribute 
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social 
cooperation.”108  Usefully, however, Beitz does give the first definition of global 
distributive justice as, “normative principles designed to guide the allocation of the 
benefits and burdens of economic activity.”109  Beitz calls the current global economic 
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system unjust on the basis that the inequality it produces reduces people’s liberty in 
morally significant ways. 
In his 1993 Law of the Peoples, Rawls responded to Beitz’ criticisms.  Rawls 
there maintains that we must start with states and move outward, that individual states 
remain the proper subject of his liberal theory of justice, even in a globalized world.110 
Rawls goes on to respond that the difference principle is not a feasible way to deal with 
the problem of economic inequality between societies, because non-liberal societies 
cannot be reasonably expected to adopt a liberal principle of distributive justice.  Indeed, 
not all societies are liberal, and it would be wrong of liberal societies to expect others to 
operate on exactly the same grounds.  One could speculate that what motivates Rawls to 
hold to his original formulation here, to see justice as province of nation-states and so 
limit the difference principle and original position to application only within liberal 
nation states, is an active concern with preventing interventionist or religious war.  His 
paradigm here is the Vietnam War, a time in which a liberal state (the United States) 
intervened in the operations of a [what Rawls would conceive of as] a non-liberal state 
(Vietnam) in order to, ostensibly, prevent the spread of communism.111  Rawls did not 
see that action as justified, and he does not want to provide theoretical fodder for further 
interventionist wars.  Thus, Rawls wants to emphasize that other, non-liberal societies, 
what he terms ‘well-ordered hierarchical regimes’ can have a robust vision of justice that 
does not include the difference principle or the original position.  As long as they are 
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peaceful, respecting of human rights, and have a system of law that imposes moral duties 
to all people within its territory, then liberal states have no duty to impose their more 
specific visions of justice on non-liberal states.  Rawls writes, “That opinion [that liberal 
states are more equitable than non-liberal ones] would not support a claim to rid the 
world of nonliberal regimes. It could have no operative force in what, as a matter of right, 
they could do politically.”112  However, Rawls does maintain that wealthy societies have 
a duty towards economically disadvantaged societies, insofar as they must make sure that 
human rights are recognized and secured everywhere---and send international aid. 
It should be noted here that Rawls’s commitment to basic rights, regardless of 
belonging to liberal or non-liberal societies, gets us very far in terms of global justice. If, 
in fact, wealthier nations took Rawls’s prescriptions to heart and actually did give enough 
aid to secure people’s basic, universal human rights, global inequality would undoubtedly 
decrease.  However, as Henry Shue argues, basic rights are, claims of justice, and not 
only claims of aid.113 This is an important difference.   
Peter Singer, for instance, emphasizes duties to aid the global poor, in his work as 
well.114  Singer has famously argued that not donating to the most efficient aid 
organizations whose mission it is to save the lives of the global poor is morally 
equivalent to walking past a drowning child and refusing to jump in because you are 
interested in keeping your expensive shoes clean/dry.115  This argument is intuitively 
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reasonable.  However, if we only think of global justice in terms of aid, as Singer does, 
we miss the urgency of the human rights claims.  
In contrast to Singer, Shue explains basic rights as minimum standards beneath 
which people must not fall: rights to subsistence and security are “everyone’s minimum 
reasonable demands on the rest of humanity.”116  Demands are not requests, and therefore 
they should not be dependent upon the benevolent aid of those in a position of power. 
Rights are those claims that should compel those in positions of power to take action to 
secure them. Rights do not exist in a vacuum.  Rather rights are, in Shue’s words, “a 
calling for the duty to preserve effective institutions for [their] fulfillment.”117  That is, 
one cannot possess a right without also being able to enjoy, or exercise, that right.  As 
Shue explains: “To claim to guarantee people a right that they are in fact unable to 
exercise is fraudulent, like furnishing people with meal tickets but providing no food.”118 
Rights and duties are thus inextricable, if we consider Shue’s claims, as well as Singer’s, 
in a critique of Rawls.   
Shue’s own diagnosis of Rawls is that, despite his far-seeing peace making efforts 
in terms of founding basic overlapping consensus between peoples of varying religious 
and cultural backgrounds, “western liberalism has a blind spot for severe economic 
need.”119  What classical liberals miss, in their insistence that everyone be left alone to 
pursue their own visions of the good life, free of conflict and intrusion, is that, in terms of 
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global economic inequality, there are duties at stake that correspond to certain situations 
of need.   
 
3.6. The Blind Spot of Liberalism 
One of my students gave the (rather insightful) analogy of liberalism’s blind spot 
for severe economic need in following way: ‘When’, she explained, ‘I am going about 
my normal day and I am buying food in the grocery store, I do not want anyone to bother 
me, or comment on my nutritional choices, or prevent me from purchasing what I see as 
best for my family.  But, if I were in a wheelchair and I couldn’t reach the shelf where the 
vegetables were, or I if have a seizure and spill over a display case of Campbell’s soup, I 
would want, or need, people to stop only going about their own business and help me.  I 
would want them to reach for the asparagus, help clean up the mess, or call 911.”120  
Global poverty is a situation more akin to the latter scenarios than the former.  Violations 
of basic rights, like those for security and subsistence, and/or deprivations of capabilities, 
have occurred, and the harm has already been done.  As Shue writes, “It is extremely 
difficult to mind one’s own business amidst a scarcity of vital commodities.”121 That is 
why a comparative approach that asks, as Sen instructs, not only about the justness of 
institutions qua rules and operations (not, say, about the justness of the set-up of the 
grocery store or the global economy), even though these questions are very important, but 
also about what kind of lives people are leading within these institutions.122 
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In addition to religious and cultural conflicts, the current state of our world, the 
current ‘human condition’, is marked by economic inequality on a scale previously 
unimagined in human history. The question is, do the contractarian visions of justice, 
such as Rawls’s and/or Beitz’s, respond adequately to the ubiquitous economic 
inequality, indeed, to the situation of the GSUS?  Do they characterize the injustice of the 
situation, in a way that reflects people’s experiences? The contractarian approaches are 
sound and good as far as they go, but they do not capture the whole of the problem.123 
Certainly, Beitz is right to claim that the global economic system is unjust, on the basis 
that it, in its very structure, undermines autonomy at the outset of ‘entrance into it.’  So, 
we could say on that basis alone that the global economy must be restructured, because it 
is unjust.  But that conclusion is not, by any means, the end of the story.  There is a lot 
more going on, a lot more that is at stake, than merely the question of whether or not the 
global economy is unjust.  That is, the question of how it is unjust is important, too, and 
that question is more in line with the aim of attending to the vulnerabilities, hopes and 
aspirations of people who live under conditions of poverty, than with an extension of 
theories of contractarian justice. 
The limits of contractarian approaches to global justice confront us when we ask: 
who agrees, in the way that I agree when I sign, say, a rental contract, to enter into the 
global economy?124  For residents of Annawadi at least, especially children like Abdul or 
Sunil, who were born into the slum after India’s macro-economic reforms of the early 
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1990s, there was no voluntary consent or moment of decision to enter the global 
economy on the unfair terms in which they do, or must.  Nor could there be.  The 
language of consent and contract does not capture the full picture of what is unjust about 
global poverty.  Elected officials in the state of India decided to ‘enter’ the global 
economy by enacting these reforms, but a vision of justice in terms of contracts is still 
thinking from the perspective of state actors, rather than individual lives. Contractarian 
approaches still conceptualize   justice in the past-regarding terms of restoring the just 
conditions that were once present, or, in Beitz’ formulation, should have been present at 
the outset of an agreement---in this case, the outset of entrance into the global economy.  
However, as noted, individuals do not choose to enter or abstain from the global 
economy; they are thrown into processes over which they have little control, and they 
remain to struggle within the global economy, because they need to survive and thrive. 
 
3.7. The Limits of the Contractarian Approach 
Contractarian approaches to global justice miss the point that people are 
compelled, and do not choose, to enter into the unequal and harmful relationships of the 
global economy.  Compare, for example, Thomas Nagel’s and David Miller’s 
communitarian-driven observations on global justice to Thomas Pogge’s and Amartya 
Sen’s or Martha Nussbaum’s more cosmopolitan approaches.  Nagel and Miller hold, to 
varying degrees, that national identity is a relevant consideration in terms of the duties 
one holds towards the global poor.  In contrast, Pogge, Sen, and Nussbaum take national 
identities to be less morally relevant, in terms of duties to the global poor.  
In his works, Politics as Usual: What Lies Behind the Pro-Poor Rhetoric, 
and Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right : Who Owes what to the Very 
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Poor?125, Thomas Pogge offers two contributions to global justice, which are 
especially relevant  for critical purposes, here. First, like Beitz, he holds that the 
current world order is unjust, that the structure of the world’s institutions 
perpetuates the status quo of prolific, absolute poverty. Even if it is true, as some 
would claim, that overall poverty is decreasing in the world from the past 
decades, Pogge asks “Does a decline in the plight caused by severe poverty over 
the last few centuries render justifiable our continued imposition of a global order 
that is designed so that is foreseeably reproduces avoidable severe poverty on a 
massive scale”?126 
Pogge is more specific than Beitz in regards to the parties that are responsible for 
the injustice of the global economic system.  Because Pogge is writing in the early 
twenty-first century, he names the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as 
the primary responsibility holders here. To certain activists, this may seem like a rather 
obvious point, but much discourse in global ethics holds that we must strengthen and 
contribute to institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as 
well as revise, but not essential reform, those current neo-liberal policies of First World 
countries that have shaped the processes of globalization up to this point. In contrast, 
Pogge’s position is that when we take a close look at the havoc that these policies and 
institutions have wreaked upon the world’s poor, we cannot conclude that we end up 
anywhere near what anyone imagines as global justice.  
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Pogge contends that freedom from poverty is a human right that involves a 
negative duty on the part of the affluent, their governments, and institutions. His central 
thesis is this: “We, the citizens and governments of the affluent countries, in collusion 
with the ruling elites of many poor countries, are harming the global poor by imposing an 
unjust institutional order upon them.”127  By harm, Pogge means human rights violations 
and the human rights deficits caused by those violations. He argues that affluent citizens 
are morally responsible for the harm they are causing because they cooperate in imposing 
an institutional order on those who experience human rights violations. This institutional 
order foreseeably gives rise to human rights violations.  The institutional order is 
reasonably avoidable; and the alternative situation that would be free of harm is also 
foreseeable.  Pogge writes, “On my view, you harm others insofar as you make an 
uncompensated contribution to imposing on them an institutional order that foreseeably 
produces avoidable human rights deficits.”128 
Pogge then argues that citizens of affluent countries have a negative duty to stop 
harming the global poor, and that they should fulfill this duty through activism that 
changes the global economic institutional order.  His argument is minimalist; he does not 
go so far as to say that citizens of affluent nations have a positive duty to aid the poor of 
other nations, although he leaves open his possibility. Pogge limits his argument to claim 
that, first, the unjust institutional order has created an associative relation between 
peoples of different countries, by virtue of the harm it has caused the global poor. Thus, 
in his article, “Priorities of Global Justice”, Pogge concludes that the prevention of 
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severe, widespread, and absolute poverty should be the primary concern of global 
justice.129 Even libertarians can adopt Pogge’s argument, because libertarians, who are 
reluctant to concede that there are any positive duties whatsoever, or that it there is a 
general justice requirement that society aid the most vulnerable, can still concede that 
there exist negative duties to avoid harming others.     
Importantly, Pogge considers his argument to be an amendment to John Rawls’s 
difference principle.  Pogge worries that the minimalism of Rawls’s principle obscures 
the role rich Westerners played in creating the global world order.   He writes:  
 
Making this duty [keeping the poor societies from falling below the 
minimum that prevents their having a just or decent social or political 
regime] the only distributive constraint misleads us to perceive the 
injustice of the status quo as insufficient assistance to the poorer societies, 
when it really consists in the imposition of a skewed global order that 
aggravates international inequalities and makes it exceedingly hard for the 
weaker and poorer populations to secure a proportional share of global 
economic growth.10 
 
 However, recognizing our only duty in terms of distributional justice that allows 
for or requires a basic minimum as a precondition for a democratic political regime does 
not encourage us to see also the degree to which we have prevented the formation of fair 
political regimes and, really, human flourishing.  In addition, then, to constructing a 
system that allows inequality only if it improves the lot of the most unequal, Pogge 
contends that we must also work to change the system when we have constructed it 
poorly. 
 Pogge has also done critical work connecting the harms of the IMF and the World 
Bank to the perpetuation of global poverty. One intuitive moral support of Pogge’s 
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analyses is the realization that we, as citizens of affluent, democratic nations, cannot 
pretend that institutions like the IMF and the World Bank just popped up from nowhere, 
independent of all human agency. In addition, we are citizens, and not employees, of our 
countries—thus, we have a serious stake in the harm our countries’ decisions ---both 
governmental and corporate---cause oversees.  
Communitarians think differently.  David Miller, for instance, aims to defend the 
view that national boundaries are ethically significant, especially in regards to a principle 
of distributive justice that distributes goods and services, firstly, according to need.  
Miller believes that “as soon as we move beyond indisputable biological need, a social 
element enters the definition.”130 Amongst the social definitions of need, if someone 
counts the category of nationality, Miller defends that person’s choice as a reasonable 
one. He explains: 
There is truth in Michael Walzer’s remark that “the idea of distributive 
justice presupposes a bounded world within which distribution takes 
place: a group of people committed to dividing, exchanging, and sharing 
social goods, first of all among themselves.” However, we have still to 
determine what the scope of this “bounded world” should be.”131 
 
Walzer appears correct to claim that one needs a relevant community in order that 
distributive justice even makes sense. However, this notion of bounded worlds is even 
more complicated that Miller takes it to be.  A strong claim can be made that the growth 
of worlds in the global north is fueled by the deprivation of worlds in the global south.  
Moreover, that the world is interconnected through economic relations, an economy 
which proponents of economic liberalization made more connected, shows us it may be 
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too late to usefully or effectively apply normative, ideal political theory about the scope 
of the relevant population of distributive justice. A community has already been created! 
Given that injustice has already happened, it is time for a comparative theory of justice 
that asks, , How can we make the world more just? 
 Miller, again, would not agree, at least in part based on his ideas about 
universalism. Miller characterizes universalism as the position that the subject matter of 
ethics is persons as such, considered independently from their local connections and 
relations, wherein the principles of rights and duties are “worked out without reference to 
social boundaries.”132  And against universalism, Miller sees the moral subject as 
eminently situated. Universalism, Miller argues, does not reflect how we already live and 
what is already meaningful to us, that is, the relations we have with the people closest to 
us.  Miller argues that it is unreasonable to expect the moral subject to disengage with all 
her groups, practices, and institutions, in other words, all the parties to which she is 
already attached, in the process of forming her basic principles.  One cannot divest 
oneself of all commitments, as the universalist would suggest, because to do so would be 
to change one’s basic identity.  And identity, Miller argues, is an extremely relevant 
consideration, morally. Commitments that matter to people’s identity include 
commitments of nationality. 
In arguing that nationality is a morally relevant consideration, Miller and Rawls 
share more common ground than first appears.  Usually, as the [grand] father of 
contemporary liberalism, we think of Rawls sharing no common characteristics with 
communitarians, given, especially, Michael Sandel’s famous communitarian critique of 
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Rawls’s Theory of Jusice.133  Yet Miller and Rawls in the Law of Peoples, are holding to 
very similar arguments: one cannot apply universalist terms to the entire world, because 
not everyone enters into the same social contract.  Or, alternately, universalisms, and 
universal theories of justice, are misguided when their subjects are no longer within the 
domestic arrangements of nation states.  
Miller is not inconsistent here, nor is he incorrect.  If one holds a contractarian 
idea of justice, as he does, then the social contract that matters in terms of justice is the 
national one. Nationality, in the contractarian vision, could be the most relevant category 
of moral consideration, particularly in regards to ideas of need in distributive justice.  
However, given the great need of billions of people on the planet, it is plausible to claim 
and argue that a contractarian vision of justice is insufficient for the problem of global 
injustice, especially the problem of the GSUS.  
Consider the situation Miller describes at the outset of his work, National 
Responsibility and Global Justice.  Miller is watching the evening news that contains 
images of scores of would-be African immigrants trying to gain entrance into Europe by 
climbing a barbed-wire fence in Melilla, Southern Spain.  During the night, some were 
shot dead, and many more were injured and returned to Africa with gashes in their skin 
from the fence.  Miller recounts his reaction:  
When the Mellila story reaches the screen, I find my sympathy for the 
young African men who are trying to cross the fence tempered by a kind 
of indignation.  Surely, they must understand that this is not the way to get 
into Europe.  What clearer indication could there be of the proposition that 
illegal immigrants are not welcome than a double fence up to six metres 
tall with rolls of razor wire along the top?  Do they think they have some 
kind of natural right to enter Spain in defiance of the laws that apply to 
everyone else who might like to move there? And why are they so sure 
that all their troubles will be over if they can slip through the net?  
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Although I can understand their plight, which must indeed be desperate if 
they are willing to try, time and time again, to risk life and limb to get 
across the border, I also think they are deluded and are responsible for 
their delusion.  But is my reaction partly a selfish one, inspired by a fear 
that the comfortable life I enjoy with my fellow-Europeans is going to be 
rudely disrupted if millions of the world’s poor are allowed to come in?134 
 
What is interesting about Miller’s description of this episode is its perspective: he is 
sitting, watching his television, from inside his European home.  The relevant moral 
question he draws from witnessing this human need and desperation is: Who is 
responsible? Further, there is an assumed basic difference between the African men 
trying to scale the barbed-wire fence, and Miller, witnessing this event on television.  The 
relevant difference, to Miller, is that Miller is a citizen of Europe.  These questions of 
responsibility and difference, are questions that arise within the social contract tradition.   
Thomas Nagel holds a similar position as Miller. In his article, “The Problem of 
Global Justice”, Nagel takes aim at the heart of the issue: he proposes a contractarian 
theory of justice, wherein there must be an associative relation between people in order 
for the idea of justice to make sense.  Nagel constrains all of justice to a form of social 
contract.  “Justice”, Nagel writes, “is something we owe through our shared institutions 
only to those with whom we stand in a strong political relation.  It is… an associative 
obligation.”135 In order that there be justice at all, there must be shared institutions and 
people must consent to the operations of these institutions on a [loosely-defined] 
voluntary, basis, at least without coercion.  Nagel continues,   “Everyone may have the 
right to live in a just society, but we do not have an obligation to live in a just society 
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with everyone.  The right to justice is the right that the society one lives in be justly 
governed.”136  He concludes: “Justice applies, in other words, only to a form of 
organization that claims political legitimacy and the right to impose decisions by force, 
and not to a voluntary association or contract among independent parties concerned to 
advance their common interests.”137 
 For Nagel, therefore, justice is constrained to the nation-state.  The reason 
for constraining justice thusly is that the nation-state is, as Hobbes first observed, 
the arbiter of physical force.138 The nation’s threat of force is, for Hobbes and 
Nagel, the only way to provide its citizens with some sort of law or centralized 
authority with the power of enforcement.  Justice, therefore, makes no sense 
without the threat of force.  In the international sphere, there is, as yet, no such 
threat of force, and therefore no associative relation. 
 Nagel defends what he terms as his ‘political conception of justice’ against 
the cosmopolitans, in the same way Miller defends his communitarianism, by 
arguing that this conception is the most realistic and the one we already use. The 
consequence of the Nagel’s political conception of justice is that global justice 
becomes a contradiction in terms.  For Nagel, justice cannot be global. 
 It is important to note, however, that Nagel does make an important 
qualification for serious humanitarian disasters, and humanitarian duties.  Nagel 
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writes: “Humanitarian duties hold in virtue of the absolute rather than the relative 
level of need of the people we are in a position to help. Justice, by contrast, is 
concerned with the relations between the conditions of different classes of people, 
and the causes of inequality between them.”139 In effect, Nagel is arguing that the 
absolute need of many people in the world is not an issue of justice, that is, that 
humanitarian disasters are not issues of justice, and, more stringently, global 
socio-economic inequality is not an issue of justice.  I quote Nagel at length: 
 
We can begin by noting that even on the political conception, some 
conditions of justice do not depend on associative obligations. The 
protection, under sovereign power, of negative rights like bodily 
inviolability, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion is morally 
un-mysterious. Those rights, if they exist, set universal and pre-political 
limits to the legitimate use of power, independent of special forms of 
association. It is wrong for any individual or group to deny such rights to 
any other individual or group, and we do not give them up as a condition 
of membership in a political society, even though their precise boundaries 
and methods of protection through law will have to be determined 
politically in light of each society's particular circumstances.  
 
Socioeconomic justice is different. On the political conception it is fully 
associative. It depends on positive rights that we do not have against all 
other persons or groups, rights that arise only because we are joined 
together with certain others in a political society under strong centralized 
control. It is only from such a system, and from our fellow members 
through its institutions, that we can claim a right to democracy, equal 
citizenship, nondiscrimination, equality of opportunity, and the 
amelioration through public policy of unfairness in the distribution of 
social and economic goods.140 
 
   Detaching global socio-economic inequality from first, humanitarian disasters, 
and second, from justice, is a serious (moral) error.  On the first point, Sen famously 
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demonstrated that humanitarian disasters like famines rarely or never happen in 
democratic countries concerned with the formal or informal equality of their citizenry.141  
On the second point, we lose too much moral ground when we fail to name the hunger 
and disease of billions of people an injustice. Moreover, it is a factual error to 
disassociate severe economic inequality from humanitarian disasters.  As in the case of 
the Haitian earthquake, socio-economic vulnerability in the form of global slums, which 
are made poor by the history of colonialism and kept poor by the inequities of 
globalization, exacerbate, if they do not socially, economically and politically, precipitate 
humanitarian disasters.142  If we only call global poverty a humanitarian disaster, and not 
a grave injustice, we tend to expect humanitarian organizations, like the Red Cross, or 
Amnesty International, to address the problem, all by themselves.  Calling global poverty 
an injustice demands greater responsibility and urgency; it demands ‘all hands on deck’, 
so to speak.  When we call global poverty a failure of justice or an injustice, we come to 
sounder conclusions: we need to strengthen international organizations like the United 
Nations, and we, as citizens of privileged states, need to organize to change the global 
economy.   
Nagel does succeed in demonstrating that global justice is a contradiction in 
terms, when our thinking is so heavily indebted to the social contract tradition.  But ideas 
of justice are not constrained to contracts; there are resources in the history of philosophy 
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that conceive of justice outside, or independent, of the contract model.  These historical 
precedents, in this case, Aristotle and Mill, are better resources for conceptualizing the 
kind of justice that can be a response to the GSUS, a kind of justice that is more relevant  
to many people’s experience of injustice in the global slums. 
 
3.8. David Hume: Justice as Contract for the Protection of Property 
Let us allow for a brief exercise in historical contrast here, a comparison between 
a vision of justice that is mostly contractual, namely David Hume’s, and visions of justice 
which have very little to do with contracts, namely, Aristotle’s and John Stuart Mill’s. 
The point of this exercise is first, to see how the contractual accounts to which some 
contemporary theorists of global justice subscribe are historical remnants, unique, rather 
idiosyncratic, and not exhaustive of all possible ideas of justice. The second aim of the 
comparison is to show how the indebtedness to the social contract tradition is, while 
useful in certain contexts, not the most useful way to conceive of global justice, with 
reference to the specific situation of the GSUS.   
Hume’s Enlightenment notion of justice is influential in contemporary discourse 
on global justice. Hume’s definition of justice validates the accumulation of property, and 
profit.  Somewhere between Ancient Greece and Enlightenment-era Europe, the 
suspicion of profit’s tendency to attenuate virtue, well noted by Aristotle, was lost.  In 
The Treatise on Human Nature, Hume famously characterized justice as an ‘artificial’ 
virtue. Rachel Cohon explains that unlike artificial virtues, natural virtues are  “more 
complete and refined forms of human sentiments.”143 The natural virtues arise from 
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attachment to particular individuals—one’s immediate circle—and so can be exclusive 
and partial.  In contrast, the artificial virtues, like justice, are “traits we need for 
successful impersonal cooperation.” Cohon continues.  There are just a few, carefully 
described artificial virtues: honesty with respect to property (often called equity or 
“justice”, although a strangely narrow use of that term), fidelity to promises (sometimes 
also listed under “justice”), the (less stringent) sort of international justice appropriate to 
heads of state, allegiance to one’s government, chastity (refraining from non-marital sex), 
and modesty (both primarily for women and girls), and good manners.”144 
The misogyny of relegating virtues by sex aside, Hume’s characterization of 
justice as an ‘artificial virtue’ rests upon his conviction that humans are essentially selfish 
creatures. As such, we can only possess ‘confined generosity’. 145  We cannot be generous 
to everyone, only those very close to us, towards whom we have preferences.  Given that 
generosity is so limited, Hume writes that in spheres outside of our immediate affection, 
“we will quarrel over who gets what, and collaboration will disintegrate.  No remedy for 
this is to be found in “our natural uncultivated ideas of morality”.146  Our natural ideas of 
morality always, for Hume, assign partiality and loyalty to our immediate loved ones 
over strangers. However, in order to get along in a society consisting of more than 
warring tribes, an invention is needed.  Justice, as an ‘artificial virtue’, is such an 
invention.  
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For Hume, justice involves an agreement that private property, specifically 
moveable goods, not be stolen or interfered with by non-owners..  In his Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals, written as a new or abridged form of his Treatise of 
Human Nature, where he originally introduced the natural-artificial distinction in virtue, 
Hume dropped the distinction between artificial and natural virtues.  However, his vision 
of justice as  a virtue that supports private property ownership,  remained.  For Hume, 
justice is, in part, an agreement between two parties that says ‘I will not violate your 
property if you do not violate mine.’  Justice rests on a sort of contract, and it is 
concerned with the maintenance of that contract.  As Cohon explains, “Hume argues that 
we create the rules of ownership of property originally in order to satisfy our avidity for 
possessions for ourselves and our loved ones, by linking material goods securely to 
individuals to avoid conflicts and maintain our lucrative cooperation.”147  So, within 
affiliated groups, there exists an ‘expression of conditional intention’—“I will not 
interfere with objects in your possession if you will not interfere with those in mine.”148   
Once the agreement exists it becomes moralized over time through convention. The 
convention that mandates mutual respect of property was not, it is important to note, an 
originally moral notion, according to Hume.  Rather, the convention was an outcome of 
the desire to keep accumulations for oneself and one’s close kin.  Justice qua convention 
came into being alongside the development of the individual, or rather, the individual, the 
individual’s property, and the idea of justice as a virtue occurred at the same moment in 
the progress of modern society.  The individual desires to protect what he has 
accumulated for himself and his close kin, and he realizes he can do this better if he is not 
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pilfering his neighbor’s goods.  Thus, a contract is born out of mutual advantage and, if 
not greed, then at least avidity. 
Is Hume’s notion of justice all there is to justice?  Or, rather, to frame this 
question for present purposes, Is [or should] Hume’s justice-as-contractual-convention 
[be] the theoretical basis for inter-relations between nation-states that aim to address 
grave humanitarian concerns related to global poverty and urban migration? Hume’s idea 
does not contribute much in terms of the problems of national sovereignty and radical, 
socio-economic inequality that exist under globalization today.  If the very distribution of 
current resources is what is unjust about radical global inequality, then Hume’s theory 
serves a merely conservative function, as a justification of the status quo. More to the 
point, Hume’s idea of artificial virtue intuitively appears to be a very limited way to think 
about justice.   
Justice is a convention we use, and a sort of contract we make up and depend 
upon, when we find ourselves wanting to keep our possessions and resources in 
associative relations.  But justice is not merely that convention and contract.  Justice 
could also be a virtue that depends upon our magnaminity or generosity, as it was for 
Aristotle.  That is, justice could be the subject of what we give away, rather than only 
what we keep.  Further, the idea of justice could be about how we set up a present or 
future agreement or contract, rather than only pointing back in time to an originary, 
supposed or presumed, contractual convention.  Justice could be about how we change 
the terms of distribution, rather than justifying our own current acquisition of resources.  
Finally, justice does not have to be a contract at all.  
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3.9. Aristotle: Distributive Justice and the Suspicion of Profit 
 In contrast to Hume, Aristotle presents an idea of justice that is relevant for the 
problem of the GSUS. Aristotle’s theory of justice, is a well-formed alternative to the 
social contract tradition.  Aristotle distinguishes between corrective and distributive 
justice, and in doing so, presents the possibility, according to his idea of distributive 
justice, that there is a kind of justice that is unrelated to strict liability, and has nothing to 
do with contracts.  Furthermore, Aristotle’s account of profit as a direct threat to the 
virtue of justice, can be very useful for a conception of global justice that responds to the 
current global economic situation in terms of the GSUS. 
Aristotle astutely observed that justice might be the kind of thing that is opaque to 
us. It is not an easy task to discern the nature of justice.  For Aristotle, justice was an 
active condition of the soul, a virtue, discerned most often from its opposite. That is, 
justice is most often first discerned from experiences of injustice.149  
Aristotle was the first to make the famous distinction between distributive and 
corrective justice.  Distributive justice, for Aristotle, recognizes fairness in dividing 
certain goods amongst political communities, while corrective justice restores the 
conditions of an originary agreement. In Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle 
writes that there are two senses of justice: one coming from the injustice of breaking a 
law, and one experienced when someone takes more than their due.150  Aristotle 
continues: “One form of the justice that is part of virtue, and of what is just as a result of 
it, is that which is involved in the distributions of honor or money …. While another form 
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is the justice that sets things straight.”151  Ernest J. Weinrib interprets Aristotle’s 
distinction this way: “Corrective justice is the idea that liability rectifies the injustice 
inflicted by one person on another”, while “distributive justice deals with the distribution 
of whatever is divisible (Aristotle mentions honors and goods).”152  Thus, corrective 
justice applies when a person has suffered a transactional injustice; it is past-regarding.  
Distributive justice is more future-regarding: it seeks to create a community in which 
people receive their fair share of particular goods in accordance with their relative merit 
or a generally agreed-upon ideal of equality.  Weinrib explains: “For Aristotle, justice in 
both these forms [distributive and corrective] relates one person to another according to a 
conception of equality or fairness (the Greek ison connotes both).  Injustice arises in the 
absence of equality, when one person has too much or too little relative to another.”153  
Even though they are connected by the over-arching ideal of equality, the two versions of 
justice differ in the form of equality proper to each of them.  Distributive justice depends 
upon a proportional equality, with reference to the entirety of the population in question, 
while corrective justice depends upon whatever notion of equality was at work when the 
two parties entered into the agreement between each other.   
As noted, corrective justice serves a restorative, rectifying function.  Considered 
as liability, corrective justice is meant to impose a sort of remedy.  Distributive justice, on 
the other hand, is meant to create peace and fairness amongst the entire community, for 
the future.  Importantly, it is not always necessary that one be liable for a past injustice or 
harm in order that one be responsible for the claims of distributive justice.  Although, it is 
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more likely that a harm of unequal distribution of goods occur before demands of 
distributive justice arise, the responsibility to manage the fair distribution of goods may 
belong to the polis, as a community, regardless of whether the community as a whole, or 
individual members of that community, were to blame for unfair distribution of goods.  
For example, say one foreign mercenary came and swindled some Athenian citizens out 
of their savings, before leaving on a ship back to Sparta, never to be seen again on 
Athenian shores.  Under Aristotle’s conception of distributive justice, it would still be the 
responsibility of members of the Athenian community to ensure that goods be distributed 
in such a way that the more gullible amongst them do not wander the streets homeless 
and in despair, even though the community and its other members are not to blame for 
the injustice.  In another instance, it may be the case that no unfairness was present, and 
no harm was done, and yet the claims of distributive justice would still be appropriate.  
As future regarding, the community in question could merely desire to create a fair 
system.  Both instances, that is, with or without the past injustice by the community, 
would be regarded as matters of distributive justice. 
 The distinction between corrective justice and distributive justice is important for 
global justice.  Global poverty is undoubtedly connected to the history of colonialism.  If 
the colonizing countries of the global north were to offer reparations to the former 
colonies, that action would be a matter of corrective justice, in the sense of correcting 
past harms, and restoring prosperity to a region formerly exploited.  However, beyond the 
issue of restorative justice related to the harm of colonialism, there is the issue, 
independent of assigning guilt and righting histories, of addressing humanitarian crises 
and grave economic inequalities right now, and for the future.  Such an effort might be 
considered distributive justice. 
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There is much more to Aristotle’s discussion of justice besides the distinction 
between corrective and distributive justice, although that distinction retains great 
influence in law and political philosophy, today.   Interestingly, however, Aristotle 
shrewdly observed that justice most often relates to arguments over profit.  Indeed, the 
language of profit gives clues to the very nature of justice. Aristotle writes: 
In connection with all the other unjust acts, a reference is always made to 
some particular vice---for instance, if one commits adultery, to dissipation, 
if one leaves a fellow soldier in danger, to cowardice, if one hits someone, 
to anger----but if one makes a profit, it is referred to no other vice than 
injustice.154  
 
Undeserved profit is most directly called an injustice, and what is unjust about 
undeserved profit guides our conceptions of justice most accurately.  Justice, for 
Aristotle, is a complete virtue, because it is that toward which the other virtues refer.  
However, justice’s relation to other virtues, such as temperance, is specific.  When we 
note the injustice of, for instance, an adulterer, we say that the person is immoral first, 
because they are lacking in some virtue such as the ability to keep promises, and we then 
conclude on this basis that they are unjust.  In contrast, when we talk about someone 
making a profit by exploiting another, we say they are unjust first, and this conclusion 
does not need the justification of the lack of some other virtue; it stands alone as 
sufficient description of that which is objectionable to the state of the soul. 
As an aside, Aristotle also astutely perceives that discerning what is just and unjust, 
as well as discerning the nature of justice itself, is not an easy task.  People who think 
they know what justice is merely fool themselves.  He writes: 
And similarly, people think there is nothing wise about recognizing what 
is just and unjust, because the things about which the laws speak are not 
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difficult to understand (but these are not things that are just, except 
incidentally).  But to know how just things are done and distributed is a 
bigger job than to know what is healthy, although even there it is easy to 
know about honey and wine and hellebore, or about burning and cutting, 
but how one ought to dispense them for health, and to whom and when, is 
such a big job that it is the same as being a doctor.155 
 
Memorizing and following the laws is not, Aristotle emphasizes, even a remotely 
similar activity to discerning what is just.  Aristotle is skeptical that the laws even reflect 
justice to the degree we assume.  Interestingly, the metaphor of health is perhaps the 
guiding metaphor of the Nicomachean Ethics.156 Aristotle holds doctors in the highest of 
esteem; his father, Nicomachus of Stagira, was a doctor, and the Ethics is named after 
him. Aristotle consistently emphasizes that restoring patients to health is both an art and a 
science. Thus, when he writes that discerning just distribution of goods is a more difficult 
job than discerning how to return a person to health, he is saying something about serious 
matters. Indeed, he writes that beyond the distinction between distributive and corrective 
justice, there are two kinds of justice: the justice that is concerned with honor and power 
and safety, and the justice that is concerned with “everything that a serious person is 
serious about.”157 The things which ‘serious people are serious about’, in Aristotle’s 
immensely appealing phrasing, include the matters about which no one can be greedy, 
that is, developing virtue.  On cannot be ‘greedy’ about, for example, being gentle of 
temper.  Virtue is something one desires, if one is a ‘serious person’, but not something 
one can hoard or take away from other people.  For Aristotle, virtue multiplies equality; it 
does not diminish it.  Whereas for Hume, justice taken as an ‘artificial virtue’, can 
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reinforce inequality, if two parties in question have vastly unequal properties and agree, 
by the invention of justice, to maintain that inequality.  For Aristotle, it is impossible that 
justice reinforce inequality, because the things related to justice (temperance, equanimity, 
magnaminity) are not things you can hoard.  If one were just, in character, one would not, 
by definition, be avaricious.  When we think of justice this way, it becomes clearer why 
justice is the virtue that unites all the other virtues, for Aristotle. 
 
3.10. Contract and Virtue: Comparing Hume and Aristotle 
It is crucial to emphasize the differences between Aristotle’s vision of justice and 
Hume’s, because there is not, at least in the West, one singular inheritance of theories of 
justice.  In terms of our inquiry here, that is, specifying a theory of justice that would be 
adequate to address the claims of injustice in the GSUS, the foundation would need to be 
more Aristotelian than Humean.  For Aristotle, justice is not an artificial invention.  It is 
rather a natural virtue that unites all the other virtues.  Justice is not, for Aristotle, a 
construction encouraged by convention that helps people with no familial affiliation hang 
onto their property.  Justice is a virtue, which, like other virtues, is an active way-of-
being-at work that enlivens the soul.158 In addition, for Aristotle, there is much more to 
justice than the maintenance of a kind of social contract.  Hume considered all justice as 
corrective. Certainly, corrective justice depends upon restoring the conditions of some 
degree of originary contract.  But distributive justice need not depend upon a [fictional or 
actual] social contract.  There can be claims about distributive justice, as Aristotle shows 
us, where no specific agreement has been violated, yet goods and honors need to be 
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distributed in a more equitable fashion, in the future.  The salient point here is that, in the 
ancient conception, distributive justice need not depend on a pre-existing contract 
regarding either property ownership or profit, which has been violated or breeched.  That 
is, distributive justice can be independent of corrective justice.  This point is important 
when we consider claims by Nagel and other philosophers writing from communitarian 
perspectives that there is no such thing as ‘global justice’ because justice depends upon 
an associative relation.  Finally, Aristotle understood what Hume may not have, namely, 
that objections to undue profit are most directly related to justice.  That is, justice does 
not first function to protect property, as in Hume’s conception, but rather to mediate and 
bring equilibrium to people’s lives and the community when some people claim too much 
property for themselves.159 Hume and Aristotle thus have radically different visions of 
justice. 
 
3.11. John Stuart Mill: Justice as Sentiment that Precedes Law 
John Stuart Mill’s vision of justice, in Utilitarianism, rounds out this study in 
contrasts.  Mill’s discussion does not limit justice to concerns about property, and he does 
not make a distinction between distributive and corrective justice.  Indeed, Mill claims 
that the sentiment of justice is always about correcting harm. So it would seem that, for 
Mill, like Hume, all justice is corrective. Mill’s definition of justice departs from Hume’s, 
however, in so far as Mill does not believe justice is an artificial virtue undergirded by 
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convention.  Rather, justice, for Mill, is first a sentiment, a feeling that harm has been 
done and must be amended, and it is from this sentiment that law and convention 
develop.  
Mill observes that the word “justice” comes from the Latin justum, as “a form of 
jussum, that which has been ordered.”  In Greek, it meant “a suit at law”.  Mill writes, 
“Originally, indeed, it meant only the mode or manner of doing things, but it early came 
to mean the prescribed manner; that which the recognized authorities, patriarchal, 
judicial, or political would enforce.”160  There has long been debate as to whether the 
province of justice is law or morality, and further what the relation is between law and 
morality, to begin with.  Mill’s position on the matter is clear: what distinguishes justice 
from moral obligation in general is that justice, the realm of rights, possesses 
correspondent duties. “Justice implies something which it is not only right to do, and 
wrong not to do, but which some individual person can claim from us as his moral 
right.”161 He continues to explain that when we call something unjust, we mean not only 
that it needs to be changed, but also that those in power to change the situation ought to 
be compelled to do so.162  
Mill’s further definition of justice proceeds via an examination of ‘ordinary 
language’. First, he asks what we mean by ‘justice’ when we use it in our everyday 
language. He concludes that there is an innate sense of justice that precedes its 
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application in law, and, in the final reckoning, justice consists of two parts: a rule of 
conduct (law), and the sentiment that sanctions the rule (morality). According to Mill, the 
sentiment behind the law is as much or more constitutive of justice proper as the law 
itself, and thus deserves much attention.  According to Mill, common attributes of ‘the 
sense of natural justice’ include these six: 
1) It is unjust to deprive a person of personal liberty, property, or anything that 
belongs to him by law.  In other words, it is just to respect the legal rights of 
another. 
2) It is unjust to take from anyone that to which he has a moral right. 
3) It is just that each person should obtain that which he deserves and unjust that 
he obtains a good or undergoes an evil that he does not deserve. 
4) It is unjust to break faith with anyone, that is, to violate an engagement. 
5) It is inconsistent with justice to be partial. 
6) Justice, in many cases, means equality.163 
Mill maintains that these six elements of the sentiment of justice—legal rights, moral 
rights, just deserts, keeping of contracts, impartiality, and equality —are part of a 
common morality that informs the law, and which nevertheless subsist in absence of the 
law, in the form of moral sentiment. 
Thus, whereas for Hume, justice cannot rest upon sentiment because ‘natural’ 
feelings are always partial and never egalitarian, Mill does not maintain such a strong 
distinction between friends and strangers.  For Mill, the stirrings of the feelings of 
injustice occur ‘naturally’, that is, they are innate, spontaneous, and commonly held. 
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They do not originate in convention alone, and such feelings are possible in the public, as 
well as the private, realm. 
 Mill’s conception of justice as consisting, first, in what he calls sentiment, and 
existing whether or not the law is there to support such sentiment, is important for global 
justice because international law, in the early twenty-first century, is still very much in 
development.  The absence of viable enforcement of international law, in the case of 
human rights violations or capability deprivations, should not tempt us to name these 
violations anything other than severe injustices.  For Mill, the fact that the sentiment or 
the feeling of injustice was present before the law did not subsequently lead him to 
skepticism about the validity of the sentiment itself.  Rather, the presence of feelings of 
injustice, whether of inequality, impartiality, or just deserts, function as a directive for 
clearer laws with more enforcement.  Under Mill’s conception, when one feels that the 
environmental degradation and serious threats to people’s health and wellbeing present in 
the GSUS is unjust, one does not have to appeal to the laws of a corrupt local 
government, or the non-existent laws of an as-yet-undeveloped international law, in order 
to make such claims.   
 
3.12. Amartya Sen: Comparative Theories of Justice 
 The social contract tradition is not the only theory of justice at work, and it should 
not be the paradigmatic theory of justice at play in considering radical global inequality.  
This position is supported by Amartya Sen.   In The Idea of Justice, Sen examines the 
long history of ideas of justice and concludes that, at least in the Western tradition, there 
are two very different approaches to justice: the ‘transcendental institutionalism’ of the 
contractarian tradition and the more realization-based understanding of the comparative 
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tradition.  Sen is the first to place two opposing histories of justice in such sharp, and 
incisive, contrast.  These two conceptions might also be described simply as ideal versus 
non-ideal theory, or thinking of justice as relating to the way to set up just institutions, 
antecedently, versus conceiving justice as a response to specific injustice, subsequently. 
However, this distinction between historical traditions, as Sen argues, goes much deeper 
than the contrast between ideal and non-ideal theory.   
To explain this contrast in Western law and political philosophy, Sen compares 
the difference between the concepts of niti and nyaya in early Indian jurisprudence.  Sen 
writes, “The former idea, that of niti, relates to organizational propriety as well as 
behavioral correctness, whereas the latter, nyaya, is concerned with what emerges and 
how, and in particular the lives that people are actually able to lead.”164  Sen compares 
these two traditions to the contractarian and the comparative theories of justice, 
respectively.165  By the contractarian tradition, he means the distinct features of Rousseau 
and Hobbes: that justice would be conceived as ideal, or perfect, and that justice would 
be a matter of just arrangements of institutions and society.  In the contractarian tradition, 
the current ideal is always contrasted with a former ideal—often the state of nature, often 
fictional—from which the contract rescues its subjects.166  The guiding question of the 
contractarian tradition is: What would be perfectly just institutions?   
Alternately, the comparative tradition asks instead: What kind of lives are people 
actually able to lead? How would justice be advanced? The comparative conception of 
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justice “concentrate[s] on behavior of actual people, rather than presuming compliance by 
all with ideal behavior.”167  That is, the comparative tradition has concerned itself with 
how people are fairing within an institution, or generally, how people are fairing, whether 
inside or outside any associative relation, regardless of institutional contract. 
Furthermore, there is understanding within this tradition that “the importance of human 
lives, experiences, and realizations cannot be supplanted by information about institutions 
that exist and rules that operate.”168   
Sen places his own Capabilities Approach squarely within the comparative 
tradition.  The capabilities approach is concerned with the justness of institutions, qua 
institutional set-up, and the ideal of equality as such.  But the capabilities approach, and 
the comparative tradition, is also concerned with institutional arrangements insofar as 
they influence the lives people are actually able to lead; not in the moment of consenting 
to some real or fictional contract, but in terms of the course and quality of their lifetimes. 
 
3.13. A Consolidated Vision of Justice Appropriate to the GSUS 
 The claim that the GSUS are unjust rests upon a vision of justice gleaned from 
Aristotle’s distributive justice.  Such a vision is firmly in the camp of Mill’s explanation 
of moral sentiment as the foundation for law, and can be best explained in terms of Sen’s 
description of the comparative tradition of justice.  First, as I have explained, Aristotle’s 
notion of distributive justice does not depend upon an originary agreement or social 
contract between parties.  A future-oriented distributive justice need not, then, depend 
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upon a pre-formed associative relation for its validity. This future potential that Aristotle 
instills into distributive justice is important for theories of global justice because one does 
not need to be a citizen of a particular country in order to demand justice. 169  It is also 
important that under Aristotle’s conception of distributive justice, justice in general does 
not necessarily depend upon one’s status as a citizen of a particular country operating 
under the rule of law. 
In this line of thought, a vision of justice that is responsive to the GSUS is best 
conceived along with Mill, so that the feeling of moral indignation or outrage, that is, the 
sentiment of injustice, precedes the formation of laws that would address such a feeling.  
Further, this sentiment guides our very notions of justice, and just laws.  The sentiment is 
significant whether or not one lives in a country that operates under the rule of law, or, 
for that matter, whether or not there exists international law that can adjudicate claims for 
non-citizens or claims between nations.  Thus, if I live in extreme poverty in a country 
that does not have in its constitution security for basic human rights, my claims of justice 
are still wholly valid moral claims, regardless of whether international or domestic law 
has yet evolved to deal with my demands.    
My claims of economic justice are especially claims of justice, in Mill’s moral sense 
and Aristotle’s conception of distributive justice.  There is still a debate amongst rights 
theorists as to whether there are first order, or basic rights (like the rights Shue mentions, 
to subsistence and security), and then second order economic and civil rights.170 Aristotle 
                                                
169 To note, the problem of moving from international legal claims to national ones, and further, to the 
claims of individuals within nation states, is a large and well-entrenched problem in discussions of 
international law. The degree to which documents like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
Geneva Conventions have legal influence within sovereign nation states is a continuing, often 
controversial, discussion in the International Criminal Court and the United Nations. 
 
170 Shue, p. 46-51 
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puts the matter in a rather revelatory light: Matters of undue, unearned, or harmfully 
unequal profit are the very paradigm for justice, or rather, injustice itself. Aristotle’s 
insights into justice and its relation to profit are more germane for the purposes of global 
justice than, say, the social contract tradition.  A possible upshot of a position like 
Aristotle’s is that matters of exploitation that result in harmfully unequal gains in profit, 
which are the conditions that create and maintain the GSUS, are unjust whether or not 
there was an original contract between parties that puts them into associative relation.  
Furthermore, an Aristotelean conception could consider justice not as a function of 
allowing people to keep their property, but rather that justice is, first and most directly, a 
matter of re-distributing property that has been harmfully divided in the first place. 
Finally, a vision of justice that is responsive to the GSUS is ultimately best drawn 
from the comparative tradition of justice that Sen explicates.  There is a great deal to be 
gained from envisioning perfectly just international institutions, for example, setting the 
rules of an institution like the United Nations, and defining the procedures of agreement, 
the terms of cooperation, between state actors considered as individuals.  That is not, 
however, my goal here.  Rather, my aim is to ask what kind of lives people are living 
who reside in the GSUS, and on that basis form a provisional definition of justice that 
attends to the concerns of people living in these situations.  
 
3.14. Responsibility for Justice 
One final comment. The debates about global justice, ranging as they primarily 
have  from questions of the rights and duties of rich westerners (excepting the capabilities 
approach), rest not only on a notion of justice inherited from the social contract tradition, 
but also on a notion of responsibility. Contractarians see responsibility as tied to guilt.  If 
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one is responsible for harm, one has violated the contract in some way.  Thus, for 
contractarians, responsibility is past-regarding and corrective. What one is responsible for 
is correcting the breach of contract and restoring the original conditions of that contract.  
If there was never any contract and never any ‘associative relation’, as Nagel terms it, 
then justice, in the stricter sense, would not apply, and neither would responsibility.  
However, there is another notion of responsibility implicit in Aristotle’s concept 
of distributive justice, which can be traced through Aristotle to, perhaps surprisingly, 
Hannah Arendt and, finally, to Iris Marion Young.  Young’s last, posthumously 
published work, Responsibility for Justice, is quite extraordinary on this point.  Young 
reads Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem, as well as her essay on responsibility, and 
interprets a serious distinction between guilt and responsibility.171  
During and after the Eichmann trials, Arendt famously disagreed with Jaspers on 
the matter of whether or not the German people could possess ‘collective guilt.’  Arendt 
believed that the concept of guilt applied only to individual deeds.  Arendt held that 
calling everyone in a society guilty does not serve any purpose, but rather obfuscates the 
restoration that needs to happen in that society.  “Where all are guilty,” Arendt writes, 
“nobody is.  Guilt, unlike responsibility, always singles out: it is strictly personal.”172  
Further, “Where all are guilty, nobody in the last analysis can be judged.”173 For Arendt, 
it is a symptom of the excessive personalization of modern society that we mistake guilt 
for responsibility. Arendt holds, further, that parties like Eichmann, those who directly 
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Responsibility”, “Collective Responsibility”, in The Portable Hannah Arendt. NY: Penguin, 2000. 
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sent Jewish people to the death camps, are in fact more guilty than those who passively 
stood by and allowed others to carry out reprehensible deeds.  Nevertheless, the lack of 
strict liability does not recuse the German people from all responsibility.  There is, 
Arendt insists, an important difference between Eichmann and the rest of the German 
people. That difference is captured in the distinction between guilt and responsibility.  
Guilt, according to Young , is past regarding, but responsibility can be future 
regarding.  Guilt and responsibility are thus not equivalent.  I quote Young at length: 
To summarize, guilt should be attributed to persons who commit crimes or 
wrongs, or directly contribute by their actions to crimes or wrongs.  Being 
responsible, but not guilty, is a designation that belongs to persons whose 
active or passive support for governments, institutions, and practices 
enables culprits to commit crimes and wrongs.  As I read it, this 
distinction is a matter not of degree, but of kind.  Guilt can come in 
degrees.  We might properly say that the person who plans the 
construction of a camp without charge is more guilty of a crime against 
international law than those who supervise the guards are.  But both are 
guilty.  Responsibility, as Arendt puts it, devolves onto people who 
haven’t committed the wrongs, but who are nevertheless connected to 
them.  In this sense I have a political responsibility in relation to activities 
at Guantanamo Bay and similar extralegal detention camps.174    
 
This sense of responsibility, as opposed to guilt, is very important for considerations of 
global justice.  Building on Arendt’s initial insights, Young theorizes what responsibility 
might look like for global justice.  She points out that there can exist structural injustice 
that has very little to do with people’s intention.  For instance, the business owner’s 
intention might not be to decimate the rainforest. The intention of those running the IMF 
might not be to impose impossible debt structures on poor countries. The Nike 
consumer’s intention might not be that Filipinos would work endless hours in sweatshops 
to create his sneakers.  In short, there might not be, as in the definition of classical 
                                                
174 Young, Iris Marion.  Responsibility for Justice.  Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011. 92 
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racism, ‘hatred in hearts and minds.’ Nevertheless, it does not follow from the absence of 
intention that there be an absence of responsibility. 
 Young suggests a new, social connection model of responsibility.  This model has 
little to do with liability in the strict legal sense, and thus has little to do with the 
corrective model of justice.  Rather, “being responsible in relation to structural injustice 
means that one has an obligation to join with others who share that responsibility in order 
to transform the structural processes to make their outcome less unjust.”175  Instead of 
blaming, or urging people to defend themselves, the aim of the social connection model 
of responsibility is empowerment, specifically, political empowerment. Young means 
‘responsibility’ in the way I mean the word when I say that, in my capacity as a teacher, I 
have a responsibility that my students learn.  I have not done anything wrong, and my 
role as a teacher is not [for the most part] a punishment.  Nevertheless, I have a 
responsibility to ensure a specific outcome.  Indeed, I am empowered to ensure that 
outcome.  Further, in the social connection model of responsibility, the responsibility is 
shared; it is not individual.  This may be hard to imagine, as we in our individualistic, 
protestant-influenced American society perhaps do not imagine any responsibility can be, 
truly, shared. Most importantly, collective responsibility is, for Young, discharged only 
through collective, that is, political, action.  Politics here means “public communicative 
engagement with others for the sake of organizing our relationships and coordinating our 
actions most justly.”176 
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3.15. Conclusion 
 Global justice, especially considered through the lens of the GSUS, should not 
rely so heavily on the social contract tradition.  Rather, in drawing its historical 
precedents from Aristotle’s distributive justice and suspicion of profit, as well as Mill’s 
notion of sentiment as undergirding the law, a theory of justice emerges which adds to the 
capabilities approach and human rights advocacy in significant ways.  Further, this 
comparative vision of justice allows for a more empowering, and less resentful or 
reactive, idea of responsibility.  Still although it may be clear what we are responsible for, 
namely the conditions of life in the GSUS, the questions of what exactly is wrong about 
those conditions and why we are responsible to those individuals who suffer from them, 
need further examination. Chapter IV will address the conditions of life in the GSUS in 
terms of the concept of alienation; Chapter V will end the dissertation with a discussion 
of ideas of human dignity that is a response to economic exploitation, alienation, and a 
future-regarding theory of justice. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ALIENATION 
 
 
“Without money, each daily human need becomes a pain.” –John Berger177 
 
“The problem of suffering takes place and must be understood within the more expansive 
frame of “the problem of creating”. – Elaine Scarry178 
 
 
4.1. Overview 
Given the situation of the Global South urban slums (GSUS), and especially 
women’s position within them, one can intuitively sense that these slums fail to support 
human flourishing in very basic ways.  In my experience, though, it is not always easy, at 
least for Westerners who have not themselves lived in the slums, to say what, exactly, is 
unjust about this condition. Thus far, I have given a partial vision of justice that allows 
for a response to the GSUS: a vision of justice based on a forward-looking, distributive 
model (Aristotle, Young), as opposed to a backward-regarding, contractarian model 
(Hume, Nagel), wherein claims of justice can be made based on sentiment even 
antecedent to the formation of correspondent law (Mill).  Now, within this vision of 
justice, we need a way to talk about how the GSUS, specifically, are unjust.  What kind 
of language would capture this condition, then, a language that gives traction to the basic 
experience of injustice?  
The language of alienation and dignity captures this sense of injustice in some 
crucial ways. However, what we know of alienation and dignity, inherited from the 
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178 Elaine Scarry.  The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World. New York and Oxford: 
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Marxist and liberal traditions, respectively, must be expanded upon with regards to the 
specific problems of the GSUS, that is, problems of both urbanization and increasing 
poverty in the global south. 
Hannah Arendt and Elaine Scarry posit alienation in terms of the ‘loss of the 
world’: the deprivation of durable material structures and lasting institutions that are the 
preconditions for political speech and action.  When communities cannot devote their 
work to creating durable artifacts like infrastructure, houses, schools, and community 
centers, namely artifacts that evidence their dignity and transcend their own lives, people 
in the GSUS become alienated.   The concept of alienation, as the loss of the world, is 
vital to understanding the injustice of global poverty in contemporary capitalism. 
 The language of alienation characterizes the conditions of life in the GSUS, 
because first, it provides a ground of critique as to why this situation is unjust, and not 
merely unfortunate or unequal. Second, the language of alienation evidences how the 
problem of poverty is one of a lack meaningful work, the kind of work that manifests 
people’s creativity, uniqueness, dignity, and creates a livable world.  Third, 
conceptualizing the matter of global poverty in terms of alienation offers a first- person 
perspective that is lacking in the third-person philosophical discourses of rights and 
obligations 
 
4.2. A Definition of Alienation, in Light of the Urban Slums of the Global South  
Alienation is a relational and humanistic concept, implying that people have 
become separated from what allows them to flourish, to be whole, or to live up to the 
possibilities of their humanity. Richard Schmitt writes that the central aspects of 
alienation are a deformation of personality, and a reduced ability to live one’s own life 
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because of domination by accidental conditions.179  In The Future of Alienation, Richard 
Schacht traces the concept of economic alienation to the Roman introduction of the 
institutions of ownership and exchange.  Schacht writes that the Romans began using the 
Latin word “alienatio” to mean economic alienation, the action of transferring ownership 
from one party to another. Importantly, alienation originally meant the loss of ownership 
and property; this sense of alienation as lost property is important, we shall see later, in 
thinking about alienation under global poverty.  Schacht posits that, since the Romans, 
the word alienation has had four basic senses: “1) different, foreign, other.  2) economic 
transfer 3) separation or estrangement from something other than oneself, to which one 
ideally should be united, 4) mental derangement or disorder.”180    
 Historically, economic alienation occurs not merely when economic transfer 
happens, but when economic transfer causes separation between the person and 
something the person needs.  Additionally, economic alienation is not merely a lack of 
control over one’s assets, but it occurs when loss of economic control leads to loss of 
control over one’s ability for self-determination. Alienation occurs when economic 
relations, or lack thereof, gain such a power that they over-determine other sorts of 
relation such as the personal, political, material, and spiritual relations of a person. 
Economic alienation happens when one’s loss of economic autonomy leads to loss of 
spiritual and physical autonomy.   
To put the matter in terms of a simple example, consider those who have recently 
lost their jobs.  When they lose their income, they lose a certain degree of ‘economic 
autonomy’, the ability to choose where and how to spend their money in ways that fulfill 
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both their physical needs, and their needs as creative persons.  They also lose economic 
autonomy in losing the ability to decide how long they are going to work, and in what 
capacity.  Their diminished wealth is now used solely to fulfill their basic needs, and so 
concerns like housing and food take on an importance that they previously did not hold.  
Furthermore, time cannot be spent for fulfilling other, more spiritual and social needs, 
like helping at children’s schools or planting communal garden, because the new 
economic status mandates time spent searching for new jobs, and there are no longer the 
economic means to satisfy these other needs. 
 Consider, also, when banks foreclose upon people houses.  Foreclosure is a 
stronger example of how the loss of economic autonomy leads to alienation.  A person is 
separated from an economic asset, their house, but it is not in that separation, only, that 
they experience alienation.  The problem is that the loss of their property mandates the 
loss of bargaining power in the market, a loss of respect as a worthy borrower.  Thus, a 
separation from a material property or asset leads to a loss of self-determination within 
the broader social structure. 
Alienation is neither purely material nor purely symbolic; it is a phenomenon in 
which there exist symbolic repercussions for material loss.  The sense of alienation that 
enhances an understanding of the GSUS is both economic and political.  As such, 
alienation is not and cannot be either disembodied or de-spiritualized experience.  As we 
will see from Arendt and Scarry’s interpretation of economic and political alienation, the 
condition has everything to do with the way our deepest spiritual and psychological needs 
express themselves, through the work of our bodies, to create a world. The sense of 
alienation relevant to the GSUS is this notion of unwanted privacy and forced isolation, 
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enforced by economic and political mechanisms, and overcome by public human creation 
and creativity. 
For Marx, in the early parts the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, the 
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, and in his critique of religion in the Theses on 
Feuerbach, alienation is not an inevitable, transcendental force beyond human 
intervention or understanding.  Rather, the condition of alienation is a product of 
contingent and mutable social relations.181  Marx’s vision of ‘natural’ human creativity, 
the antithesis of alienation, was to exist in and acknowledge human community and the 
extent of our material relations and connections within that community. Marx’s theory of 
religion, and his critique of Hegel, show the ways in which some human suffering is a 
matter of human doing, and not an intractable essence, feeling, mood, power, or spirit 
beyond human control. To suffer under alienation is to suffer because human relations 
create material a reality that inhibits or abolishes full human potentials and capacities. For 
Marx, nowhere are the forces of perverse human social relations more evident than in 
capitalism, and one reason that capitalism perverts human relations is that it perverts 
human labor.  For Marx, alienation occurs, partly because under capitalism, the structure 
of the system is not created by the worker and its mechanisms are outside of the control 
of the worker’s creativity.  Another way to say this is that alienation occurs for workers 
when they do not see the product of their work as an expression of themselves, their 
human powers, and their social relations.  The end product of the alienated worker seems 
to have no relation whatsoever to the work done by that worker. As we see from Capital, 
because labor is an objectification of human power, the way to correct the fetishization of 
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the commodity under capitalism, that is, the idolizing of the product made, instead of the 
work expended in making the product, is to create a system which, unlike capitalism, 
allows for workers to recognize themselves in their work, and have this recognition 
confirmed by others. In addition to the alienation of the worker from her or his work, 
Marx [famously] describes other types of alienation: the alienation of the productive 
activity of the worker, the alienation from our species being, the alienation from other 
human beings, and the alienation from nature.182  
However, in considering the problem of the GSUS, we must expand on Marx’s 
vision of alienation, beyond his diagnosis of the proletariat and the capitalist. Women 
living in the GSUS do all kinds of work, both productive and reproductive, and the 
singular model of the alienated worker, who is usually presumed to be male, laboring in 
industrial factories gets us only so far.183 Nevertheless, the processes by which migrants 
and immigrants end up in GSUS looks remarkably similar to expropriation, and Marx’s 
instincts on the relation between alienation and private property are still quite visionary.  
These ‘instincts’, as it were, can be expanded and applied to the current situation of late 
stage globalization, and Hannah Arendt and Elaine Scarry can help with such a task.  
Taken collectively, Arendt’s and Scarry’s readings of Marx offer a vision of alienation 
that can describe those conditions in the GSUS, which can point to the specific injustice 
of the GSUS. As noted, Arendt and Scarry both posit alienation in terms of the ‘loss of 
                                                
182 Of course, my account here does not exhaust, by any measure, the history of the concept of alienation.  
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the world’, that is, the depravation of durable material structures and lasting institutions 
that are the preconditions for political speech and action.  This sense of the ‘loss of the 
world’ gives us the most traction in understanding what it is that people suffer and fight 
against under global poverty.  
 
4.3. Arendt as Critical Reader of Marx 
 The Human Condition is propelled by a concern for alienation.  At the outset, 
Arendt explains that the singular, proclaimed purpose of the analysis is to historically 
trace back modern world alienation in order to understand the modern age.184  Our age, 
driven by capitalism, is marked by the loss of the world in general, but this loss is 
especially acute for those living in poverty, that is, for those living on the underside of 
capitalism.  The condition of the GSUS is one of world alienation, in the way that Arendt 
means the term, because the lack of material infrastructure preordains an unwanted 
isolation, and a logic of utility, which compromises a recognizable plurality amongst 
persons.  Simply put, a slum is not a world. 
 Arendt’s critique of capitalism is grounded in her reading of Marx, to be sure--- 
Marx is the fountainhead for Arendt’s conception of alienation. However, the two visions 
of alienation are not identical; Arendt departs from Marx in important ways. “World 
alienation,” Arendt writes, “and not self alienation as Marx thought, has been the 
hallmark of the modern age.”185  For Arendt, the machinations of modern capitalism 
effect not separation from oneself, from one’s natural and essential condition, but rather a 
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throwing back upon oneself into a state of unwanted privacy and isolation.  Some aspects 
of capitalism, like totalitarianism, destroy a world and, in doing so, obfuscate a shared 
sense of community and a public realm, as well as a shared history.  Bereft of a material, 
objective world, a person is left to her/himself, only. Furthermore, the destruction of the 
world under capitalism undermines the sense of each person as, unlike the commodities 
we make and use, absolutely unique and non-exchangeable.  When people become 
alienated from a world, the so-called ‘social’ realm overtakes the possibilities for political 
participation, and people are left with mere contemplation in place of action, loneliness in 
place of solidarity, and introspection in place of speech.  Without a world to support 
political action, people’s visions of the possibilities for their lives become constricted to a 
series of social relations, by which Arendt means private interests that reduce people to 
laboring solely to support their private life, instead of working together to build a shared 
and lasting dwelling place.186  
The public realm is the only arena in which people’s plurality, qua individuals, 
and their uniqueness are recognizable.  Without a public realm, supported by a material 
world, the logic of labor, which is to say the logic of utility, holds sway for all 
interactions, and the sense that people are not exchangeable for one another, the sense 
that each person has immeasurable value, is lost.  Or, more precisely, this sense that each 
person is absolutely unique, and quite literally an unprecedented event on the planet, is 
never allowed to arise in the first place.  Without a public realm, there is no space for 
people to show themselves. In the public realm, speech is “the disclosure of the “who” in 
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contradistinction to “what” somebody is---his qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings, 
which he may display or hide---that is implicit in everything somebody says and does.”187  
For Arendt, we are alienated from the world when our suffering becomes an 
excessively personal experience that cannot be transformed into manifested, material 
structures and institutions, institutions that provide the conditions of the possibility for 
speech and action that distinguishes us in our plurality. 
Marx diagnoses alienation as a problem primarily of labor, while Arendt 
diagnoses alienation as a problem of a lack of speech and action.  Marx saw the activity 
of labor as both the problem and solution to alienation, as both the proletariat’s 
misfortune and liberation. For Marx, laboring is the locus of the entire [alienated] 
condition.  In the Manuscripts, Marx writes:  
The devaluation of the world of men is in direct proportion to the increasing value of 
the world of things. Labor produces not only commodities; it produces itself and the 
worker as a commodity – and this at the same rate at which it produces commodities in 
general.  This fact expresses merely that the object which labor produces – labor’s 
product – confronts it as something alien, as a power independent of the producer. The 
product of labor is labor which has been embodied in an object, which has become 
material: it is the objectification of labor. Labor’s realization is its objectification. 
Under these economic conditions this realization of labor appears as loss of 
realization for the worker; objectification as loss of the object and bondage to it; 
appropriation as estrangement, as alienation. So much does the labor’s realization 
appear as loss of realization that the worker loses realization to the point of starving to 
death. So much does objectification appear as loss of the object that the worker is 
robbed of the objects most necessary not only for his life but for his work.”188 
The problem of labor, for Marx, is that it can be objectified to such a degree that it is 
possible that the more people work, the less they have a world.  Capitalism, in its 
separation of labor from property and land, produces an inverse relationship to the 
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amount of labor versus the workers’ livelihood, even their very lives. However, 
diminishment of the world of things under the reign of labor is not a problem of labor 
qua activity, for Marx, but a problem of exploited labor under capitalism.  Laboring can 
affirm humanity’s species being, the connection we have with one another, the ability to 
act above instinct to create ourselves and to create our world. Marx continues: 
It is just in his work upon the objective world, therefore, that man really proves 
himself to be a species-being. This production is his active species-life. Through this 
production, nature appears as his work and his reality. The object of labor is, 
therefore, the objectification of man’s species-life: for he duplicates himself not only, 
as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he sees 
himself in a world that he has created. In tearing away from man the object of his 
production, therefore, estranged labor tears from him his species-life, his real 
objectivity as a member of the species and transforms his advantage over animals into 
the disadvantage that his inorganic body, nature, is taken from him.”189 
Thus, for Marx, labor that is not estranged, but rather, ‘natural’, has the potential to 
affirm our humanity and connect us with one another. One of the harms of alienated labor 
is that it forces us to consider ourselves mere individuated bodies, and embodiment as 
such becomes a problem for us, something to be overcome, rather than the means through 
which we affirm our creativity. 
For Arendt, in contrast, in order to break free from living in a condition of 
isolation, people must be allowed to stop laboring, stop working, to rest their bodies and 
put down their tools, and speak and act as individuals in the public realm.  Thus, she 
distinguishes labor from work, and work from speech and action. As Jennifer Ring 
explains, Arendt sees the modern glorification of labor as a symptom of the neglect of the 
objective world, whereas Marx places less importance on the content of the product--- 
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what it is and what it does---and more emphasis on the relation of the product to the 
worker in the laboring activity.190  That is, Marx cares about whether the worker can 
express him/herself in the work and whether he/she can see him/herself in the finished 
product.15 Arendt is ostensibly more materialist than Marx; she cares about the product’s 
function and how long it lasts, and to what extent it creates a world in which humans can 
engage in political activity.  Yet Arendt’s materialism is not reductive.  The consequence 
of the creation of the world is to build a setting that allows for the disclosure, through 
speech and action, of people as absolutely unique and non-exchangeable subjects.  Her 
materialism is, essentially, the precondition for her singular brand of humanism.  
Arendt critiques Marx on the grounds that he glorifies labor to the extent that 
labor takes on an importance it should not hold.  Indeed, the glorification of labor is a 
serious mistake, because such a misevaluation is symptomatic of alienation under 
modernity.  She calls the over-valuation of labor as a symptom of alienation “the 
unnatural growth of the natural”.191  Labor, as activity, is natural to the human condition.  
For both Marx and Arendt, there is simply no getting around labor, the cyclical activities 
that keep humans alive.  Labor is a necessity, and, moreover, it is meaningful. Yet, for 
Arendt, labor should not bleed over into other realms and activities, and it is not the arena 
for people to realize their uniqueness in speech and action, although it, along with work, 
are the conditions of the possibility for the public realm to emerge.  However, under the 
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world-alienation indicative of modernity, the activity of laboring has gained such 
importance that it has replaced the activities of the public realm.  Arendt writes: 
 In not other sphere of life do we appear to have attained such excellence 
as in the revolutionary transformation of laboring, and this to the point 
where the verbal significance of the word itself (which always had been 
connected with hardly bearable “toil and trouble,” with effort and pain 
and, consequently, with a deformation of the human body, so that only 
extreme misery and poverty can be its source), has begun to lose its 
meaning for us.192 
 
 Arendt speaks of ‘excellence’ here, ironically.  It is no accident that the meaning 
of labor has historically been connected to first, the exertion of the human body, and 
second, to childbirth.  We moderns, alienated from the meaning of labor, fail to give the 
activity, in its difficulty, the respect it is due. The activity of laboring, when allowed to 
take over the entirety of a person’s life, causes misery and suffering.  Thus, it must be 
kept in check. Labor, for Arendt, keeps us alive but does not make us human, viz.: 
   
 Without taking things out of nature’s hands and consuming them, and 
without defending himself against the natural processes of growth and 
decay, the animal laborans could never survive.  But without being at 
home in the midst of things who durability makes them fit for use and for 
erecting a world whose very permanence stands in direct contrast to life, 
this life would never be human.193 
 
 Labor has life-giving and life-sustaining consequences.  But, as the cliché goes, 
man does not live by bread alone.  Arendt’s ‘materialist humanism’ (if one may call it 
that) characterizes the human being as a creative being, in the sense that there is an 
essential human need to create a home for herself, a world, that outlasts the vagrancies, 
the capricious fate, of ‘mere life’.  As labor is a testament to life, work is, in a sense, a 
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testament to death.  That is, the world that work creates is an acknowledgment of the fact 
that humans, as opposed to gods, are the kind of beings who die.  They are also the kind 
of beings who do not merely exist as individuals, in each monadic generation, but as an 
historical collective, and they thereby have a need to create and express themselves so 
that that their creations outlast their singular lifetimes.  
Again, though, Arendt departs from Marx, first in making distinctions between 
labor, work, and action, where for Marx, action was bound up with laboring from the 
very beginning.  For Marx, labor was, in fact, a political action.  He had a vision of 
laborers working together in industrial factories, wherein their cooperative labor itself 
would create community and power.  Arendt did not share this vision.  For her, labor, 
whether cooperative or individual, is an isolating experience. In The Human Condition, 
labor and work are the conditions of the possibility of speech and action, but by no means 
coextensive activities.  In fact, Arendt considers alienation to be the process by which one 
is deprived of political speech and action, precisely when conditions force a person only 
to labor or work.  This is not to say that Arendt believes labor to be an unworthy activity 
for the human person. Labor has its proper place in human lives and, by drawing these 
distinctions, she only wishes to keep that place limited, and not to abolish or devalue it.  
In her own account of the rise of industrial capitalism, labor in and of itself is not a 
liberating activity because if one’s life is consumed wholly and fully in labor, one is 
alienated from the cares of building a world and gaining a political voice. The industrial 
revolution generated, for the first time, “the new laboring class, which literally lived from 
hand to mouth, stood not only directly under the compelling urgency of life’s necessity 
but was at the same time alienated from all cares and worries which did not immediately 
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follow from the life process itself.”194  In other words, in the modern era, life qua survival 
takes on an importance that it, in more human eras, should not possess.  Indeed, people 
should be allowed to ‘care for other things’, a world, things that attest to our humanity 
but are not merely for the purposes of survival. For Arendt, alienation is not strictly an 
alteration of basic personality such that one is separated from oneself.  It is a loss of the 
world.  Such a world is made by the extension of ourselves not only as laborers, (animal 
laborans) but as workers (homo faber). 
 
 
4.4. The Importance of a World 
Arendt characterized modern life in terms of ‘world-alienation’ and ‘earth 
alienation.’ Living in modernity involves a divorce from both the cyclical processes of 
nature, earth, and the trans-temporal constructions. These ‘trans-temporal remnants’ are 
the literal buildings that make a world for people to inhabit which, barring a natural 
disaster, do not perish with a single generation, but entail security and a history.   
A world, for Arendt, is a home that supports human activities and the emergence 
of essential human characteristics. It is a place for humans to distinguish themselves from 
nature and from one another, and so also a space for speech and action; a world is where 
these political events are made meaningful by common remembrance, history, and shared 
stories. The world, Arendt writes, is 
[not] identical with the earth or with nature, as the limited space for 
movement of men and the general condition of organic life.  It is related, 
rather, to the human artifact, the fabrication of human hands, as well as to 
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affairs which go on among those who inhabit the man-made world 
together.”195  
 
We create the world and enter into it by first erecting durable material structures, 
lasting institutions, and cities.  Once belonging to this world, we find ourselves both 
insulated from the vagrancies of nature and bound in relation to each other in specific, 
limited ways.  The human-made world shields us from the natural circularity of time.  We 
preserve for ourselves a rectilinear sense of time by breaking from nature’s circularity, 
and engendering in these conservative acts the possibility of human natality and 
spontaneity, where new things can appear and disappear within our common space.  
Living and dwelling in a world enables us to reveal ourselves as absolutely unique 
beings, and these revelations mark time neither as eternal recurrence nor plodding 
progress. Rather, time becomes characterized by new, unexpected beginnings.  We 
maintain our properly human rectilinear time by building more permanent dwellings--- to 
share the space of the world and to transcend the life span of individuals---and in so 
doing we create a history. The persisting structural and material reality is the precondition 
for a political space of appearance, where speech and action are made possible, and 
where it becomes very clear than one person is not equivalent to another. 
Arendt writes, “To live together in the world means essentially that a world of 
things is between those who have it in common, as a table is located between those who 
sit around it; the world, like every-in-between, relates and separates men at the same 
time.”196  This sense that the world unites people while at the same moment distinguishes 
them is important.  In a setting of durable material structures, people bind together in 
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community, and also set themselves apart as individuals, by which Arendt means they 
reveal themselves in their plurality, and not their sameness. Moreover, people are not, 
like the made world itself, subject to the logic of utility. Given the precondition of a 
world in which to relate, people are not considered, and indeed do not consider 
themselves, as means to someone else’s, or some other things’, end.  In their plurality and 
their uniqueness, people themselves are the very loci of value to which the preposition of 
the ‘for which’ are applied.  Furthermore, the existence of a world makes possible the 
desired situation, unlike that of market laborers, that the value of one person cannot be 
exchanged for the value of another.    
Arendt writes that people construct a world in an effort to face their mortality.  “If 
the world is to contain a public space, it cannot be erected for one generation and planned 
for the living only; it must transcend the life-span of mortal men.”197  This idea, is, of 
course, Greek in origin, coming from a time when the Ancients believed they, as humans, 
were incomparably marked as the sole mortals in the universe, a cosmos filled with 
immortal gods and nature.  The problem, for the Greeks, was centered on reconciling the 
relationship between the mortals and the Gods.  Nevertheless, the problem of mortality, 
or rather the need to transcend it in some way, remains with us today in the modern 
world.  Striving for immortality is not vanity, but something essential to human need.  
“The task and potential greatness of mortals,” she writes, “lie in their ability to produce 
things-works and deeds and words- which would deserve to be and, at least to a degree, 
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are at home in everlastingness, so that through them mortals could find their place in a 
cosmos where everything is immortal but themselves.”198     
Arendt’s account of the need of humans to create something, through work, which 
is both an expression of ourselves and transcends ourselves, has significant crossover in 
parts of twentieth and twenty-first century psychology.  Psychologists often speak of the 
need for generativity, to leave something behind of oneself.199  Generativity here does not 
mean merely leaving a legacy behind to one’s own children.  Rather, one can take 
generativity to mean that one must leave a common world to a common public.  This 
need to leave something behind of ourselves evidences, first, the need to show something 
of ourselves in the public realm, which expresses our absolute uniqueness and 
irreplaceability. “If the world is to contain a public space, it cannot be erected for one 
generation and planned for the living only; it must transcend the lifespan of mortal 
men.”200  Interestingly, (and although she does not term it as such) Arendt writes that the 
very denial of generativity is what marks slavery in the ancient world.  “ [The] curse of 
slavery consisted not only in being deprived of freedom and of visibility, but also in the 
fear of these obscure people themselves.  That from being obscure, they should pass away 
leaving no trace that they have existed.”201  
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Similarly, sociologist Orlando Patterson has claimed that the one experience 
common to all forms of slavery in history was a marked sense of social death.202  
Patterson’s conception of social death involves much more than a dearth of generativity, 
extending to the denial of personhood to the slave in the form of an utter lack of social 
recognition. In a sense, Arendt’s perspective on slavery is similar to Patterson’s, except, 
for Arendt, social death meant not just obscurity in this life, but in death as well. But, to 
continue with Arendt’s analysis, here, in order to create a polis and so to face one’s 
mortality, there must first be a world.  Without a polis, a place from which to speak and 
act, we suffer from obscurity.  The polis is a guarantee against the futility of individual 
life, and a way out of isolation.  Such a path out of isolation fulfills an essential human 
need to leave something behind of ourselves when we perish.203 
People living in globalized poverty are suffering from unwanted isolation, and the 
lack of capability to create a world, and to leave their creation behind. However, to claim 
that the lives of people who live in the slums are constrained, most often, by too much 
labor and not enough work, is not to claim that they are socially alienated. Drawing on 
Arendt’s account of alienation, it must be stressed that their political and economic 
alienation, when it occurs, comes as a consequence of their alienation from work that 
allows them to build a world.   
Before resident Debora Swistun co-wrote Flammable: Environmental Suffering in 
an Argentine Shantytown, she composed a letter to a local socially-progressive radio disk 
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jockey, on the matter of the conditions of her neighborhood.  The letter was entitled: 
“Does anyone care if I survive?”   Swistun wrote: 
I live in Flammable Shantytown.  Does that name ring a bell?  During the 
Alfonsin presidency, we survived the explosion of the Perito Moreno, an 
oil ship, which made us abandon our homes for fifteen days without 
anybody’s help.  A couple of years ago, a coke coal processing plant 
began to operate in the neighborhood.  People all over the world have 
opposed it but our “generous” country agreed to it.  Oil tanks, grease, 
gases, all sorts of fuels, and all kinds of pollutants, a hazardous waste 
incinerator, a landfill, and close to thirty plants.  You might be asking 
whether this paradise where I eat, sleep, and breathe, and try to make 
progress is located in some remote location, far from civilization.  My 
answer: I see it every day, I breath it, I carry it inside of me. 204 
 
Swistun’s letter questions whether her neighborhood, a place marked by severe 
environmental degradation and continual efforts at expropriation, is ‘far from 
civilization’, separated from the world of adequate houses, schools, churches, in 
other words, the centers of the cities.  She answers that if there is a separation, she 
‘carries it inside of her’.  She is not alienated from an awareness of her conditions, 
their unfairness she knows these all too well.  She has not become inured to sub-
standard living conditions such that she no longer objects to them. Rather, she, 
and her neighbors are alienated from a collective political voice, and a viable 
world that would allow for their political influence. 
 
Ayero and Swistun conclude their work by positing that the specific suffering of 
the people in the Flammable slum is a kind of social suffering, marked by alienation. 
Swistun passionately rejects the kind of ‘social death’ to which she feels the residents of 
Flammable have been subject, along with the neighborhood’s continued expropriation 
and exploitation of its resources.   Swistun and Ayero conclude that the specific injustice 
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of Flammable is that its resident’s do not have control over their own livelihoods.  They 
write:  
[R]esidents in Flammable are condemned to live in a time oriented to and 
by others.  In interesting and unexpected ways, then, the world of Tiresias 
finds parallels in the lives of contemporary shantytown dwellers who, like 
the Greek seer, are forced to become “mere onlookers.” Destitute and 
poisoned Tiresias of the shanty world are living in a times dictated by 
others, an alienated time, obliged, as Pierre Bourdieu so eloquently puts it, 
“To wait for everything to come from others.” 205 
. . . [O]ne thing is clear: residents placed all their hopes in what the 
government, the companies, or lawyers and judges will do on their behalf, 
not on what they can jointly achieve (significantly, many of the meetings 
we attended ended with neighbors agreeing to request a meeting with the 
mayor, Shell personnel, or the secretary of public works).  Collective 
action of the contentious kind was never raised as possibility when news 
concerning court rulings and rumors about impending relocation plans 
were running rampant. As defiant Maria del Carmen and many others at 
the local improvement association seem to be, they see others, not 
themselves, as the engines of change.  Theirs is a hopeful submission to 
both degraded living conditions and to the actions of others.  206 
 
The Arendtian framework of alienation as a loss of speech and action on the basis 
of the loss of a world helps us understand the condition of the residents of Flammable and 
other GSUS.  It shows us that the economic and political alienation that GSUS residents 
experience has a material basis: it stems from a lack of a world.  Having a world means, 
first, having the capacity to work to build that world. 
In order to understand, then, what it means to have the capacity of labor replace 
the capacity of work, we should understand first Arendt’s distinction between work and 
labor.  The homo faber, the worker, is the capacity of a person to construct artifice that 
possesses durability.  The homo faber is the ‘work of our hands’ that ‘works upon’, rather 
than the animal laborans, the labor of our bodies that “mixes with’.  Of course, the hand/ 
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body distinction is metaphorical: the work of our hands, like the work of holding a child 
or putting together television parts on an assembly line, is the labor of our bodies.  Arendt 
means ‘the work of our hands’ in a specific sense: the work extends outwards from 
ourselves to create something durable, that does not correspond to same timeline as the 
bodily cycle of growth and decay, and is an expression of ourselves as unique beings.  
The ‘labor of our bodies’ corresponds to labor that is needed to fulfill the cyclical, 
metabolic processes; it must be done over and over again, and its products are temporary.  
Arendt writes that the human artifice which homo faber produces,  
 
[A}re mostly, but not exclusively objects for use and they possess 
the durability Locke needed for the establishment of property, the 
“value” Adam Smith needed for the exchange market, they bear 
testimony to productivity, which Marx believed to be the test of 
human nature.  Their proper use does not cause them to disappear 
and they give the human artifice the stability and solidity without 
which it could not be relied upon to house the unstable and mortal 
creature which is man.”207 
 
The loss of the political space, voice, speech, and action manifests itself, in part, 
as a severe deprivation of human artifice and infrastructure.  This worldlessness is felt as 
a loneliness, forced retreat inward, a retreat to contemplation. Arendt diagnoses the 
source of this loneliness as the infringement of social activities onto the public and 
private realms. 
It important to remember here that Arendt means a world deprived in a very real, 
economic and political sense, that is, the loss of private property. In defining the loss of 
the world, she writes: “The greatest threat here . . . is not the abolition of private 
ownership of wealth but the abolition of private property in the sense of a tangible, 
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worldly place of one’s own.”208  A world is lost, for Arendt, not when capital 
accumulation is lost, exactly, but when one loses a protective place of one’s own from 
which one can be shielded from the vagrancies of nature. Arendt diagnoses the origins of 
capitalism, as does Marx, with expropriation of property and the enclosure movement.  
By expropriation, Arendt means the “deprivation for certain groups of their place in the 
world and their naked exposure to the exigencies of life.”209  Expropriation was always, 
and remains, a matter of the poor being cast from their place in the world. Arendt 
explains:  
 
The first stage of this alienation was marked by its cruelty, the misery and 
material wretchedness it meant for steadily increasing numbers of 
“laboring poor,” whom expropriation deprived of the twofold protection of 
family and property, that is, of a family-owned private share in the world, 
which until the modern age had housed the individual life process and the 
laboring activity subject to its necessities.210 
 
The process of the expanding GSUS is also a process of expropriation, caused by the 
machinations of global capitalism.  As discussed, for both Arendt and Marx, the rise of 
capitalism stands, in a causal relationship to alienation.  But for Arendt, and not for Marx, 
capitalism has caused humankind to be thrown not into the ever-moving and ever-
changing flow of commodity, but rather back onto themselves in what Max Weber has 
termed an ‘innerworldly asceticism.’  Again: “World alienation, and not self-alienation as 
Marx thought, has been the hallmark of the modern age.”211 
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  The condition of ‘innerworldly asceticism’ is true across the spectrum of 
wealthy and poor alike.  However, in richer parts of the world, capitalism causes 
alienation from one another, and the accumulation of wealth has different, and specific, 
consequences in the poor areas of the world.  That is, the accumulation of capital in the 
Global North causes, not the loss of relationship between people, but the loss of private 
places of ownership that are the preconditions for the possibility of a public realm to 
appear at all in the Global South.  
One might note that there is both a privative and a non-privative sense of privacy at 
work here.  There is a paradoxical movement in the process of alienation: people are 
forced into unwanted privacy when their privacy, in the sense of private property-as-
place in the world, is lost.  When labor takes the place of work, the body takes the place 
of a world, and we are thrown inward upon ourselves, we are ‘too far in’ our bodies, there 
is no outlet for our needs, imaginings, expressions, our uniqueness, and our dignity. 
 
Thus far, I have shown how poverty deprives a person of a world, but I have not 
made clear, yet, how the deprivation of the world is truly a harm, and the kind of harm 
that is an injustice. Of course, as we see in Flammable, the deprivation of a world, in 
degrees, can effect the deprivation of public speech and political empowerment.  The 
essential point, here, is that such a relationship between speech and action on the one 
hand, and the world or lack thereof on the other, is no accident. Alienation is a harm 
because it is painful.  Further, alienation as the loss of the world prevents people from 
transforming their pain into shared reality.  The ability to transform one’s pain, one’s 
private contemplation and emotion into shared and public reality is an essential human 
need.   The transformation of the private into the public is, at heart, a matter of 
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appearance, of the necessity of being seen and heard by others. It is not good to carry all 
emotion and evidence of activity within the space of our bodies.  In an individual sense, 
one can accomplish this externalization by way of art and music, for example, but in a 
collective sense—and in the sense that communities need to become politically powerful-
-- this externalization is manifested in the creation of a public world.  The privative, 
merely contemplative, stance is what the modern world forces upon people, according to 
Arendt, a central thesis of this dissertation is that the GSUS is a specific instance of that 
‘forcing’ in our own time..  
Very simply, we need a world and the experience of the lack of a world has a 
psychological structure similar to pain.  Arendt explains: 
The presence of others who see what we see and hear what we hear 
assures us of the reality of the world and ourselves, and while the intimacy 
of a fully developed private life, such as had never been known before the 
rise of the modern age and the concomitant decline of the public realm, 
will always greatly intensify and enrich the whole scale of subjective 
emotions and private feelings, this intensification will always come to pass 
at the expense of the assurance of the reality of the world and men. 
Indeed, the most intense feeling we know of, intense to the point of 
blotting out all other experiences, namely, the experience of great bodily 
pain, is at the same time the most private and least communicable of all.  
Not only is it perhaps the only experience which we are unable to 
transform into a shape fit for public appearance, it actually deprives us of 
our feeling for reality to such an extent that we can forget it more quickly 
and easily than anything else.  There seems to be no bridge from the most 
radical subjectivity, in which I am no longer “recognizable,” to the outer 
world of life.  Pain, in other words, truly a borderline experience between 
life as “being among men” (inter homines esse) and death, is so subjective 
and removed from the world of things and men that it cannot assume an 
appearance at all.212 
 
The experience of pain is both a paradigm for worldlessness, and perhaps more 
surprisingly, an effect of worldlessness, the specific harm of wordlessness. Crucially, the 
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manner in which pain is attenuated is by making an appearing in the world, transforming 
its location from the body to the visible public realm.  This is the manner in which 
alienation, also, is attenuated.  Of course, there are many other immeasurably serious and 
more obvious harms from losses experienced by people who live in the GSUS: of clean 
water, a sustainable source of food, hygienic living conditions a non-toxic environment, 
and basic shelter, all of which losses or lacks are evidenced in physical pain.  But the 
cumulative effects of these harms to the whole person, or, if you like, to the soul, is one 
of alienation. We lessen our alienation when we are able to work, and not just labor, that 
is, when we are able to make manifest our pain in a public, shared sense, so that we 
individuals are not carrying the entire burden of suffering on our own backs and in our 
own bodies:  
   
We have seen that the animal labrorans could be redeemed from its 
predicament of imprisonment in the ever-recurring cycle of the life 
process, of being forever subject to the necessity of labor and 
consumption, only through the mobilization of another human capacity, 
the capacity for making, fabricating, and producing of homo faber, who as 
a toolmaker not only eases the pain and trouble of laboring but also erects 
a world of durability.  The redemption of life, which is sustained by labor, 
is worldliness, which is sustained by fabrication.213 
 
4.5. Elaine Scarry on the Making of the World 
 The thought that work and creation is a response to the suffering caused by labor 
is not unique to Arendt.  Elaine Scarry emphasizes the importance of activity, of 
fabrication, for the making of the world, as well. For Scarry, the making of the world is a 
response to sentience, in terms of physical pain occasioned by labor, and the unwanted 
isolation physical pain consequences.  “The problem of suffering”, Scarry writes, “takes 
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place and must be understood within the more expansive frame of the “problem of 
creating”.214  Scarry’s account of alienation in The Body in Pain is, on the whole, 
surprisingly concurrent with Arendt’s.   
Arendt and Scarry, both readers of Marx, are concerned with the faculty of 
making, the work made, and the degree to which the significance that is attached to both 
the energia of work and its ergon are lost in contemporary thought.  Scarry comments 
that “Marx is in the United States so often narrowly perceived in his capacity as critic of 
western economic structures that it is sometimes forgotten that he is our major 
philosopher on the nature of material objects.”215 Taken together, Scarry’s and Arendt’s 
account of ‘making the world’ add to our understanding of the specific injustice of global 
poverty.  Given the scale and specific problems that the GSUS in terms of a lack of work 
and an overabundance of labor, especially labor done by women, Marx’s 19th century 
discourse needs to be expanded to account for this historical shift.  Arendt and Scarry 
help in this endeavor.  Indeed, Scarry describes making as “the most morally resonant of 
acts (as now in the late twentieth century theories of distributive justice identify as the 
most urgent locus of ethical action “making” and “distributing what is made).”216 
Scarry confirms the relationship between the loss of the world and human 
alienation through a different historical precedent, though, then Arendt.  Her starting 
point is not the Greeks, as was Arendt’s, but the Hebrew scriptures.  The scriptures are, 
Scarry writes, “a monumental description of the nature of artifice.”217 She claims that the 
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problems of belief, as encountered by the Israelites in the Judeo-Christian scriptures, 
become the problems of industrialization in the 19th century. For Scarry, forced 
contemplation, a belief that isolates, is a belief that comes both as a response to pain (a 
belief in God can be a response to the urgent question of ‘why do I suffer?’) and a cause 
of further pain, insofar as sentience is unutterable and so unable to be shared.  Simply 
believing, with no material object that confirms or transforms that belief does not fulfill 
the human need that (as Aristotle wrote of the purpose of Greek tragedy), people 
experience suffering together and realize they are not alone in their trials.  The 
construction of first, artifacts, and later, civilizations, become a way of suffering-with.  
Further, pain is attenuated by the very activity of work, vis-à-vis the externalization of 
one’s imagination (belief) in the material world.  In transforming the unutterable into a 
shared and sensibly-experienced world, pain and loneliness are thereby attenuated, made 
bearable, and given meaning.  When there is no outlet for people’s pain and imagination 
in work that constructs lasting edifices, people become alienated. Marx’s vision of 
creativity, which Scarry posits as an inheritor of the Judeo-Christian problem, shares 
important characteristics with life in the global slums: the transience of less-than-durable 
structures in which to dwell, and the lack of a political body and public realm strong 
enough to counter degradation that private interests of the transnational economy bring. 
 Perhaps surprisingly, both Arendt’s and Scarry’s accounts of alienation begin 
with a description of physical pain.  Arendt explains that physical pain, occasioned by 
laboring, effects an unwanted privacy.  This isolation is a very essentially human problem 
that must be solved. Arendt writes 
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Indeed, the most intense feeling we know of, intense to the point of blotting out 
all other experiences, namely the experience of great bodily pain, is at the same 
time the most private and least communicable of all.  Not only is it perhaps the 
only experience which we are unable to transform into a shape fit for public 
appearance, it actually deprives us of our feeling for reality to such an extent that 
we can forget it more quickly and easily than anything else.  There seems to be no 
bridge from the most radical subjectivity, in which I am no longer “recognizable”, 
to the outer world of life.  Pain, in other words, truly a borderline experience 
between life as “being among men” (inter homines esse) and death, is so 
subjective and removed from the world of things and men that it cannot assume 
an appearance at all.218 
 
 If the speech and action of the public realm are the ways in which people make 
their appearance, in their plurality and identity, the absolute antithesis of these modes of 
appearance is physical pain.  Further, for Arendt, the physical pain associated with labor 
is subjective to the degree that it isolates, rather than connects us with others.  
 Similarly, Scarry writes:  
It is intense pain that destroys a person’s self and world, a destruction 
experienced spatially as either the contraction of the universe down to the 
immediate vicinity of the body or as the body swelling to fill the entire 
universe.  Intense pain is also language-destroying: as the content of one’s 
world disintegrates, so the content of one’s language disintegrates; as the 
self disintegrates, so that which would express and project the self is 
robbed of its source and its subject.219 
 
As humans, for Scarry, we need to express and project ourselves.   We need to “turn 
ourselves inside out”, transform privately suffered sentience into shared artifacts, and 
further, civilizations that have material consequences in the external world.  Otherwise, 
embodiment becomes a problem for us and the boundary between our subjectivities and 
external objects becomes blurred.  When a society is alienated, people are taken for 
objects, and objects acquire the values of persons. Thus, according to Scarry:  
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This dissolution of the boundary between inside and outside gives rise to a 
fourth aspect of the felt experience of physical pain, an almost obscene 
conflation of private and public. It brings with it all the solitude of 
absolute privacy with none of its safety, all the self-exposure of the utterly 
public with none of its possibility for camaraderie or shared experience.220 
 
Intense physical pain ‘unmakes’ the world, for Scarry.  It deconstructs the careful webs 
that connect a person’s inner world to external referents.  Physical suffering defies and 
destroys external expression in the world, imposes an undesirable privacy upon its 
subject, and undermines the world by virtue of its lack of external referent, lack of object.  
For the person in serious pain, the world of external artifacts and objects constrict to 
include only the unutterable, inward state of the body.  The making of artifacts, the 
making of the world, is an attempt to give voice to that pain, and a pain which at first 
came on the scene as unutterable.  In transforming the unutterable into a shared world, 
pain and loneliness are attenuated, made bearable, and given meaning.  
 To clarify this matter for present purposes, the structure of Scarry’s argument 
relating to the problem of work in the GSUS, is a follows: 
 
1) Physical pain, an essential condition of humanity and human labor, has no object, 
in terms of language or external referent; it is experienced as isolating and 
privative. 
2) To attenuate this pain, to give it meaning, and to fulfill our species being, people 
first imagine, then create civilization-as-artifact, through work. 
3) The product of work, the artifact, functions as a response to the problem of 
suffering, wherein we ‘turn ourselves inside out’. The isolating element of 
suffering diminishes when we can attend to the shape of the pain, express it, and 
diffuse it in the public realm.  
4) We are alienated when, under capitalism, we are prevented bring this process of 
pain-imagination-artifact- sentience shared to fruition. 
5) This alienation is an injustice. 
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While the condition of post-industrial poverty only sometimes includes acute 
physical pain, Scarry connects the broader condition of alienation under capitalism to the 
same symptoms of constriction of a world and subsequent assumption of painful private 
contemplation.  On Scarry’s reading of Marx, this alienation occurs when human 
imagination has no outlet. Pain and imagination are ‘two sides of the same coin’, so to 
speak, of the structure of material making.  “While pain is a state remarkable for being 
wholly without objects, the imagination is remarkable for being a state that is wholly its 
objects.”221  Physical pain radically divorces us from our connection with the world and 
shrinks the tentacles of our attachments to the small province of our bodies only.  
Imagination, on the other hand, expands our subjectivities to such a degree that, in 
imagining, we experience ectasis, a radical stepping-outside, and sometimes a losing, of 
ourselves.  We can never just ‘imagine’, without imagining something.  When I stop 
laboring from my day-to-day tasks and look up and ‘imagine’ the future, the content of 
my thought is never pure form without content.  I imagine cities, bridges, students, 
shelves of books.  The imagination is always attached to something, some referent. 
Scarry writes “That pain and imagination are each other’s missing intentional 
counterpart, and that they together provide a framing identity of man-as-creator  . . . is 
perhaps most succinctly suggested by the fact that there is one piece of language used--- 
in so many different languages---at once as near synonym for the created object: and that 
is the word “work”. . .  [it] express[es] man’s expansive possibility, the movement out 
into the world that is the opposite of pain’s contractive potential.”222  The word ‘work’ is, 
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of course, both a verb and a noun.  It both hurts to work and, by working, we diminish 
hurt, and so the word can carry connotations of pain with it, and also imaginative efforts 
to reduce pain. We also take ‘work’ to mean cultural artifacts like poems, paintings, or 
buildings.  (We see this same distinction in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, in the 
difference between a person’s ways of being-at-work, energia, and the enduring artifact 
that evidences this activity, the ergon.223) Thus, humans work to make works, and, in 
doing so, for Scarry, they ‘turn themselves out’ and therefore externalize their pain and 
suffering.  The shareable artifacts (which include human language) are the link between 
the meaning of the word work as pain and the meaning of work as imagination, creation, 
an effort to diminish pain. The artifact as product of human labor is the bridge between 
pain and imagination. 
 Scarry terms the collectivity of artifacts ‘civilization’.  By ‘civilization’, she 
means a world, rich in literal things that bear the mark of the work done to create them. 
She writes: 
 
The human imagination has its collective expression in civilization: it is 
the thing created.  But this created thing contains within itself the process 
of its own creation, the system of production and reproduction by which it 
comes into being, sustains and perpetuates itself.  It is civilization 
conceived in this way --- not as a stable and completed object to be 
externally assessed in its freestanding activity but as something that seems 
at once interior to that thing, the process residing within it that brings it 
about, and yet exterior to that thing, the vast artifact in which all other 
artifacts (pitchers, plates, cities, and systems, all objects collectively 
designated “civilization”) are made and modified- that is Marx’s 
subject.224  
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Further, she clarifies, “In civilization, as in the early altars of a religious culture, the body 
is turned inside-out and made sharable.”225  
‘Turning ourselves inside out’ relieves the burden of our sentience, because it 
gives suffering meaning.  We cannot make meaning in isolation: the process of making 
meaning is a communal process, and it is not divorced from our material reality.  We 
create artifacts by being attentive to our suffering, then expressing and transforming it 
into a world where others can see it. “It is through this movement out into the world that 
the extreme privacy of the occurrence (both pain and imagining are invisible to anyone 
outside the boundaries of the person’s body) begins to be shareable, that sentience 
becomes social and thus acquires its distinctly human form.”226  This process of creation 
manifests our dignity as human beings.  
Scarry also graphically illustrates the process of creation, expression, and shared 
sentience: 
     
person         ------------à          object (projection of the human body) 
(sentience    ß-----------           
remade) 
 
 Capitalism subverts the so-called ‘proper’, ‘natural’, or adequate response to the 
problem of suffering.   Thus, Scarry describes Marx’s project as giving an account of “the 
collapse of making into unmaking” under the conditions of capitalism.227  Marx and 
Scarry both have a vision of human nature as creative, and as such, the essential injustice 
of capitalism is that it undermines people’s creative potential.  Scarry writes: 
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 Because Marx understands men’s and women’s fundamental human 
identity to reside in their existence as “creators,”, “imaginers,” and 
“makers,” the social system that departs from this ground is uncreative, 
anti-imaginative, destructive, a deconstruction of making.  This 
deconstruction has as its most immediate evident and outcome the 
widespread physical suffering of the industrial population, and Marx 
reacts to the deconstruction with . . . the metaphysical incredulity of a 
good craftsman looking at a bad piece of work.228 
 
What the making does, capitalism ‘undoes’, in a similar sense to the way in which pain 
‘undoes’, deconstructs, the world.  Making is a contingent process, and the works made 
are not static things whose use and meaning are shared equally, by everyone.  Capitalism 
undercuts the potential of making and creating to attest to and affirm people’s dignity.  
Under capitalism, some share in the benefits of work and the work made more than 
others, and this inequality is an injustice. Again, Scarry on Marx: 
 
Marx’s frequent and sometimes tonally bitter reminders almost always 
take the form of, “These people have x and these people have y,” This 
form, thought intended to signal a fundamental dislocation in the nature of 
making, sometimes seems . . . . to have become vulnerable to being 
misunderstood or misheard as merely a petulant point at a difference that, 
though perhaps recognizable as “unfair” or “unjust,” is too easily 
restatable as “to bad”, a shame.  But for Marx it entails a serious 
dislocation in the species itself, for it announces that the original relation 
between sentience and self-extension (between hurting and imagining, 
between body and voice, or body and artifice) has been split apart and the 
two locations of the self have begun to work against one another.  The 
problem of economic distribution . . . is the problem of distributing the 
power of artifacts to remake sentience.229 
 
Scarry’s purpose in the second half of The Body and Pain is to describe how the 
problem of belief manifested itself in the religious works of the Old Testament, but the 
problems of religion---the relation of the artifact to imagination and suffering---have not 
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suddenly disappeared in a secular culture. The problems of the belief, as encountered by 
the Israelites in the Old Testament, become the problems of industrialization in the 19th 
century. Scarry claims that Marx’s Capital and the Hebraic texts are engaged in the same 
task: to “break open the sensuous object (now a table, now a wall of bricks, now a bolt of 
lace) and find located in the interior structure of each our bodies and our gods.”20  The 
connection Scarry makes here is similar to Feurbach’s thesis: the alienation that occurs in 
the fact of the distance and power differential between humans and God in the Old 
Testament gets played out again in the distance and power differential between humans 
and other humans in capitalism, so much so that it effects the very grounding of people’s 
understanding of themselves and each other. Scarry points out that Marx has diagnosed 
the problem of capitalism by inverting Hegel’s doctrine. Instead of making [or remaking] 
oneself by making the world, the ‘industrialized person’ creates the world, quite 
dysfunctionally, by wounding himself.  
Scarry shows how much we need a world, as externalizations of ourselves and as 
relief from unutterable inwardness.  The reason alienation is an unjust condition, and not 
just an unfortunate one, is that it deprives people of a world, in Arendt’s sense, a place to 
distinguish themselves, where one human life is equal but not equivalent to another.  
 
4.6. Alienation as Critical to Theorizing Global Poverty 
The inequality between the global south and the global north is an inequality of 
worlds, and of the ability to make the worlds.  The cities of the global North —London, 
New York, Berlin, Hong Kong—are improving precisely because the cities of the global 
south—Lagos, Guayaquil, Calcutta--- are expanding beyond their boundaries.  Or rather, 
the gain of private property in the North is associated with the expropriation of property 
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and assets in the South. The inequality people experience in the GSUS is not merely 
unfortunate, but unjust.  Inequality can be harmless, in the sense of certain hierarchies, 
like that between teacher and student, or even certain discrepancies in income or wealth, 
but the inequality of the GSUS is a different sort.  The inequality is unjust because the 
alienation it engenders is harmful to some people; it causes suffering that prevents some 
people from flourishing, in the sense of manifesting their dignity. There are four aspects 
of the general wrongfulness of global poverty, which each merits separate critical 
focus—that it is unnatural, unjust, a problem with work, and a disturbance of human 
relations---which I now provide, briefly.  
 
 
1) Global Poverty’s Inequity is not ‘Natural’ 
It is important to name alienation as a critical basis of the injustice of global 
poverty in general, and the conditions of people living in the GSUS, specifically, because 
doing so draws attention to the fact that this kind of poverty is neither natural, nor 
inevitable, nor ahistorical.  In the way that slavery was construed as a necessary evil in 
the antebellum south, so there is a tendency to construe global poverty in a similar 
fashion, a kind of justification akin to ‘the poor will always be with us.’230  (As well, the 
natural inferiority of those enslaved was posited and endlessly speculated about when 
slavery was justified and contemporary references to the cultural and political deficits of 
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those in the global South may serve as analogous justifications for their exploitation.) 
Instead, to name what people are experiencing as alienation highlights the fact that, as 
Marx expressed it, these experiences are both historical and ‘unnatural’, in the sense that 
these conditions are not preordained by natural laws but are created, and can be changed, 
by people. Because of economic conditions, more people are living in the GSUS than 
ever before.  The scale of the GSUS is an unprecedented event in human history.231 The 
GSUS is, however, not a natural condition like ‘natural inequalities’ between height or 
even relative IQ.  Further, it is false to consider the inequalities of the GSUS as ‘natural’ 
in the way that inequalities resulting from fair competition for scarce resources might be, 
in some imagined state of nature.  The world of the GSUS is being diminished at the 
expense of the expansion of the world of the global North.  We are not living in a state of 
nature; we are living in a world where power brokers in the global North make specific 
decisions about trade and governance that privilege some populations over others.  
 
2) Global Poverty’s Inequity is Unjust 
People living in GSUS do not experience the same sort of wealth inequality that 
exists between a Wall Street hedge fund manager and an academic philosopher.  Even 
given how vast the wealth inequality is between a philosopher and a Wall Street tycoon, 
that inequality is not harmful to the philosopher if the inequality is not preventing her 
from flourishing, from manifesting her dignity as a human being, and if (in accordance 
with the first part of Rawls’ difference principle), the fact of the inequality is not 
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depriving her of her freedom.232 On the other hand, the inequality between the Global 
North and South, given the extent to which people in the GSUS are living hand-to-mouth, 
is in fact preventing the manifestation of their dignity, their flourishing, and their 
freedom.  That is, inequality is alienating them, and therefore harming them.  It is the 
inequality which is harming them, and not the sheer fact of their having so little, because, 
in addition to the clear and present harm of lack of adequate standards of living, this harm 
will not be mitigated until those in the GSUS have political and economic empowerment.  
Currently and for the most part, they lack empowerment because they lack the capability 
to create a world that populations in the Global North have. Of course, the category of 
harm is not monolithic; there are many different types and degrees of harm.  The specific 
type of harm that the condition of alienation engenders is one that involves the loss of the 
world as a result of the exploitation of labor.  In naming alienation as a critical basis for 
the injustice of global poverty, the equality principle and the freedom principle are not at 
odds: greater inequality is unjust on the basis of deprivation of freedom.  A concern for 
people’s freedom is at the heart of this vision of justice. 
 
3) Global Poverty is a Problem of Work  
Putting the matter of global poverty in terms of alienation underlines the way in 
which the problem of global poverty is a problem of work.  Thus far, philosophers 
addressing global poverty have conceived the problem in terms of a re-envisioning of 
rights and obligations, a plea for charitable donations, a matter of distributive justice, or a 
                                                
232 This is the first part of Rawl’s Difference Principle: that each person has an equal claim to their basic 
rights and liberties, which are the same for all, wherein one person has their liberty to the degree that it 
does not infringe upon another’s liberty. See Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard UP. 
1971 and Political Liberalism. NY: Columbia UP. 1993.  
  139 
call for greater recognition. All of these approaches capture important elements of the 
problem, but a discourse about work is missing from the discussion.  Primarily, 
philosophers have overlooked the issue of work because we have thought of the problem 
from a certain perspective, that is, from the perspective that characterizes the geography 
of the places in which the influential universities are located, namely the well-off Global 
North.  The questions have primarily originated from what the Global North can do for 
the Global South. To be sure, these questions were not wrong or misguided. Indeed they 
are immensely worthwhile, because given the degree and amount of suffering engendered 
by global poverty, the rich have a great deal of responsibility toward the poor.  
Nevertheless, these kinds of questions do not capture the entirety of the problem, because 
they leave out consideration of the perspective of the people who are living in poverty.233 
The questions that the problem of global poverty require are more basic than the 
discussions of redistribution or charitable donations and the like. They are, in fact, the 
questions that characterize the beginnings of political philosophy: what are the limits and 
meanings of labor? What sort of privileges should one’s work entitle a person?  The 
problem of poverty is, in large part, the problem in the relationship between work and the 
world that this work produces.  The problem of work---whether too much or too little, 
who is doing it, who reaps its fruits---is critical to the problem of the GSUS. Global 
poverty is also a matter of private property, the expropriation of which Arendt explains as 
the origins of world alienation.  People in the GSUS remain poor because they have no 
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private property, in either the sense of individual property or public community 
commons.  The land upon which they live is constantly being usurped from them. The 
mechanisms of global capitalism are preventing them from getting a foothold in the 
world, a foothold people need because it gives them a place from which to speak and act. 
 
4) Global Poverty is a Matter of Relations between People    
Putting the matter in terms of work and work’s products acknowledges people’s 
empowerment.  The questions surrounding global poverty are shifted from a stance of 
what, ex post facto, the rich can do for the poor, to a cause of poverty itself.  For 
example: if one has the means, it is surely ethical to donate to philanthropic endeavors 
that aim to diminish global poverty. However, attention to this ‘duty’ of the rich should 
not exclude the ways in which people living in poverty can be ethical.234 To be sure, the 
duties of the rich, whether negative or positive, are not jettisoned in this alternative line 
of inquiry, because it is true that the rich have created a global system that is actively 
preventing the poor from flourishing in constructing a world.  However, the discussion of 
the ways in which work can and should build a world, the kind of world that allows 
people to manifest their dignity, acknowledges people’s empowerment because it 
emphasizes that, in a just world, the global south need not be dependent on the 
beneficence of the global north for its continued survival.  If a community is allowed to 
build a world, that is, correct the unsound relationship between work and work’s products 
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and benefit from the fruits of its own labor, then that community is closer to  creating 
political power on its own terms. 
Finally, the language of alienation is critical to naming the injustice of the current 
state of global poverty, because it offers a first-person perspective.   Alienation is a 
description of the experiences of those living in the GSUS. In prioritizing the experience 
of the people actually living in these conditions, the kind of harm global poverty inflicts 
can be highlighted.  Poverty is an injustice not simply because people have far less 
money, but because this lack of economic freedom causes harm, that is, it prevents their 
flourishing as human beings. Putting the matter in terms of alienation shows the process 
by which economic inequality causes harm by inhibiting the freedom that is due to a 
person because of their innate dignity.235 
Defense of the first-person standpoint—and part of the methodology used here comes 
from a plurality of traditions.  Phenomenology stresses the priority of experience as the 
basis for inquiry.236 Similarly, from analytic ethics we find a perspective of absolutism 
that demands an interpersonal, rather that bureaucratic, accounting for actions. In his 
essay, “War and Massacre,” Thomas Nagel explains this position:  
If the justification for what one did to another person had to be 
such that it could be offered to him specifically, rather than just to 
the world at large, that would be a significant source of restraint . . 
. If the account is to be deepened, I would hope for some results 
along the following lines. Absolutism is associated with a view of 
oneself as a small being interacting with others in a large world. 
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The justifications it requires are primarily interpersonal. 
Utilitarianism is associated with a view of oneself as a benevolent 
bureaucrat distributing such benefits as one can control to 
countless other beings, with whom one may have various relations 
or none. The justifications it requires are primarily administrative. 
The argument between the two moral attitudes may depend on the 
relative priority of these two conceptions.237 
In terms of absolutism, the concept of alienation is essential for understanding global 
poverty , because  policy makers are not immune or inured to the claims of individuals.  
Indeed, as humans (if not as economic agents) all, policy makers included, stand in equal 
relationship to others, and we must give others personal justifications for the way in 
which we construct or perpetuate systems of power that harm some and benefit others.  
We must not pretend, in our theory, that we are, as Nagel writes, ‘in control of countless 
beings’, like some sort of ideal utilitarian bureaucrat. 
The strongest defense of the first-person standpoint in terms of methodology 
comes from feminist epistemology, specifically feminist standpoint-theories.238  This 
tradition draws from Marx’s iteration of the Hegelian master/slave dialectic in developing 
the standpoint of the proletariat: in defense of the epistemic privilege of the worker, Marx 
likened this privilege to the privilege of Hegel’s slave.239  In the dialectic, the slave has a 
more fully developed knowledge of the situation as a whole because she/he is more fully 
connected to the material aspects of that situation, aspects that allow her/him to construct 
the world. The epistemic position of the worker, for Marx, and of the slave, for Hegel, 
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provides a superior starting point for understanding and changing the world.  Feminist 
standpoint theories have widened the concept of epistemic privilege to apply to many 
different marginalized groups.  My claim, in relation to this methodology, is that the first-
person perspective of the people living in the GSUS provides them with an epistemic 
privilege in understanding the machinations of global capitalism, and the injustices they 
are experiencing.  
For example, when Carolina María de Jesus compares her situation of living in 
the slums of Rio de Janeiro in the 1960s to the Christians being tortured under Caesar, 
that account should be just as significant, if not more significant, than the account that 
French economist Daniel Cohen gives when he claims that globalization is not a result of 
exploitation.  The fact that María de Jesus lived under conditions of poverty, and her 
experiences were shaped by the material repercussions of ‘under side’ of globalization, as 
it were, gives her more insight into the situation of globalization as a whole.  Quite 
literally, she felt globalization’s consequences in her body, its limitations in the amount 
of food she could buy for her children.  She bore the weight of decisions made by 
Brazil’s elite about the distribution of food and the dumping of chemicals—therefore it 
should be her account, and accounts like hers’, which guides theorists’ proclamations 
about justice.  The experience of alienation gives critical insight into the problem of 
global poverty as a whole. 
One can never speak absolutely accurately from the subject position of another. 
There is a long and harmful history of privileged people ‘speaking for’ others in a way 
that is disempowering and covers over important differences, which is most likely one 
reason philosophers concerned with global poverty have not, up to this point, paid much 
attention to such first- person perspective.  However, the problems of representation, as 
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crucial and as profuse as they are, should not prevent us from addressing economic and 
political injustice.  To do so imperfectly is better than doing nothing at all. For example, 
academic feminism turned to the problems of identity politics, problems concerned with 
the difficulty of representation and the importance of making distinctions between groups 
such as ‘first world’ and ‘third world’ feminists, in the 1980s, at the same moment that 
the ideology of neo-liberalism, with Reagan and Thatcher at the helm(s), began to take 
hold in the world at large.  That ideology had the effect of diminishing and even 
criminalizing social service programs women, perhaps most of all, needed.  Thus, 
because feminist academics had a very serious reticence to ‘speak for poor women, the 
other’ (they had learned that lesson well, after the charges directed toward second wave 
feminism), they unfortunately did not have much to say about the ideology of 
neoliberalism (nor of economic justice in general), even though its policies that were 
seriously compromising the well being of many women, poor women and women of 
color especially.   
One way to solve this problem, to talk about economic justice and the Global 
South without falling into serious misrepresentations of women is to avoid attention to a 
first-person perspective in the first place.  This is what some philosophers, such as Onora 
O’Neill and David Miller, have done.240  But, as I have said, I think we lose something 
when we do this.  When the discussion of poverty becomes too abstract, talk of 
vulnerability and compassion, loss and hope, dignity and suffering, have little place.   
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It is, moreover, exceedingly difficult to talk about visions of human flourishing 
without recourse to people’s experiences.241  The problem of work and work’s products is 
also out of place in such abstract discourses.  So I believe it is worth a try, here, as 
seriously flawed as that attempt might be, to risk approaching this problem from a first-
person perspective, with a methodology that prioritizes experience.  Accounts and 
interpretations of those experiences, and the theory that comes from them, are, and will 
inevitably be, misrepresentations in some measure. However, to avoid all 
misrepresentation in this case would be to avoid addressing what specific harm is being 
done by constructing a world of severe economic inequality. 
None of this is to posit a blanket description of all life in slums, everywhere, as 
absolutely alienating. The qualifier is important, because many who live in the GSUS are 
not socially alienated from one another.  Communities in slums may be stronger than a  
typical suburban community in the United States.  People who live in conditions of 
poverty must depend upon one another for shared resources in ways that wealthier 
families need not, and, geographically, people in the slums live closer to one another than 
in communities that may be disconnected by sidewalks, cars, and mechanically 
descending garage doors.  It is certainly not impossible that people living in the slums 
would organize together to be politically empowered; indeed, political empowerment 
would aim at both creating a durable world and a means to improve people’s 
livelihoods.242  Alienation is not a stagnant property that points to aspects of people’s 
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essential identities. There is so much variation between cultures in terms of people’s 
actual social practices that it is difficult and here inappropriate to make any larger claims 
about people’s degree of social alienation across these differences.  Still, there are 
evident trends of globalization and neoliberalism that generally create the conditions of 
these slums, our era’s manifestations of urban poverty, with surprising and disturbing, but 
not totalizing, uniformity across culture and places.  In urban slums where adequate, 
reasonable standards of life and basic needs are not met because the work that people do 
does not give them a durable world they can leave behind to the next generation, the 
alienation that people experience is the basis for claims of injustice, not only claims of 
inequality.  Alienation as the loss of the world may not occur in all slums in the global 
south, but because of the current conditions of global capitalism, it occurs in some, where 
it is unjust.  
Women are especially vulnerable to suffering when living in unjust conditions, 
and the work that women do is especially exploited.  Women suffer more than men 
because often they are not the private individuals that exist as the beneficiary of the neo-
liberal ideal; they are also often in positions where they must bear an unequal burden for 
the care of family members.  Additionally, private interests are expropriating a second-
wave feminist insight, interests that hear ‘women, too, should be in the workplace’ to 
mean that women can and should be the primary movers of global capitalism that 
alienates those living in the GSUS. Thus, the work that women do, both in terms of their 
care work and their so-called ‘productive’ work, fuels their alienation. 
The basic reason, for using the concept of alienation to describe the conditions in 
the GSUS is that the work of many people who live there, especially the work many 
women do, fails to produce a world. Standing directly at the fulcrum of this generation’s 
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instantiation of global capitalism, much of the work of those living in the GSUS is 
outside of their creation and creativity; the work they do prevents them from seeing it as 
an expression of themselves, their human powers, and social relations. The work of 
women living in the GSUS is acutely alienating, more so than, say, working in a large 
corporation in the wealthy world, because the work women do in the GSUS is often tied 
so completely to their survival. The reason they do not leave it is not so much because of 
cultural pressures, but out of physical need --- if not for themselves than for their 
families.   
 Arendt’s diagnosis of modernity or Scarry’s worry about the dearth of creativity 
likely work in characterizing much of the world, including the middle class and wealthy 
world, today. However, these conditions of alienation are especially acute in the GSUS, 
and thereby, unjust. The aim in this project has not been to show how the conditions of 
the slums are essentially different from the lives of rich westerners, but rather, why these 
conditions of the GSUS are essentially unjust. Ultimately, the conditions are unjust 
because they violate human dignity. How this is so, and what is meant by dignity in this 
regard will turn out to be our ultimate concern, in chapter V. 
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CHAPTER V 
DIGNITY 
 
 
“There is every reason to believe that there is no difference of nature but merely a 
difference of power between the ability to feel and the ability to create ”  
– Gabriel Marcel243 
 
5.1. Overview 
In Chapter III, I argued that contractarian theories of global justice are insufficient 
responses to the problem of the urban slums of the global south. And in chapter IV,  I  
proposed that the language of alienation is crucial to realistic and responsive conceptions 
of distributive justice. I there deepened the meaning of alienation with regard to Hannah 
Arendt’s and Elaine Scarry’s respective readings of Marx, and considered the alienation 
specific to global slums as ‘the loss of the world.’  This lack of a world is supported by 
the exploitation of women’s labor, both reproductive (the work of care) and productive 
(labor in the workplace, outside the home). In this final chapter, I will argue that in order 
to answer to alienation and gendered exploitation in the urban slums of the global south, 
political philosophy, international law, and development economics needs a more robust 
and precise account of human dignity.  I will define dignity in a way that counters the 
prevailing logic of utility, which assumes that people, women in particular, are means to 
an end of economic growth and not ends in themselves. Inspired by a disagreement 
between Jürgen Habermas and Jeremy Waldron on the origins of the concept of dignity in 
Western law, I consolidate an intellectual history of dignity that incorporates both the 
notion of dignity as inalienable worth regardless of social status, which is found in Kant 
as well as early Hebraic law, with Roman law’s notion of dignity as status, dependent 
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upon social recognition. I will then use this new, robust notion of dignity as both moral 
autonomy and moral authority to critique the instrumentalization of the global poor. 
Dignity is both, like the Existentialists’ idea of freedom, a fact and an achievement. The 
union of autonomy and authority is best expressed in people’s creation of a world, in the 
dignity of being able to manifest oneself in one’s lasting and shared creation. 
 
5.2. Why Alienation Is Not Enough 
Alienation, as I have detailed, is suffering on account of a lack of a world.  The 
lack of the world happens because labor is exploited or constricted in such a way that 
people are not able to work, to live up to their full human capabilities, including having a 
political voice.244 Another way to say this is that alienation happens when people are not 
able to transform their sentient suffering into ‘voice.’245   When people are alienated, their 
relations with others become maladaptive and malnourished.  However, calling the 
condition of the global slums  “alienation” names and helps describes the problem, but  
does not offer positive content for a vision of what it would look like if  people were not  
alienated, that is, what their social relations and their worlds would look like if they were 
flourishing.  A discussion of dignity offers such a positive vision. 
Ideas of alienation and dignity have come from divergent historical traditions.  
Alienation and women’s exploitation are matters of social relations, while dignity is 
primarily seen as a component or grounding of individual rights. Marx, along with many 
others, was skeptical of rights language, and thus skeptical of dignity. For the most part, 
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Marx saw rights as tools used to protect the private property interests of the bourgeois.246 
The idea of alienation comes, as I have said, from Marx and Hegel, culminating in 
schools of structuralism, post-structuralism, and critical theory, from which theorists , 
such as  Nancy Fraser, draw the notion of recognition.247  On the other hand, the 
inheritance of rights, and so dignity, come from the liberal tradition, broadly construed.  
These traditions have, to put the matter delicately, not always understood themselves to 
share common ground.  
Yet common ground there is.  The crux of the issue is this: How can we make 
sense of alienation, without some sort of notion of the preciousness, value, or worth of 
people?  The idea of dignity provides a standpoint for the critique of economic structures 
that theories of alienation make possible.  Rather than leave dignity to history and 
consider its usefulness only in regards to constraining the power of the state over 
individual liberties, we should strengthen the concept so that it can respond to economic 
alienation and exploitation, as well.  In accordance with the central insight of the 
Capabilities Approach, we need a touchstone for what a flourishing human life looks like, 
and normative standards and expectations for such a life.  The [admittedly Kantian] idea 
is simple, and, I think, intuitively shared amongst many.  We need standards of the worth 
of human life that are outside the realm of price, because ‘price’, the measuring of human 
lives in terms of the global market of exchange, is precisely the problem. This goes for 
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Marx as well; regardless of what he said about dignity, we could not make sense of his 
theories of alienation if we did not hold to some sort of standard of humanism in which 
people are priceless, precious beyond measure.  If we did not have a notion of the way in 
which people themselves are ‘beyond price’, that is, a notion of dignity that is 
independent of economics as such, how could we decide whether economic systems were 
just or not?  The alternative to a dignitarian touchstone is some sort of weak relativist’s 
position on the matter, namely, that we in fact have no basis for recognizing injustice.  
The idea of dignity, too, needs to be informed by the Marxist tradition of 
alienation and exploitation. Taken alone, the idea of dignity can be used justify a number 
of unjust and exploitative roles.  For example, in Ecuador it is common to laud the 
dignity of the woman in her role as a mother, ‘la alma de la casa’, the soul of the house. 
Many people may consider women’s dignity to be solely operative in their identity as 
mothers, and in this thinking they constrain the dignity of women to their role as primary 
caretakers.248  Thus the idea of dignity can be used in service of the exploitation involved 
in reproductive care labor.   
Alternately, one could imagine how a woman’s dignity might be tied to her 
identity as a productive member of society, as a worker and a helper of her family.  Ching 
Kwan Lee describes how this happens when young Chinese daughters feel shame in 
returning to their country village of origin after they have failed to find reliable work in 
the factories of the cities, because their sense of dignity is tied up in the remittances they 
can send back to their families.249 The idea of dignity can be used to exacerbate 
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exploitation of labor, inhibit the creation of a world, and so contribute to alienation.  That 
is, simply subscribing to dignity, without further clarification of the concept’s meaning, is 
no guarantee against the continued ‘feminization of responsibility’.250 
As I have described in earlier chapters, there are varying philosophical positions 
on global poverty, all containing certain degrees of soundness and validity. Arguing from 
beneficence, the rich should donate their money to the most efficient aid organizations.251  
Arguing from distributive justice, the governments of wealthy countries have a positive 
duty to help the poor.252  Arguing from harm, rich Westerners should enact their negative 
duty to abstain from harming the poor, and so take political action to change global 
institutions to reflect this negative duty.253  But, in so far as we must have a basis on 
which to critique the inadequate distribution of resources, from a position outside of 
systems of wealth and income (that is, we must have a position to critique economics that 
is not circular), surely the problem is not contained within the bounds of questions of 
charities or duties of the personally rich or members of rich nations.  We must, and can, 
have a moral and ethical position that informs economics, rather than implicitly allowing 
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economics to inform ethics as if it were its sole foundation.  This was Amartya Sen’s 
point in Development as Freedom, and it is my starting point here.254  
As Jeremy Waldron and Joseph Raz note, the word dignity does not usually occur 
in every day conversation.255 It is a word that might appear when someone is in the 
hospital, and it is a kind of artifact of lawyers and philosophers. This fact, that we do not 
use the word in so-called ‘ordinary language’ does not, in this case, negate its 
significance, because dignity is not a complete abstraction.  We have an experience of 
dignity, or at least an experience that some basic part of the person is being violated, 
when their dignity is threatened and they are degraded. My intuition is that we tend not to 
talk about dignity much, not because it has little real force in our lives, but because it has 
so much force, but only at specific moments, namely, when dignity is being threatened.  
To put the matter simply, things that are very important are hard to talk about, harder still 
to define. 
Dignity steps in to make claims of autonomy (including integrity of sentience, 
independence of moral self, freedom in fact if not achievement) and authority (including 
integrity of voice, political influence, freedom in achievement) in the moments when the 
material backing that would provide evidence for, and promote freedom from, shame and 
degradation, is absent, often because people’s labor is being exploited. That is, claims of 
dignity are made at the moment when alienation occurs, when people’s lives lack the 
material, social, and economic structures to live in what might be called ‘a fully human’ 
fashion, but their moral selves still demand and deserve to live fully human lives. Thus, 
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the notion of dignity provides a standpoint for the critique that the concept of alienation 
directs toward social structures. 
The manner in which dignity comes to the fore in the moment of alienation and 
exploitation is akin to the well-tread dilemma of human rights, expressed by Hannah 
Arendt in her discussion of refugees.  Refugees are those who, without citizenship, are 
most justified in making claims of rights, and who are most in need of having these 
claims satisfied.256  At the same time, refugees are the people least likely to have their 
claims met, because there is no correspondent state apparatus in place to satisfy these 
claims.   Given this paradox of refugee status, the questions then arise: Do rights exist in 
a quasi-realist sense, independent of social institutions that would be in viable positions 
to claim a responsibility, a duty, for them?  Or do rights exist in a quasi-constructivist 
sense, in the way that they would only have validity if there existed concurrent 
institutions strong enough to hold duty and responsibility for them? Do rights always 
have to have viably-achieved, corresponding duties, in order to ‘count’ as rights?  
Of course, Jeremy Bentham originally posited this problem in terms of a similar 
duality in the notion of liberty. Bentham’s complaint was that “Defenders of natural 
rights would say that men are born free, but then complain in the name of rights that so 
many of them were born into slavery.”257 The solution that Jeremy Waldron proposes to 
Bentham’s fruitful dilemma is that men are indeed free, and, for that mater, dignified, in 
the juridical sense, and they need to have their freedom or dignity represented by way of 
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normative command.  So, for Waldron, it is not incoherent to claim both that dignity can 
mean both inalienable status and “may be used concomitantly to convey the demand that 
rank or status should actually be respected.”258 
Similarly, I hold that dignity, like rights, must be present no matter whether there 
is a corresponding duty-holder or not, because dignity, like rights, are calls to change or 
build lasting institutions, indeed, to build a world, that allows for justice.  Nevertheless, I 
must stress that dignity does not exist solely in some pre-formed realist notion of only 
that which is to be discovered.  There are two parts to dignity: the part that is innate, 
which can and must be heard in absence of material support and social recognition, and 
the part that created, that is, is a call for material support and social recognition.  Dignity 
should be thought of as both innate moral autonomy and social authority. 
Again, claims of dignity are made in moments when the experience of alienation 
obscures, obfuscates, anesthetizes, and/or erases the experience of human flourishing, a 
flourishing supported by security against shame and degradation.  It is not immediately 
evident what one is claiming when one is demanding their dignity be respected. The all-
encompassing quality of dignity, the fact that it steps in at moments when voice is ‘lost,’ 
in Elaine Scarry’s sense, that is, when one is suffering, does not invalidate it as a concept. 
Rather, because it is a placeholder for so many important conceptions and intuitions, 
dignity deserves more attention. Just because dignity is a hazy concept does not mean it 
is, as Schopenhaur claimed, the ‘shibboleth of empty-headed moralists’. Dignity is not 
strictly contentless.259  It is only that its content is too close to our body, too close to our 
need, to be adequately voiced in the material and social world.  That which is too close to 
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our needs is not an abstraction. The indeterminacy of claims of dignity derives from the 
fact that one looses one’s language when one suffers, not because there is a lack of truth 
to suffering. 
Yet, extending Scarry’s line of thought, just because suffering deprives people of 
a voice at the moment of occurrence does not mean that it cannot eventually be 
transformed into language, logos, an account. Indeed, this transformation from pain to 
logos is the very process of ‘making the world’---the transformation of painful sentience 
into word, deed, and human artifact.  Analogously, just because dignity appears on the 
scene as hazy and indeterminate, because of its origins in pain and suffering, does not 
mean that it need remain that way.  
 
5.3. Dignity in Law and Activism: an Overlapping Consensus 
The idea of dignity, however loosely defined or theorized, gained predominance 
on the international stage during the mid-twentieth century, principally in the United 
Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (UNDHR).260   The two 
decades that followed witnessed the heyday of the concept of dignity in both domestic 
and international law. The last century saw a great number of newly post-colonial 
constitutions include the concept of individual human dignity as the basis for their 
founding documents.261  The middle of the twentieth century, was, it seemed, the moment 
for dignity.  This was an intentional move on the part of those concerned never to repeat 
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Nazi atrocities, and to define themselves against the Fascism and the xenophobia that was 
made possible by ascribing complete power to the state. The United Nations called upon 
philosophers from many different cultures and traditions to draft the UNDHR, and they 
drew on a long history of the idea of dignity.262  From the Roman Stoics, the Judeo-
Christian tradition, Confucianism, renaissance humanism, enlightenment rationalism, 
working socialism, and feminism, they drew up a document they hoped would serve to 
draw a line in the sand as to what the international community would condone, and 
hopefully prevent.  What resulted was what Rawls might have termed an ‘overlapping 
consensus’---not one specific and concrete idea of dignity that could alienate any one 
religious or cultural tradition, but a loosely defined term that grounds, describes, and 
forms the project of human rights as a whole, a term that leaves open the possibility that 
reasonable people, holding different metaphysical pictures of the good life, could adopt 
without conflict to their rich and individual belief systems.263  As Jürgen Habermas 
recounts, “appealing to the concept of human dignity undoubtedly made it easier to reach 
an overlapping consensus, for example during the founding of the United Nations, and 
more generally when negotiating human rights agreements and international legal 
conventions, and when adjudicating international legal disputes between parties from 
different cultures. Everyone could agree that human dignity was central, but not why or 
how.’’264 
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Interestingly, as David Luban recounts, Eleanor Roosevelt and other drafters of 
the UDHR, like the framers of the Capabilities Approach, intentionally left the definition 
of human dignity incomplete.  Luban characterizes Roosevelt’s resolution on dignity in 
terms of Cass Sunstein’s notion of an ‘incompletely theorized agreement.’265 As Larry 
Solum puts the matter, it was one of those instances “When you cannot reach agreement 
at the deep end of the pool of ideas, head for the shallow end!” Thus Luban concludes 
that, in this history of the UDHR, the term ‘human dignity’ is really a kind of 
placeholder: an uncontroversial, neutral-sounding term for the unknown ‘X’ that anchors 
human rights.”266 So the idea of human dignity became, in the twentieth century, both a 
crucial legal justification for human rights and, if not a placeholder, than at least a useful 
construct that accommodates a number of, sometimes competing, principles and values. 
Its construction resulted from the specific and timely problems of Nazi atrocities and 
colonial aggression.  
The current situation of global poverty is, as I have claimed, a situation of 
widespread alienation and exploitation.  This exploitation is made possible because the 
ideology of neoliberalism has coopted the insights of human rights and used them for its 
own purposes, namely, to engage greater populations in the workforce without 
correspondent autonomy or authority over their economic situation.  That is, global 
economics has a tendency to interpret dignity in human rights as ‘the right to work’.  In 
doing so, development economists and policy makers assume that human rights have a 
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pragmatic justification.  That assumption is false.  The groundings for human rights, 
although pluralist, are always principled, not pragmatic.  Dignity is such a principle. 
  In a colloquium on human rights, Allen Buchanan writes that too often, practical 
rights like the right to work are usurped by the modern capitalist machinery and taken 
more to mean a responsibility to contribute to industry rather than a freedom to be 
independent and financially sustaining if one so chooses.267  As Nancy Fraser and Linda 
Gordon note as well, when the responsibility to contribute to industry is moralized this 
way in modern societies, any situations of dependence (non-contribution) are morally 
suspect and “can be a threat to one’s being regarded as an equal”268 Wherein dependency, 
and caring for dependents, is construed as a threat to equality, those who have few 
choices but to be dependents or caretakers are systematically devalued.   
According to Buchanan, the principled grounding of human rights can be lost in 
the logic of the modern era wherein citizenship qualifies a person for having rights and, 
further, where citizenship is associated with participation in the economy. However, 
rights are grounded in principles other than the irrepressibly pragmatic assumptions of the 
modern era.  Buchanan believes one such principle is equal status, but various theorists 
posit a multiplicity of principles upon which rights are grounded. It is not my aim to enter 
this argument over which principle grounds human rights.  I do want to argue, though, 
that it is not reasonable to think that human rights are not grounded on principles at all.  
The point is that rights are certainly not grounded upon the non-principle of relative 
strength of the economy.  Under international charters, women do and should have a right 
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to work, but too often this is taken to mean that women have a responsibility to contribute 
to a global economy wherein they themselves do not clearly benefit, so that they are 
working for the profit of those who own the means of production, that is, mostly men.  
The expectation of ‘responsibility to contribute’ is, generally, replicated and multiplied in 
the private realm, as well. Generally, rights for all are not taken to operate in absence of 
principles, and so rights for women should not be grounded on a logic of utility, either.  
The pragmatic justifications for poor women’s rights is an anomalous move, 
because justifications for human rights in general, that is, human rights that apply to 
women and men, are not based on utility but on principle.  This is true both historically 
and at present. Amy Gutman explains: “A defense of human rights as pragmatic 
instruments raises the question of whether an international human rights regime can do 
without all moral and metaphysical foundations by defending itself on pragmatic 
grounds.”269 Here, she is outlining a well-tread debate in rights theory: whether or not 
human rights need to be grounded on moral or metaphysical principles and what these 
principles are, exactly.  For example, Buchanan holds that all rights are grounded in the 
moral principle of equal status: every person is equal to every other person in all morally 
significant ways. Some framers of the UDHR argued that human rights are grounded in 
the principle of universal human dignity.270  Gutman’s insight into the debate is that 
theorists argue much more about which principle grounds and unites human rights than 
whether or not rights are grounded in principles at all.  
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Gutman holds that there can and should be a reasonable, overlapping consensus to 
this question of the principled grounds of human rights. There are many reasonable 
grounds, but it does not follow from this pluralism that all grounds are reasonable.  She 
explains: “The foundational arguments for human rights are historically rooted in human 
dignity, natural law, divine creative purpose, and related notions.”271  Now we ground 
human rights in more secular notions, which Gutman thinks is a good development, as 
well. Further, “The drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights involved 
people tied to cultural traditions in North and South America, Europe, Asia, and Africa, 
and religious traditions including Islam, Judaism, Eastern and Western Christianity, 
Hinduism, and more.”272  Of course, as DuBois shows us, the cosmopolitanism of the 
UDHR remained ideal, and in practice left out the African nations, but it nevertheless 
presented itself as being inclusive, and took the route of the overlapping consensus on 
many matters of justification.273  Gutman mentions a few reasonable grounds of rights 
considered in just Article 1 of the Universal Declaration: free and equal personhood, 
equal dignity, equal creation or endowment, equal brotherhood, and human agency. All 
of these foundational principles are, strictly speaking, reasonable ones, and there can be 
multiple principles at work to support human rights.  What is unsound is a pragmatic 
grounding for human rights, like the “right to work’ so as to make an economic 
contribution to the well being of others.” 
We no longer live in an era wherein the greatest threat to human rights is 
totalitarianism.  The defining injustice of our age is unprecedented global poverty, 
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especially in the form of the expansion of urban slums, a new human condition never 
before seen in history---and the condition calls for a rethinking of dignity. This call for 
rethinking dignity is not a criticism of the framers of the UDHR—the story of its drafting 
is a fascinating one, not the least because it exemplifies the necessary tension between 
visionary ideas and the need for practical agreement amongst real differences.  However, 
in our era, the major threats to human rights come not from the rich and varied religious 
traditions, but from a global economic system that instrumentalizes, alienates, and 
exploits people in poverty.   
Essentially, instead of caring about the wellbeing of women in the Global South, 
development economics too often asks “what are women good for?” Buchanan notes that 
practical rights like the right to work commonly are usurped by the modern capitalist 
machinery and taken to mean a responsibility to contribute to industry rather than a 
freedom to be independent and financially sustaining---if one so chooses. But, again, 
human rights have never had pragmatic justifications; they have principled ones.  The 
idea of dignity— the grounding principle for human rights, a principle that decrees one 
has worth beyond price, or that one has universal status--- needs to be rethought with 
more precision and content, in response to the problems of global poverty in the present 
era, so that the ideals of dignity can continue to have moral force. 
 
5.4. Roman and Hebrew Responses to Slavery 
Our modern idea of dignity comes from two contradictory traditions: the Hebrews 
and the Romans.  In fact, the idea of dignity comes first out of the conflict between these 
two groups during the expansion of slavery in the Roman Empire.  The Romans based 
part of their justification of slavery on the idea of dignity as dignitas, hierarchical social 
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status, and the Hebrews justified their objection to slavery on the basis of dignity as 
Kavod, the image of God in every man that gave innate moral worth regardless of social 
status.  Both ideas are at work when we speak about dignity.  The work we need dignity 
to do, in the context of global economic alienation and exploitation, is both the work of 
claiming unconditioned moral equality and a call for social recognition.  That is, dignity 
needs to mean both an endowment and an achievement, both autonomy and authority. 
Jeremy Waldron argues that the idea of dignity currently present in international 
law is inherited from the Roman idea of dignity as status.274 Waldron, along with James 
Whitman and Gregory Vlastos, contends that “the modern notion of human dignity 
involves an upwards equalization of rank, so that we now try to accord to every human 
being something of the dignity, rank, and expectation of respect that was formerly 
accorded to nobility.”275 For Waldron, it is not the case that, as recently egalitarian, we 
are now a society without rank. It is that we, or at least the parts of us that take dignity in 
law seriously, are a society where everyone has the same, high-level rank.  We receive 
our ideas of dignity from our ideas of punishment, specifically, our ideas bout who 
deserves which punishments.  Whitman writes that the harsh punishments, and utter lack 
of mercy, that used to be reserved for the lower ranks of society have become 
increasingly rare, at least in Continental (if not American) law.  Now, the model of the 
law is to treat everyone like a high-ranking member of society.276  The model of 
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punishments for aristocrats has become universalized, and the dignity that used to be 
accorded only to aristocrats is now due to everyone. To clarify: to claim that everyone 
should be treated as a prince is not the same thing as claiming that the treatment of 
princes should be reduced to the treatment of slaves. The situation is rather that slaves are 
now due the same treatment as princes, so to speak.  As Waldron would describe it, 
dignity as status has become universalized.  
The selfsame model of an aristocratic or non-egalitarian society holds, while the 
number of people who should be treated like aristocrats, or at least not punished like 
slaves, has expanded to, ideally, include everyone.  The idea of dignity as rank, as that 
which has historically belonged to people like the clergy, nobility, monarchs, and those 
who hold high-level degrees, originally belonged only to land-owning males.  Yet the 
idea has not disappeared in a world shaped by global abolitionist movements.  Rather, we 
see everyone now as we used only to see the aristocracy, as worthy of freedom from 
degradation.   
Waldron writes that this Roman inheritance gives us a way to think about dignity 
in terms of a sort of upright bearing, a noble self-possession.  For Waldron, dignity is a 
constructive legal fiction as, according to Arendt, political equality was to the Athenians.  
“The Athenians adopted a legal principle of treating one another as equals, not because of 
any moral conviction about real equality between them, but because such a principle 
made possible a form of political community they could not otherwise have.”277  So it is 
not relevant if everyone is, in all or some ways, equal.  The modern notion of dignity in 
law, according to Waldron, is that we treat them as if they were equal, because only then 
will we have the kind of political community we desire.   
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Crucially, Waldron also points to a gap between envisioning dignity as value-
beyond-price, the Kantian idea of worth, and dignity as rank or authority, dependent upon 
one’s place in society.  Waldron is correct in this observation, but I would add that these 
two ideas appear in contradiction because, historically, they appeared as the response of 
two different social groups to the institutionalization of Roman slavery.278  The Hebrews 
constructed an idea of dignity as inalienable moral equality, in objection to slavery.  In 
constrast, the Romans constructed the idea of dignitas, social status, as a justification for 
slavery. 
Jürgen Habermas regards Waldron’s telling of this inheritance story as correct, 
but incomplete.  Habermas contends that the notion of dignity now at work in democratic, 
post-colonial constitutions comes also from the Judeo-Christian heritage, in addition to 
the Romans.  Habermas writes of Waldron’s account:  
 
Two decisive stages in the genealogy of the concept are still missing [in 
Waldron’s account]. First, universalization must be followed by 
individualization. The issue is the worth of the individual in the horizontal 
relations between different human beings, not the status of ‘‘human 
beings’’ in the vertical relation to God or to ‘‘lower’’ creatures on the 
evolutionary scale. Second, the relative superiority of humanity and its 
members must be replaced by the absolute worth of any person. The issue 
is the unique worth of each person. These two steps were taken in Europe 
when ideas from the Judeo-Christian tradition were appropriated by 
philosophy . . .”279 
 
I agree with Habermas’ contention that our ideas of dignity come as much from 
the Judeo-Christian tradition as they do from the Roman idea of dignity as status and 
honor.  The current legal and moral visions of dignity include both ideas about 
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inalienable moral equality and social recognition, and sometimes these contradictory 
ideas are contained in one, ‘common sense’ concept.  However, I would add to 
Habermas’ telling that our ideas of dignity come specifically out of a disagreement 
between the Hebrews and the Romans about the moral and/or legal justifications of 
Roman slavery. 
To qualify, I recognize this story I am giving, that there were two contradictory 
visions of human dignity coming from the Romans and the Hebrews, in justification for 
and opposition to Roman slavery, respectively, is controversial. Some scholars would 
claim that human dignity, as such, does not appear in the Torah and is consequently not 
part of the Hebrew tradition; it is a Western philosophical idea, coming only from the 
Romans, unrelated to religious traditions.280  However, even though the words ‘human 
dignity’ may or may not show up in the Torah, depending on how one translates ‘Kavod’, 
because I am again concerned more with the work the word is doing and less with the 
arrant historical etymology of the word or phrase itself, I contend that notions of the 
preciousness of people were very much present in early Judeo-Christian tradition.  
Furthermore, as Hegel writes in The Philosophy of History, it does not matter whether 
dignity is a development of Christianity, as such, because in any case it owes its genesis 
to Judeo-Christian thought in classical antiquity.281  So, I am not claiming that the Judeo-
Christian tradition ‘owns’ the concept of dignity, nor that dignity is only intelligible when 
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one thinks of it as emanating from God.  I am giving a historical account of the contexts 
in which dignity appeared on the scene in relation to a disagreement over slavery, to 
show that the common sense ways we think about dignity, both in law and human rights 
documents, and, more generally, in meaningful descriptions of our humanity, involve 
these two seemingly contradictory concepts. Furthermore, an idea of dignity that can 
respond to economic exploitation must involve resonances of both conceptions, that is, 
dignity as fact and dignity as achievement.  
As for the Romans, the first time ‘human dignity’ appears in the ancient Roman 
texts is in Cicero, in a rather peculiar and interesting context: Cicero is writing a letter to 
his wayward adolescent son who is living it up, as it were, on his father’s short dime, in 
some far flung corner of the Empire.  Cicero disapproves.  His son is not studying 
enough.  In the letter, Cicero cautions temperance.  He urges his son to ‘live in a manner 
befitting human dignity’, that it is good not to spend too much money, not eat or drink 
too much.  In short, Cicero urges his son toward moderation. The idea of dignity, here, 
was about a father’s idea of the good life for his son. Comically, Cicero beseeches his 
son, ‘please, son, stop spending my money---I am a scholar of law, not the favorite of the 
Emperor.’  In other words, ‘you must act as if we were dwelling in the favor of the 
Emperor, because we do not have an entirely stable social position in which to fall back 
upon.’282 
The Roman notion of dignitas is slightly different from Cicero’s idea of the 
human dignity by which he wants his son to live, that is, to act according to one’s station 
in life.   Christopher McCrudden notes that elsewhere, Cicero defines dignity as man’s 
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special place in the universe in contrast to animals.283 Dignity is the element that, like or 
because of reason, separates man from animals.  By men, Cicero meant, of course, only 
the male sex. It is interesting to note that, for the Romans, dignity was to men as charm 
was to women.  Kant, much later on, made an analogous observation in Observations on 
the Beautiful and the Sublime---that what reason is to men, charm is to women.284   
In any case, dignity for the Romans was reserved only for men, specifically men 
of status.  Women and slaves could not have dignitas.   It is important to note that women 
and slaves were not merely excluded from possessing dignitas by some unfortunate 
accident, but that the very notion was constructed on the basis of the opposition of social 
status between land-holding men and women and slaves.  Dignitas meant that which 
women and slaves did not possess.  Dignitas described men who had rank in the Roman 
Empire: citizens of the empire, landholders, jurists, generally those who were politically 
involved and had influence.  Dignitas meant rank and status. The precondition of status 
was at least a modest amount of wealth. Men with dignitas were expected to carry 
themselves in a manner befitting of their social position, and were noticed for a certain 
ineffable confidence, a bodily bearing, of holding oneself in high regard. Again, dignitas, 
was, by its very constitution, exclusionary.  If one person held a role, like a jurist, giving 
him status amongst many, that meant that many others could not play that role.  Dignitas 
was not originally an egalitarian notion. 
As Orlando Patterson notes, the entire Roman legal system was based on a 
principle of privilege, and this privilege was a response to the need for a justification of 
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institutionalized slavery.  “Ancient Greece and Rome were not simply slaveholding 
societies; they were what Sir Moses Finley calls “genuine” slave societies, in that slavery 
was very solidly the bases of their socioeconomic structures.”285  Interestingly, Patterson 
explains that freed slaves in the Roman Empire, no matter how much power they 
possessed by virtue of the resources at their command or their proximity to the Emperor 
himself, were always considered people without dignitas or honor. Dignitas was social 
standing that could be acknowledged by judges and officials.  If one was ever a slave, one 
could not be of noble or honorable background, and thus one’s ‘social death’ was sealed 
for long after one’s change of legal status.286  
Early Rabbinic law had a different notion of the preciousness of human beings, 
one that, not surprisingly considering the Hebrews’ typical opportunity and social stature 
in Roman society, had little to do with rank.  As is widely known, at various points in the 
development of the Empire, Romans enslaved Hebrews.  Slavery was perfectly legal 
under the Roman laws that applied, for the first time, the concept of absolute ownership 
to people, as well as things.  Patterson contends that, because of slavery, the Romans 
intentionally created the fiction of absolute property.  Roman law reflected a concept of 
absolute ownership and this right to power was realized through ownership of persons.  
Partly in response to Roman law and concepts of absolute ownership that confuse 
things with people, early Rabbinic law speaks of the principle that human life is 
immeasurable; it has infinite value.287 This idea was universal and deeply egalitarian: all 
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human life had infinite value or worth, it was not dependent upon one’s rank or role in 
society.  The law was necessarily so because the Hebrews wanted to argue that slavery 
was morally wrong, no matter the rank of the person being enslaved. These Hebrew ideas 
eventually made their way into Christianity.  For this reason, Arthur Chakalson writes 
that, for the early church, the ideas of dignity and equality were inseparable and 
interdependent.288  
One consequence of Kavod, the principle that human life has immeasurable worth 
on the basis of humanity’s relation to God, was that it places life beyond any other value, 
specifically the value of money.  Rabbinic law also speaks of Kavod as the idea of the 
domination of nature by men, mirroring a relation between God and the world.  Thus we 
get the first instances of what medieval Christians would term imago dei, the idea that 
humans have dignity because they are made in the image of God.  Their dignity, endowed 
by God, comes from God; they have dignity because God has dignity, and they are 
creations of God. Also, for the Hebrews, the opposite of dignity was not, as it was for the 
Romans, a lack of recognized social status.  Rather, the opposite of dignity was the first-
person experience of humiliation, namely, shame.289 To summarize, the primary features 
of the Hebraic concept of dignity were: a vision of the law derived from transcendent 
divinity, the notion that dignity emanates from the source of the image of God in man, the 
principle that dignity is equal in all people, and a repulsion toward and/or rejection of 
slavery. 
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The ideas we have of dignity now, ideas present in both law and international 
human rights documents, are complex ideas coming to us by way of secularization, from 
both the Romans and the early Christians.  By ‘secularization’, I mean what Yehoshua 
Arieli means: the process of universalization of originally religious ideas, like equality on 
the basis of one’s relation to God.290  Because the Roman Empire, like international law 
today, was so large and ever expanding into diverse areas with diverse religious 
traditions, it needed to have universal principles vague enough to accommodate multiple 
traditions.  Universal principles were needed because of the reality of a large central 
governance of diverse tribes and principalities.  Thus, even though the very notion of law 
was drastically different between the Romans, who thought of law as authority of 
collective will and the Hebrews, for whom law was revelation given by transcendent 
divinity, these two contradictory understandings of dignity, and the laws that supported 
them, came to exist side by side.291  
How could two ideas of dignity, one based on the rejection of slavery and the 
other based on its justification, co-exist, and further, merge, in people’s common-sense 
understandings? The dual facets of the Christian tradition allowed for this contradiction.  
Patterson notes that the situation of the Roman Empire was not entirely different from the 
situation of the antebellum American South.  Both cultures exemplified a split in Pauline 
dualism, wherein, under the banner of one religion, the oppressed group could hold to 
God as liberator while the group in power could envision God as the Messianic King, 
who judges and demands obedience.  I quote Patterson at length: 
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Thus the masters [in the American South], among themselves, could find 
both spiritual and personal dignity and salvation in the ethic of the 
justified and redeemed sinner.  The crucified Jesus as redeemer and 
liberator from enslavement to sin supported a proud, free group of people 
with a highly developed sense of their own dignity and worth.  Similarly 
the slaves in the silence of their souls and among themselves with their 
own preachers, could find salvation and dignity in the same interpretation 
of the crucified Lord.” 
Not was it necessary for master and slave to have two separate 
religions.  Christianity, after Paul, had already constructed an 
extraordinary shrewd creed with a built-in flexibility that made it possible 
for emperor and slave to worship the same god without threatening the 
system, but also without denying all dignity to the oppressed.” 
In the U.S. South there developed the last and most perfectly 
articulated slave culture since the fall of the Roman Empire. The religion 
that had begun in and was fashioned by the Roman slave order was to play 
the identical role eighteen hundred years later in the slave system that was 
to be Rome’s closest cultural counterpart in the modern world.  History 
did not repeat itself; it merely lingered.292 
 
Thus, the two ideas of dignity, what Teresa Iglesias terms as 
universal/unconditioned dignity and restrictive/role conditioned, that is, dignity as 
endowment versus dignity as acquirement, were fused when the Romans had to 
accommodate Christianity without violence, and Christianity had, later on, to 
accommodate Roman law.293 So I think that the idea of dignity, from its very origins in 
Western law, has a long history as a sort of compromise, a construction, a kind of 
‘overlapping consensus’.  Our ideas about dignity, like a lot of other things, come from 
the unique “fusion of secular and spiritual realm that defined western history” a fusion 
that occurred not the least of which because, “Rome as world-embracing empire needed 
universal salvation and Christianity needed an empire.” 294 This fact that dignity gets 
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confused in so far as it comes from two opposing traditions does not, as I have said, 
negate the validity of the idea; rather, in paying attention to the tension between the two 
opposing ideas of dignity, as related to the opposing traditions, in this case Roman 
custom and Judeo-Christian text and practice, we understand the shape that the doxa 
about dignity has taken in our own age. 
As I have said, there is a tension between these two ideas of dignity. They are not 
altogether compatible.  Once more, the problem with taking the two ideas of dignity side-
by-side, the Roman idea as socially achieved dignitas and Hebrew ideas as divinely 
endowed dignity-as-equality is that it is very hard to conceive of a status that is universal.  
Stephanie Hennette-Vauchez notes this problem, that status, like Roman dignitas, 
depends in its very structure on inequality.295 However, international laws and human 
rights since the mid-twentieth century have been able to compound these two 
incompatible ideas rather adroitly.  Habermas explains: 
 
After two hundred years of modern constitutional history, we have a better 
grasp of what distinguished this development from the beginning: human 
dignity forms the ‘‘portal’’ through which the egalitarian and 
universalistic substance of morality is imported into law. The idea of 
human dignity is the conceptual hinge that connects the morality of equal 
respect for everyone with positive law and democratic lawmaking in such 
a way that their interplay could give rise to a political order founded upon 
human rights. To be sure, the classical human rights declarations when 
they speak of ‘‘inborn’’ or ‘‘inalienable’’ rights, of ‘‘inherent’’ or 
‘‘natural’’ rights, or of ‘‘droits inalie ́nables et sacre ́s’’ betray their 
religious and metaphysical origins: ‘‘We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are endowed . . . with certain unalienable rights.’’ In 
the secular state, however, such predicates function primarily as 
placeholders; they remind us of the mode of a generally acceptable 
justification whose epistemic dimension is beyond state control.296 
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The post-World-War-II democratic secular state, self-limiting in its goal, imports 
the idea of universal, inalienable dignity by way of a placeholder function, the content of 
which is to be filled out by individuals’ and communities’ interpretations of the good life, 
not decisions of the state.  Still, dignity is not without content, even in the constitutions of 
democratic secular states, because the force of the Roman idea of dignitas as an occasion 
for authority is, and should be, retained.  “Notwithstanding their [human rights] 
exclusively moral content, they have the form of enforceable subjective rights that grant 
specific liberties and claims.”297  A complicated inheritance, to be sure, but a rich one.      
So, what to do with such an inheritance, in light of the problems of our century, 
that of mass poverty created and maintained by economic exploitation, often billed as 
liberation for women?  A notion of dignity must have resonances of both ideas.  People 
surviving on the underside of globalization must be able to claim their dignity in times 
and places where social recognition is lacking.  Thus, dignity must mean universal moral 
equality regardless of social context.  That is, dignity must mean autonomy.  Autonomy is 
descriptive: it points to something already existent regardless of social exigencies.  Also, 
however, dignity must mean a call to action, a call for greater social recognition.  That is, 
dignity must mean authority. The success of this call depends upon the social context.   
Authority is active, the call for dignity is creative, in addition to a description of a 
discovery.  To complete this picture of dignity as both autonomy and authority, we must 
give an account that includes, but is not limited to, the Hebrew and Roman response to 
institutionalized slavery.  
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As Habermas writes, the movement from dignity understood as related to social 
roles to dignity understood as an innate endowment in the individual person happened 
long after antiquity, first in the medieval discussions of human’s likeness to God, and 
then, much later, when Kant radicalized the notions of autonomy.  In the rest of this 
chapter, I will show how a vision of dignity that would constitute an adequate response to 
global poverty must include both the individual and social conceptions of the idea.  
 
5.5. The Complicated Inheritance of Kant 
The philosophical renaissance of Kantian deontology arrived in tandem with the 
global resurgence of interest in human rights.  Kant’s notion of unconditioned duty is 
especially important for the theory and practice of human rights and humanitarian aid.  
As Hugo Slim explains, “Kant’s particular “oughts” are distinctive because they are 
absolute.”298  Nevertheless, the Kantian inheritance of universal human rights is and 
should be intentionally selective.  The idea of dignity present in universal human rights 
need not carry all of the baggage of Kant’s rationalism.  Kant is useful for the project of 
strengthening human rights for the global poor in so far as he reminds us what a principle 
is in the first place, that is, that, qua principle, it applies to everyone without qualification.  
Further, we can gain from Kant a further upbraiding not to replace the right to work, 
which can really function as to shroud “the right to be exploited”, with the dignity of the 
human qua human being.  Beyond remembering what a principle is, and what it means to 
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treat all people as ends and not means, Kant is less useful for the project of economic 
rights: his qualifications for what makes a human being a ‘moral person’ are erroneous. 
 A reasonable construction of dignity involves the second formulation of Kant’s 
categorical imperative, that all people should be treated as ends in themselves and not as 
a means to end.299 This part of the categorical imperative is the principled, deontological 
salve, as it were, to the problem of women being treated as means to the ends of 
economic development that benefits families, husbands, nations, and multinational 
corporations, that is, anyone but the women themselves.  This formulation is principled 
insofar as it is not subject to the vagaries of situation, or competing interests, of the 
parties at play.  This yoking of human dignity and human rights to the second formulation 
of Kant’s categorical imperative is well-trod ground, to be sure, but is also constantly 
forgotten in contexts like international development, which use human rights when they 
see fit, and jettison them when they contradict the goals of economic growth. To hold to 
the second formulation of the categorical imperative in the context of economic 
development would require principled commitment to the fact that women’s wellbeing 
and freedom, along with their dignity and self-respect, cannot be subsumed in service to 
some greater goal, even if that goal is a good one, like feeding the family or decreasing 
national debt.  Applying the categorical imperative to the rights of women counters some 
of our commonly held, though often subconscious, notions of what women should be --- 
sacrificers for their families, their husbands, their children, or the greater good.  To think 
of poor women living in the GSUS as ends in themselves implies a radical transformation 
of many development policies, including even the well-meaning policies of micro-
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lending and microfinance.300  If poor women of color are ends in themselves, and not the 
ends of someone else’s profit or well-being, many development ventures, not to mention 
the machinations of global capital that have no interest in development proper, are 
explicitly immoral.     
Important as the second formulation of the categorical imperative is, it is not 
necessary, however, to drag along the entire architectonic of Kant’s moral theory into a 
theory of dignity that responds to global poverty.  As Naomi Zack writes in The Ethics 
and Mores of Race, “Even Kant’s most ardent defenders recognize his excessive legalism 
and inflexibility concerning the application of ‘the moral law”301. . . “Kant’s overall 
meaning is quite clear: Morality is the province of rational beings who are capable of 
using only their reason to act wholly from duty.”302  Debates about dignity get caught up 
in these Kantian debates about who, or what, qualifies as a moral being. Human rights 
frame everyone as a moral being. The strict qualifications of Kant’s rationalism --- who 
can be rational, qualifications for the motivations of ‘pure’ duty, debates as to whether or 
not Kant is even writing about human beings in his moral theory303--- do not add 
anything to the universalization of dignity in response to global poverty.   
Dignity should be a descriptor of both people who appear to be rational, under 
Kant’s qualifications, and those who are not.   As Care Ethics has shown, it is not merely 
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the independent or even ‘reasonable’ person, in the impossibly strict sense of Kant’s 
meaning, who makes claims of dignity.304  Rather, people with needs make claims of 
dignity.  It is right that their bodily, psychological, in other words, heteronymous, needs 
should factor into such claims. In his aesthetics, Kant also outlines a version of dignity in 
which man’s rationality and autonomy triumph over nature and the emotions.305 
Privileging reason over emotions fails to be constitutive of dignity for a number of 
reasons: first, because it’s speceist, second, because responding to alienation and 
exploitation means responding to the emotions of the people experiencing these 
conditions, and third, because a vision of dignity that responds to alienation relies upon a 
theory of artistic creation that is receptive, as well as expressive.306  Kant’s formalism 
does not capture this receptivity needed to ‘build the world’.  Dignity is the capability to 
create the world.  In being thus, it is dependent on a vision of creativity that has a 
capacity to respond to the contingencies of our needs and our bodies. Kant’s vision of 
dignity solely as autonomy—the capacity of the rational agent to give the law to himself-- 
does not capture the full picture of dignity as autonomy and authority. 
 
5.6. Dignity as Autonomy and Authority  
To review, it is helpful to see this theory of dignity, so far, in outline form: 
 
Explanandum: 
 
Given the realities of the GSUS—the specific and gendered alienation and exploitation 
that occurs within the slums—we need a theory of dignity, as a principle of human rights, 
that cannot be confused or substituted for another means of exploitation.  The loose 
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305 See Paul Guyer’s Kant and the Experience of Freedom, Cambridge: Cambridge UP  1996. 
 
306 This is a new claim entirely—it’s the subject of the rest of this chapter. 
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overlapping consensus from current human rights practice does is not sufficient for this 
purpose. 
 
Explanans:  
 
1) Taking the experience of slavery as a paradigm of economic exploitation and 
alienation, the ideas of dignity that come out of slavery in the Roman Empire are 
useful.  We have seen that dignity meant both a) unqualified moral equality 
(autonomy), and b) status (authority).  
2) Autonomy and authority should be part of the principle of dignity 
3) The principle of dignity should include Kant’s categorical imperative insofar as it 
should always treat people as ends and never as means, but not in so far as Kant 
narrowly defined his categorical imperative to apply only to rational agents and 
not all human beings as such. 
 
Now, there is more that needs to be said about part 1 of the explanans: that is, why it is 
necessary to conceive of dignity both as autonomy and authority, in order to respond to 
alienation in the GSUS.  Or, why authority, coming from the Roman notion of status that 
was originally a justification for slavery, needs to be part of dignity, a theoretical 
protection against exploitation.  The idea of status, as exclusionary, could merely 
function to reinforce inequality under globalization. The justification for dignitas was, 
essentially and in large part, a justification for landholding, that is, having a place in the 
world from which to speak and act.  Alienation is, as we have said, the lack of a world.  
What, then, does it mean to have a world? What remains to be explained, here, then, is 
how dignity—as a response to alienation—is the capability to create a world. 
To make the case for why dignity must involve both authority and autonomy, 
consider one example from Nelson Mandela’s life.  During his years in prison at Robin 
Island, Mandela writes that he took considerable comfort from the words of the poem, 
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Invictus, by William Ernest Henley and taught this poem to his fellow prisoners.307  The 
poem begins:  
Out of the night that covers me, 
Black as the pit from pole to pole, 
I thank whatever gods may be 
For my unconquerable soul. 
It concludes:  
It matters not how strait the gate, 
How charged with punishments the scroll, 
I am the master of my fate: 
I am the captain of my soul. 
The power of the poem, and perhaps the moral support Mandela drew from it, lies in its 
description of self-mastery, something like what Kant meant by autonomy.  No matter 
what the circumstance, no one can take away a moral power from you, and that 
inalienability of dignity is your ‘unconquerable soul’.  Indeed, despite being locked away 
in prison, Mandela found that he could still have moral autonomy, and took great comfort 
in this fact. 
Henley’s poem typifies a sort of Victorian nostalgia and sentimental 
simplification, but the basic message stands: one’s moral worth and standing does not 
depend, in an essential way, upon external contingencies.  The religious scholar Karen 
Armstrong expresses a similar position in her description of the Prophet Muhammad’s 
revulsion against the violence and war.  In the face of the assaults by the Meccan 
Calvary, Muhammad was able to adopt a nonviolent strategy and negotiate a peace treaty 
because “God had sent down the “gift of inner peace” upon the Muslims, so that they had 
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been able to respond to this assault with calm serenity.”308  In Armstrong’s telling, moral 
autonomy, and indeed radical social progress, was possible for Mohammad and the early 
Muslims, precisely because their inner peace was not dependent upon external oppressive 
and violent circumstances. By the realization of their moral autonomy, the early Muslims 
were able halt a cycle of violence and introduce a new element, nonviolence, into the 
social context of the time.   
Yet, this sort of autonomy cannot be all that dignity entails, because it is not all 
that justice  (or freedom from alienation and exploitation) entails.  One would not want to 
say that just because Mandela could maintain an admirable degree of self-mastery while 
imprisoned, that the reason, duration, or conditions of his imprisonment were not unjust.  
Nor would one want to deem meaningless sectarian violence as ‘just’.  As Isaiah Berlin 
explained, a vision of freedom that has as its basis the prisoner is not a very convincing or 
strong vision whatsoever.309  That freedom, and concurrently that dignity, verges on 
being purely symbolic, in a time when we need a vision of dignity that is not only 
symbolic, but also social and material. 
Yet neither would one want to say that Mandela had no dignity while he was 
imprisoned.  Similarly, it is not right to claim that migrants to the GSUS have no dignity. 
Nevertheless, their situation is not wholly just.  Dignity as moral autonomy is inalienable, 
and a basis upon which people can make human rights claims, regardless of their social 
                                                
308 Karen Armstrong, Twelve Steps to a Compassionate Life.  New York and Toronto: Knopf, 2010.  62 
 
309 Isaiah Berlin.  Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford UP 1990).  He writes, “‘The fundamental sense 
of freedom is freedom from chains, from imprisonment, from enslavement by others.” 48 
  182 
conditions.  Yet not everyone seems to have dignity in so far as they have the capability 
to create a world that is, in so far as they have authority. 
There is a distinction to be made here between having and manifesting dignity.  
This distinction follows the differentiation between autonomy and authority, the 
historical split in our understandings of dignity that first appeared between the Hebrews 
and the Romans over institutionalized slavery.  The problem is that one both has and is 
without dignity in situations of degradation.   Autonomy must be part of dignity.  We 
have seen this in the history of social progress, in the rejection of slavery and systemic 
violence.  Yet there is also an element of authority to dignity, authority that must be 
dependent upon social recognition and material circumstances. The crucial point is this: 
all people have moral autonomy, regardless of social circumstances.  But when people 
make claims of dignity they are also demanding that the social and political world creates 
a space for their demand to have authority. That is, they are demanding that they be able 
to manifest their dignity, through the creation of the world.  
One reason why many people, Nussbaum and Sen included, want to characterize 
dignity as ‘intuitive’ is because many people, certainly not only philosophers, have an 
idea about what dignity is, and have an existential stake in this idea.310  For example, a 
young Egyptian Revolutionary defined dignity, and the spirit of the revolution, thusly: “It 
means that, for the first time in my life, I feel like my life counts for something.  I matter. 
We matter.”311 A conception of dignity must capture this sense of mattering, counting for 
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something.  This revolutionary is expressing something akin to authority.312.  Authority, 
as part of dignity, is social recognition and the capability to create a world.313 Dignity as 
authority has some necessary preconditions of material and support behind it.  Authority 
is the capability to create a world.  The difference in how we normally think of the word 
‘authority’ is that the authority attached to dignity does not base its legitimacy on 
entrenched or socially constructed hierarchy, but rather on the fact of dignity as 
autonomy.  This point is important: if dignity as authority requires legitimation or 
justification, rights bearers will not find such legitimation where the Romans did, that is, 
in institutional social hierarchies.  Rather, the fact of autonomy gives legitimacy to the 
achievement of authority.  Said a different way, dignity as authority is derived from the 
fact of moral autonomy.  However, the dissimilar justifications do not imply that dignity 
qua authority has a radically different meaning than dignity qua dignitas; both meanings 
are grounds for having and speaking from one’s place in the world.  
So, again, the problem to which this version of dignity must respond, in our time, 
is widespread poverty, created by globalization and neo-liberal policies, experienced as 
alienation, and fueled by the exploitation of women’s labor. A version of human dignity 
that is responsive to this problem would be one based in both autonomy and authority, 
both in having and manifesting dignity.  What it would mean to manifest dignity would 
be what it would mean not to be alienated.  One manifests dignity by creating a world.  
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Consider again, Zehrunisa’s vision for her life, from Chapter I, in the account 
Katherine Boo gives of Zehrunisa’s rather measured hopes and plans for her life, as it is:   
She wanted a more hygienic home here, in the name of her children’s 
vitality.  She wanted a shelf on which to cook without rat intrusions- a 
stone shelf, not some cast-off piece of plywood.  She wanted a small 
window to vent the cooking smoke that caused the little ones to cough like 
their father.  On the floor she wanted ceramic tiles like the ones advertised 
on the Beautiful Forever wall- tiles that could be scrubbed clean, instead 
of broken concrete that harbored filth in each striation.  With these small 
improvements, she thought her children might stay as healthy as children 
in Annawadi could be.314  
 It could be said that Zehrunisa needed and wanted the basic material backing from 
which should could have a place in the world, a place to speak and act.  She needed basic 
infrastructure, basic hygiene, a basic home so that she and her children could both have a 
world and, from having a world, create a world. She needed the capability to create the 
world, a capability that was intricately connected to her and her children’s basic health 
and needs. 
5.7 Authority as the Capability to Create the World 
Elaine Scarry writes that the problem of creating the world is essentially related to 
the relief one feels in expressing, and thus externalizing and alleviating, the interiority of 
the body, especially the body in pain. Scarry claims that this externalization of one’s self 
is a necessity, a necessary activity, for human beings.  Yet, importantly, expressing 
oneself through the creation of both material structures in the world and lasting political 
institutions is not, for either Scarry or Arendt, solely a matter of ‘expression’. Because 
Arendt and Scarry are concerned with alienation, their vision of ‘creating the world’ does 
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not rest upon the individualism that the Romantic vision of art portends.  Instead, the idea 
of the creation of a world is rooted in a mimetic envisioning of creation, one source of 
which is Greek.315 The creator or artist is not the sole progenitor of the work, and the 
work is not merely the outpouring of the artist’s genius.  Another way to say this is that 
the artist does not only give the law to him/herself.  Rather, the artist creates the work as 
a response to something, in the case of ancient Greeks, a response to the muses or the 
gods.  This version of dignity, then, based on autonomy and authority --- the capability to 
create the world ---is not solely dependent upon the romantic construction of artist as 
visionary and expressive.  To note, there is a distinction here between creating the real 
world through labor, work, and politics, and creating art, which is the ideal, imaginary, or 
imagined world.316 Yet theories of artistic creation can inform the notion of ‘creating the 
world.’  Further, perhaps (and I can merely suggest this here) there is not such a great 
difference between the visionary artist and the visionary citizen. Both create something 
new, and can, because of their imagination, set something radically new in motion in the 
world.317 
Gabriel Marcel emphasizes the relation between expression, creativity, and 
receptivity in his essay “On Human Dignity.”318  About dignity, Marcel writes first that, 
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in considering the subject, we should be wary of a certain tendency in modern society 
that abstracts the human being and instrumentalizes the person, as indicative of a 
condition lacking love.  A symptom of this abstraction is when society considers 
individuals as “mere units of production, and to judge his worth only in terms of 
productivity.”319  Marcel notes that Marxists and communists have just as much tendency 
toward abstraction as free market capitalists.  This tendency to consider individuals as 
units of production is the antithesis of dignity.  Interestingly, Marcel points to the 
example of the design and construction of cities as an example of this abstraction made 
manifest.  He is concerned by the large, impersonal buildings being constructed in the 
slums outside Paris during his time, “merciless structures, not for human beings to dwell 
in (for “to dwell” still has a human connotation) but to be “incorporated into.”  He writes: 
“I have the immediate and almost physical feeling of this universal threat which today 
weighs upon human beings, after passing through these suburbs where everything 
changes before our eyes at such amazing speed”320   
It is a wonder that, in defining dignity, Marcel points to an artistic vision, 
specifically a relationship between creation and admiration. After witnessing the horror 
of inadequate human dwelling places, Marcel responds with an aesthetic vision.  His 
response—the connection he makes between the urban disenfranchisement and a vision 
of dignity---is highly instructive.  There is indeed a connection between dignity and a 
vision of creation, because alienation, the antithesis of dignity, is the lack of ability to 
create the world.  Marcel does not talk of alienation in the essay, nor does he specify why 
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exactly an artistic vision of creation is so essential to dignity, but the connection he 
makes between the state of city dwellings and an aesthetic vision of dignity of the person 
is compelling.   
Marcel speaks first of the ability of his characters in novels and plays to escape 
what he calls the ‘disease of poverty’: “the poverty which is neither lack of money nor 
lack of success” but a spiritual disease that attenuates a person’s ability to recognize other 
human beings as possessing dignity.321  He writes, “the artist will probably be safe from 
this disease of poverty, as well as the believer who can pray.  In either case, salvation 
comes from transcendence.”322  Marcel writes of one character in particular, who, as an 
artist, “is a mediator, exists in a spiritual climate of admiration.”323  
The creative person admires others in standing outside of herself, and experiences 
a sort of transcendence.  The admiration is made possible by the fact that the artist 
recognizes and feels the dignity of those she admires, and does not reduce them to tools 
for her own success or instrumentalize them as objects.  That there would be a 
relationship between admiration and creation, in other words, that one does not create ex 
nihilo, is perhaps counterintuitive because, as Marcel writes, we often confuse creation 
with production.  Creation is imaginative and responsive to one’s environment, while 
production is automatic and not necessarily tied to the contingencies of one’s 
surroundings. I think this confusion arises because of our historical positioning in late 
capitalism, which ideologically supports just-in-time production techniques in areas of 
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life outside of production proper, like confusing handmade pottery with the ceramic vases 
one finds in chain retail stores.  At any rate, “in reality any creation is a response to a call 
received, and it is receptivity that we should stress here while pointing out that a serious 
error is made whenever receptivity and passivity are confused, as it seems to me they are 
in Kant”.324  
Indeed, Kant does confuse receptivity with passivity, insofar as autonomy is 
always an active process of giving the law to oneself.  Kant banishes, with fervor, any 
traces of heteronymous influences in the moral law, and in doing so precludes the 
possibility that the moral agent might be moral, not because she is passive in the face of 
passions she cannot control, but because she is receptive to influences one would not 
wish to control, in other words, influences she admires.   
Marcel continues: “there is every reason to believe that there is no difference of 
nature but merely a difference of power between the ability to feel and the ability to 
create; both presuppose not only the existence of a soi, but of a world in which the soi 
recognizes itself, exercises and spreads itself; a world in between the closed and the open, 
between having and being, and of which my body appears necessarily the symbol or 
materialized nucleus.”28   This is the crux of the issue, the reason autonomy and authority 
are united in dignity: there is no difference in nature but merely in power between feeling 
and creation, because creation must be receptive to feeling, indeed, creation is the 
necessary response to the pain, experienced in my body, to feeling.  We can see here 
direct resonances between Marcel and Scarry. Further, we can see why we must define 
dignity as both autonomy and more than autonomy.  The self is both an expressive and 
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receptive self, both has and manifests dignity, and the body, vulnerable to pain, appears 
as the center of these experiences. 
It is impossible to create good art, or the world, without being vulnerable.  
Creation is a response to vulnerability, and, in so far as creation is tied to dignity, 
manifesting one’s dignity is, too, a response to vulnerability.  This is why Marcel says it 
would be a mistake to infer the meaning of dignity from only those who have an 
appearance that accompanies power, in other words, from those who have hierarchical 
status.  I quote at length:  
It is my own profound belief that we cannot succeed in preserving the 
mysterious principle at the heart of human dignity unless we succeed in 
making explicit the properly sacral quality peculiar to it, a quality which 
will appear all the more clearly when we consider the human being in his 
nudity and weakness- the human being as helpless as the child, old man, 
or the pauper . . . 
Do we not run the risk, as a rule, of letting ourselves be deceived 
by what I would like to call a decorative conception of dignity … which 
we more or less confuse with the display of pomp that usually 
accompanies power?  It is considered advisable, for example, to surround 
the judicial power with appearances and conditions likely to command 
respect, or, if one prefers, to put a certain distance between men entrusted 
with high duties and ordinary people.325 
 Marcel takes dignity to have a sacred quality to it, and I believe this sacred 
quality can be preserved even in thoroughly secularized contexts.  The sacral 
quality of which he speaks is not the accouterment of pomp, that, for example, a 
judge wears, but the mysterious quality that admiration of that, for example a 
mentor, inspires.  When one looks up to a role model, or admires a teacher, there 
is something fascinating about this person, fascinating because she or he has 
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knowledge or skill one has not yet acquired.  The student/apprentice steps outside 
herself, transcends herself, to create something that she would not have been 
capable of before the inspiration of her mentor.  The apprentice is vulnerable:  she 
is entering into unknown territory.  The process of creation is especially difficult 
because a person is never quite sure what she is doing, when she is creating 
something absolutely new but also on her own terms, and yet one is accountable 
to very accomplished masters of a craft.  (What are “my” terms when I am 
creating?  This world, this art, will never be as good as X’s, this person I’ve 
admired for decades, from whom I have learned so much but still is not me.)  
Nevertheless, the process of artistic creation is especially rewarding as well: one 
feels, when one has created art or the world, not so much that one has conquered 
one’s vulnerability, but that one’s vulnerability has been made meaningful. 
This vulnerability does not merely arise from the fact of transcendence in 
the creative process, but also from the need to create in the first place.  Creation is 
a response to vulnerability in the way that pain and suffering cause unbearable 
insularity. As Scarry explains, suffering does not appear, in its first iteration, as 
transferable to language.  We feel isolated when we begin to suffer because it is 
each of us individually that feel pain, and there is not an adequate language of 
suffering to express the contours of our experience.  This isolation, though, can be 
tempered by creativity.  We create art, artifacts, indeed, we create the world, out 
of the need to attenuate the isolation of suffering and the fact of vulnerability. The 
non-alienated work of creativity gives us a shared world wherein our suffering is 
made meaningful.  Thus, creation must be responsive to suffering. 
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This vision of artistic creation is different, perhaps, from the more 
Romantic tenors in Marx’s own [implicit] vision of creativity.  The artist, that is, 
the person who creates the world, is not merely expressing herself, although that 
is certainly a part of artistic creation, but she is also responding to the need to 
manifest her dignity.  Insofar as the foregoing vision of creation is responsive, it 
has more in common with the Greek’s idea of mimesis than the Romantic’s idea 
of the creator as individual genius.  In its ‘sacral quality’, that is, the mystery of 
admiration, the self is responsive to forces beyond its control, including the force 
of its own vulnerability that is at the mercy of an unjust economic system.  
Certainly, the romantic idea of artist as expresser is involved here too ---one must 
express one’s feelings in creating the world, in an effort to overcome alienation--- 
but, in addition to expressing, the artist is also responding.  Further, the work 
made, that is, the creation, in addition to the activity of the work itself, call for a 
response and with that call it creates authority.  In the function of expressing, we 
see the fact of dignity as autonomy.  In the function of reciprocal response, we see 
the achievement of dignity as authority.  
Autonomy and authority are united in dignity, but, and this is important to note, 
they are not strictly the same.  As I have said, one always has autonomy, and so dignity, 
but one cannot always manifest one’s dignity by belonging to and shaping the world, so 
one does not always have authority.  One has autonomy, and dignity, regardless of 
circumstance, but authority depends upon the circumstances of feeling, on our bodies, 
and of our place in the world.  At the outset, these are things that we cannot control, over 
which we have, strictly speaking, little to no ‘self mastery’.  Indeed it is precisely at the 
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moment when people’s personality and bodily integrity have been compromised by 
economic and political forces outside of their control, when, for instance, people living in 
poverty are alienated, that the claims of dignity become paramount.  With this situation in 
mind, Marcel writes that we must be very careful not to confuse honor, status, or even 
respect with dignity.  Indeed, we will not arrive at dignity unless we consider those to 
whom status and respect are not usually bestowed.  It is on this point, Marcel encourages, 
that we must leave Kant behind; his rationalism that values self-mastery as autonomy 
above all else misses the need to have an element of dignity responsive to that which we 
do not, and cannot, control.  Another way to say this is that a part of dignity, the creative 
part, is of principled value despite its not being absolutely rational, in the Kantian sense.  
One might object to this dual formulation of dignity as autonomy and authority on 
the grounds that autonomy and authority are contradictory.  How, one could ask, could 
one intentionally fuse two concepts that came about in direct opposition to one another, 
on the bases of the Hebrew opposition to and Roman justification of slavery?  Analogous 
to the way in which existentialists consider freedom both a fact and achievement, so 
dignity is both a fact (autonomy) and something akin to an achievement (authority).326 
Authority in dignity is akin to a directedness-towards, or an aim, in the Aristotelian sense.  
Aristotle wonders, at the outset of the Ethics, if the work of being ethical is like an archer 
aiming at a target.327  It cannot be like this, he concludes, because we do not know the 
target before we begin, but, it is only by beginning and creating that the target becomes 
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clear.  Further, I ground the justification of authority in the fact of autonomy, rather than 
in social status.  Lastly, I frame authority as the capability to create the world.  Authority 
has a material and social bases and is the precondition to creative speech and action, and 
is the opposite of alienation.  So, my understanding of authority is very different from the 
Roman understanding of dignitas as social status.  It captures something that the Romans 
knew: that to possess a full dignity one needs social recognition dependent on having 
one’s own place in the world (dignity is not merely symbolic).  However, my conception 
of dignity as authority also draws from what Marxists know: that social status and 
recognition, too, can be merely symbolic without the material support that allows a 
person’s labor to be an expression of their self. 
In fact and in form, dignity is not very far from artistic creation at all.  Dignity is 
tied to work, both in the sense of labor and the material product, the energia and the 
ergon. In this way, dignity relates to alienation. The dignity of being able to manifest 
oneself in one’s lasting and shared creation is the response to alienation in the loss of the 
world.  Because women’s work, bodies, and selves are not property or means to an end, 
they share in this dignity and this world. 
To qualify, this conception of dignity as autonomy and authority does not, and is 
not intended to, exhaust all possibly forms of dignity. I am here only talking about human 
dignity, which does not preclude the possibility that animals and other parts of the natural 
or made world possess dignity.  I think they do; but my aim is not, here, to define how.  
Furthermore, as I have said, I do not share Kant’s rationality criteria for being human. In 
fact, I am not really interested in defining criteria for what makes us human at all.  
Therefore, I am not saying that work makes us human, or gives us dignity. I am claiming 
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that a world, made by communal, and not individual work, allows us to manifest our 
dignity.  Along this line of qualifiers, care ethicists have real and sound concerns about 
defining humans in terms of their autonomy without regards to their dependency, a 
dependency that is not a result of economic exploitation, but always already part of the 
human condition.  What about, they ask, people who cannot work, for whom others must 
work on their behalf, that is, the disabled who cannot communicate in ways that strict 
enlightenment rationalism would fail to deem as fully human?  Would we say that they 
do not have dignity, then?  No.   In fact, if a disabled person were being exploited, we 
would claim that their exploitation, along with everyone else’s, in unjust on the basis of 
their innate dignity, a dignity that has no relation to their ability.  Neither would we want 
to deny this person a world in which to flourish, because they suffer and experience joy 
like all others.  A world is not made by one person. We think on these terms because we 
are used to thinking of people as, like Arendt’s diagnosis of the social, private 
individuals.  A world is made communally, gifted over generations by many people. A 
world made by work, as the precondition of speech and action, gives people authority and 
evidences people’s uniqueness and non-exchangeability, their dignity. 
To conclude, this vision of dignity that answers the problem of alienation under 
widespread poverty, fueled by the exploitation of women’s labor, has, for all intents and 
purposes, four parts: first, a principled, deontological grounding in line with the 
grounding for human rights in general.  Second, it involves the principled commitment to 
people, and especially women, as ends in themselves.  Third, autonomy is involved in 
dignity, but, fourth, cannot be considered in terms of a broader vision of justice without 
also considering authority, as the capability to create the world.  This conception of 
dignity still, I think, qualifies as fitting into an overlapping consensus needed in the 
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cosmopolitan contexts of international law and activism.  It is more specific, certainly, 
than the UDHR or Capabilities Approach, but it is a ‘weak’ metaphysical conception that 
could fit into, and even bolster, stronger metaphysical belief systems.  Because it relies 
on a vision of creation that is receptive, but does not delimit what it is that creation is 
receptive to, it could still encompass a version of dignity as grounded in the image of 
God, or social recognition.  Indeed, my hope is that this more robust conception of 
dignity adds to, and does not detract from, the immensely rich and valuable history and 
tradition of metaphysical descriptions of the matter.  I do want this version of dignity, 
though, to detract from the prevailing ideologies of neo-liberalisms that support 
globalization, and so the status quo of ever expanding poverty in the global south, of 
which women bear much of the pain. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 
 
 
6.1. Overview 
 
 In this dissertation, I have shown that the urban slums of the global south (GSUS) 
constitute a new human condition, and, further, that they demand a new vision of justice 
that accounts for gendered exploitation, alienation, and dignity.  I must note here that the 
project as a whole was originally inspired by Martha Nussbaum’s and Amartya Sen’s 
Capabilities Approach. However, this project contributes to and expands the Capabilities 
Approach in critical ways.  Nussbaum maintains that the approach relies upon ‘an 
intuitive idea of human dignity’, and further, that the approach has Aristotelian and 
Marxist origins.  Yet, the approach, as it stands, does not offer a theoretical guarantee 
against exploitation, and does not offer a full account of how, exactly, women’s work is 
exploited in the global south.  The preceding chapters have offered a fuller account of a 
Marxist and Aristotelian vision of justice, as a response to the need to understand the 
GSUS, and have offered an account of dignity which functions as a bulwark against the 
exploitation of women’s labor.  In this conclusion, then, I will show how my work as a 
whole adds to and strengthens the Capabilities Approach. 
 
6.2. The Capabilities Approach as a Response to Global Poverty 
As I have said in Chapter II, there is a tendency to subject women, and poor 
women especially, to what Linda Zerilli has called ‘the logic of utility’: instead of asking 
what women want or need, what kind of lives they envision for themselves, many 
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development theorists ask instead, “what are women for?”328  Amartya Sen, Martha 
Nussbaum, Sabina Alkire and other practitioners and theorists of the Capabilities 
Approach clarify why questions of utility are, in fact, the wrong questions to ask.  
In his 2000 work, Development as Freedom, Sen argues that the goals of ethical 
development should not be to increase the relative power of the elites in the global south, 
open up new markets for Western enterprise, or compete on a global stage in Gross 
Domestic or National Product comparisons, but rather, to raise the standard of living for 
each person, considered individually.329  Development policies exist to enhance 
freedoms, and therefore people’s freedoms should not be compromised for the goals of 
development. The capabilities approach that Sen’s work inspired is a robust approach to 
measuring and theorizing poverty and wellbeing, that, on the empirical side, de-
emphasizes the ubiquitous measures of GNP and GDP and instead advances a multi-
dimensional poverty index.   
 
Nussbaum defines the theoretical side of the field thusly:  
 
The Capabilities Approach can be provisionally defined as an approach to 
comparative quality-of-life assessment and to theorizing about basic social 
justice.  Its holds that the key question to ask, when comparing societies 
and assessing them for their basic decency or justice, is, “What is each 
person able to do and to be?”  In other words, the approach takes each 
person as an end, asking not just about the total or average well-being but 
about the opportunities available to each person.  It is focused on choice or 
freedom, holding that the crucial good societies should be promoting for 
their people is a set of opportunities, or substantial freedoms, which 
people then may or may not exercise in action: the choice is their’s.330 
  
                                                
328 Zerilli, Linda M.G.  Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press,  2005. 
 
329 Sen, Amartya.  Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford UP,  1999. 
 
330 Nussbaum, Martha C. Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach. Belknap, Harvard 
UP: Cambridge. 2011, 18. 
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 Sen and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is the current leader, in approaches to 
global justice from the philosophical field, which need not rely heavily on the social 
contract tradition.  Whereas, as explained in chapter III, for Thomas Nagel, economic 
freedom was taken to be separate from conditions of justice in the global sphere, Sen has 
a vision of global justice that includes substantive freedoms, considered as capabilities, 
for each person.  Capabilities are the aspects of human flourishing, which governments 
should support but not force to function. Just as for Henry Shue, there is no meaningful 
difference between having a right and being able to enjoy that right, for Sen, substantive 
freedoms are freedoms that strengthen each other, and where there is no meaningful 
difference between possessing a freedom and exercising that freedom.  In addition, as 
Shue recognizes that severe economic need was not detached whatsoever from 
considerations of basic rights, so Sen recognizes that “economic unfreedom, in the form 
of severe poverty, can make a person helpless prey, in violation of other kinds of 
freedom.”331  In short, poverty, considered as unfreedom, is capability deprivation.  The 
deprivation of capabilities is an injustice because each person has dignity and agency, and 
poverty prevents people from flourishing. 
Sen makes the case that there is no significant separation between economic 
inequality and severe humanitarian violations more forceful.  In doing so, he makes great 
headway into the question: Why is inequality bad?  He considers, by way of example, 
mortality rates amongst Caucasians and African-Americans in the U.S.332  There is 
evidence, as Sen shows, of far greater mortality for black men as compared to white men, 
                                                
331 See Sen, Amartya.  The Idea of Justice.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP. 2009.   
 
332 To note, this is of course a domestic example not strictly considered in the realm of ‘global justice’.  But 
I mention it here because it is especially illuminative of the point that economic inequality cannot be 
separated from humanitarian concerns. 
 
  199 
and black women as compared to white women, and this is the case even after the studies 
are adjusted for income differentials:   
While U.S. black men have 1.8 times the mortality rate of white men, black 
women have nearly 3 times the mortality of white women in this situation. . . . It, 
thus, appears, even after full note is taken of income levels, black women die 
young in very much larger proportion than white women in the contemporary 
United States.333  
 
One of Sen’s aims, in giving these statistics, is to show that inequality, economic or 
otherwise, has far reaching consequences in terms of basic capability depravation.  In 
terms of its influence on people’s lives, socioeconomic justice is not a separate category 
from, say, negative rights of bodily inviolability. 
What Sen, Nussbaum, and other theorists of the capabilities approach offer is a 
more fully developed, robust [yet still incomplete] theory of justice than those relying on 
the contractarian framework.  Moreover, they see their work as an important expansion of 
human rights discourses. Sen and Nussbaum give a picture of the goal of justice, which 
other theories do not quite capture.  That is, working, in part, from Aristotelian and 
Marxist paradigms, Sen and Nussbaum give a vision of what it means for humans to 
flourish.  As such, the capabilities approach has broad implications for global justice, 
beyond a narrow debate about rights and duties.  Instead of constraining themselves to 
questions regarding what duties rich westerners have to the global poor on the basis of 
whatever social contract they imagine to be present, the locus of justice, for theorists of 
the capabilities approach, revolves around the question: What is each person actually able 
to do and to be?  That they ask this question is the reason the Capabilities Approach is so 
inspirational.  The matter of global justice, then, for the capabilities approach, is not 
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closed when affluent countries decide the degree of their duty in terms of institutional 
arrangements.  Just institutional arrangements are, to be sure, an important part of a 
theory of justice for the capabilities approach, but they are not the whole story.  Global 
justice is about, also, the flourishing of each person within, and after, the institution’s 
arrangements.  Further, institutional procedures are to be judged not only on the fairness 
of their rules, but also on how each person is fairing within them. 
For both Sen and Nussbaum, there is a crucial distinction between promoting the 
capabilities themselves, and forcing their functionings. The Capabilities Approach does 
not aim to impose external standards on what, as political philosophers say, ‘visions of 
the good life’ should be.  The approach does aim that parties with power (governments, 
international law, multi-national corporations, and development organizations) should 
enact policies which make it possible that each person has the choice to fulfill their 
capabilities in the best ways they see fit.  That is, the preconditions for the ability to make 
these choices must be in place.  In fact, this vision of justice demands that these 
preconditions of possibility be present in each person’s life. The difference between 
capabilities and forced functionings is best captured in the distinction between fasting and 
starving.   A policy in line with the capabilities approach would mandate that a 
government bear a responsibility to make sure its people do not starve, that is, to make 
sure it is possible that each person has the full choice to fulfill their capability of bodily 
health.  But a policy would not force this capability of bodily health to function; for 
example, if someone, decided that being a religious ascetic was a meaningful path of life, 
they could practice their religious beliefs freely and choose to fast, that is, not to ‘force 
the functioning of the capability of bodily health.’  The important thing is that they would 
have a choice in the matter. 
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The capabilities approach is grounded in the tenets of freedom as choice, and, as 
Nussbaum describes, ‘The intuitive and widely shared idea of human dignity.’  Further, 
she writes, “If it is true that a society is not minimally just unless it has given people the 
preconditions of a life worthy of human dignity, then it is incumbent on political actors to 
figure out what that life requires.”334 While Sen theorizes notions of freedoms 
extensively, the approach, in both Sen and Nussbaum’s iterations, refrains from 
theorizing a robust notion of dignity.  They leave the idea of dignity intentionally vague, 
because they are trying to consider dignity within the framework of an overlapping 
consensus. Such a consensus is not a specific and concrete idea of dignity that could 
alienate any one religious or cultural tradition, but a loosely defined term that grounds, 
describes, and forms the project of the capabilities approach as a whole, a term that 
leaves open the possibility that reasonable people, holding different metaphysical pictures 
of the good life, could adopt without conflict to their rich and individual belief systems. 
(The capabilities approach may according to some interpretations be a little more specific 
than that, but not by great lengths.)   
We need the idea of dignity, more specifically, to ground the approach, because a 
principle or idea of dignity advances agency and empowerment in ways that ideas like 
‘satisfaction’ do not.  People can be passive recipients of ‘satisfactions’, but the idea of 
dignity is about what a person can be or do, in accordance with the possibilities before 
her.What I have done in this project is to ‘fill in’ a notion of dignity that can be especially 
useful for the capabilities approach.  I have given a historical genealogy of the term 
‘dignity’ which traces it back to the Roman institution of slavery.  In doing so, I have 
shown how we can use an, or the, idea of dignity in such a way that it functions as a 
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protection against economic alienation, given that slavery is a (perhaps the original) 
paradigm of economic exploitation and alienation. 
The Capabilities Approach is a response to the instrumentalization of poor people 
in the Global South.  But it is not quite an adequate response to the alienation and 
exploitation of people in the GSUS.  If it is true that the GSUS constitute a new human 
condition, as I have claimed, then the Capabilities Approach must respond to the GSUS 
residents as a specific phenomena—and take into account gendered economic 
exploitation that neoliberal reforms instituted.  Otherwise, the capabilities at issue could 
merely be used in service of expansion of capital markets.  The capabilities themselves 
are no guarantee against exploitation.  One could say that women’s reason, affiliations, 
and bodily integrity are good because they serve the good of her broader community, or 
her respective nation-state === and/or because they serve her.  The capabilities approach 
is right to emphasize the dignity of each person.  But the approach itself does not give 
enough content to its notion of dignity in order that it function against exploitation.  My 
work helps the approach on these fronts. 
The preceding chapters have filled the theoretical and practical gaps in the 
Capabilities Approach.  First, the approach gestures toward Marxist and Aristotelian 
origins without explaining these origins, in detail.  I have shown, here, how global 
poverty is not only a matter of alienated labor as such, but a matter of that labor not 
producing a world, a place from which people can speak and act.  The first precondition 
of a ‘world’ is basic housing and infrastructure.  The problem with positing that women’s 
increased labor will necessarily bring them out of poverty is that their constant labor does 
not necessarily translate into their own assets, or private property.  
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Further, the Capabilities Approach does have Aristotelian origins, in so far as it 
has a robust vision of human flourishing.  But Aristotle can do even more work for 
capability theorists. The capabilities approach needs to include a vision of justice that 
comes from Aristotle’s notion of distributive justice, a forward-looking, community-
oriented justice instead of a past-regarding just that aims to mend former harms.   
Any viable alternatives to neoliberal development must begin and end with a 
principled, universal commitment to people’s dignity.  This principled, universal 
commitment replaces the prevalent logic of utility, and consider all people, poor women 
included, as ends in themselves, and not means to some other valued goal.  To hold to 
this principle would mean that women’s wellbeing and freedom, along with their dignity 
and self-respect, cannot be subsumed under the service of some greater goal, even if that 
goal is a good one, like feeding the family or decreasing national debt.  Women should be 
seen not as a means to achieve the goals of multinational enterprises, NGOs, or 
governments, but should be considered, in policy and practice, as ends in themselves, 
their own human flourishing seen as the value toward which all other values are the 
means. 
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